【正文】 D and product introduction strategies can bring China’s panies into this game. 　　Conclusion The Five Guiding Principles of Marketing for Chinese Firms: 　　 marketing strategy on building brand value 　　 strategically, not tactically 　　 distribution strategy in line with the long term brand plans 　　 customerfocused Ramp。 3) The difficulty of cementing and enforcing adherence to dealer agreements. With respect to the first factor, business should think of China as a country more like Europe than the United States. Europe has a mercial diversity based upon regional cultures, laws, tastes and power structures that is only gradually assimilating through political and media forces. By contrast, the United States is a remarkably homogeneous marketplace.　 　　The second factor is even more inhibiting. China does not have an integrated transportation infrastructure to support a national distribution network. Domestic panies, like Tsingtao Brewery have solved this problem by acquiring 22 local breweries from Shenzhen in the south to Beijing in the North. These breweries are producing and locally distributing the flagship brand, as well as lower priced labels. By contrast, foreign breweries like Fosters and AnheuserBusch have failed because they constructed enormous production facilities to deliver a volume of production that exceeded the capabilities of the logistical infrastructure. Foreign panies, like Pepsi, are learning to set up intricate makeshift connection points between logistical and distribution nodes, in order to gets its product to smaller cities and rural areas.　 　　The challenge to marketers goes beyond branding products, which is tough enough to do in China, to the issue of getting product to market. In some industries strategic marketing has to master a region, before moving on to the next region. Is national mass marketing right for a new brand, or is it premature? The mistakes of AnheuserBusch and Whirlpool tell us that national brands may need to start out with a more regional focus. 　　The third factor goes to the heart of building powerful regional and national markets. Goods get to market only when dealers are assured a steady source and consistent quality of supply.　And suppliers are assured that dealers will adhere to stipulations of a distribution agreement. The administration of mercial law and the bona fides of personal relationships sustain this mutuality.　 　　Durawool, Inc. an American pany, contracted with Chinas Metallurgical Zuhai Sez United to produce choppedwool fibers for automotive brake pads.　Durawool would market this product to brake manufacturers outside China. Zuhai executives signed a nondisclosure agreement to protect Durawool’s manufacturing process. Subsequently, a key manager who did not personally sign the nondisclosure left Zuhai and started his own pany using Durawool’s process. The new pany, Sonny Steel Wool Ltd, municated a lower price offer to Durawool’s customers in the . Sonny’s CEO thought his operation was legitimate since he did not personally sign the nondisclosure agreement. Durawool thought it was violated. A case to enjoin Sunny Wool from export is before the . courts. This is where most breakdowns in distribution agreements end up (NYTimes, May 28, 1996).　 　　China supports effective channel structures in some industries. A good case in point is Samsung. Samsung developed its distribution strategy for its monitor business in China with a Channel Building team. Instead of establishing agent dealers in separate cities, it set up general agencies in seven administrative districts of China, including Beijing, Shenyang, Shangai, Nanjing, Wuhan, Xian, Chonquing, Chengdu, Fuzou and Guangzhou. It recruited ten regional managers for this geographic structure and another ten managers for vertical segments in different industries. Each regional agency works with several distributors who in turn have subdistributors that serve exclusive regional territories. This organization is the strongest channel management structure in the monitor industry. It has enabled Samsung to bee the number one producer of monitors in China (China Business Weekly, December 8, 2000).　 　　Samsung’s extensive product line, local manufacturing capability, and painstakingly built national brand all support the costs of an extensive distribution system. The product line, in particular, supports the distribution investment by permitting a cost effective, focused offering to each major region and city. By contrast, Sony has so far created only a niche for itself in China. The Sony brand is an aspirational brand with excellent connotations of quality and prestige. But this serves only a small portion of the market, and the product line offered in China is relatively small. Hence, the Sony distribution system consists of only two general agencies who focus their efforts on the premier urban markets. Sony will benefit in the long run as it extends its highend image down to the middle of the market, and the distribution system will be built out gradually. 　　Pricing: 　　For years Chinese brands have been waging a price war. Profitability has been driven down in industries like appliances, television, and puting equipment. Leading Chinese brands threatened by foreign petitors have used price cuts to maintain their dominance,　while overproductive industries like appliances have suffered through a “natural selection” process prior to the expected consolidation around 23 domestic brands. Building market share through pricing actions is definitively a major part of the petitive game.　 The strategic question in the midst of a price war is: “how do we position ourselves to own both shareofmarket and shareofheart as the war es to a close?” The big question following in the wake of any price war is: “how can we convince our customers to begin paying for brand value again?” 　　After twenty years of rapid development, China ha