【導(dǎo)讀】和體制環(huán)境下的影響。高管薪酬的研究大都集中在委托代理框架上，并承擔(dān)一種行政獎勵。和業(yè)績成果之間的關(guān)系。我們提出了一個框架，審查了其組織的背景和潛在的互補性方面。的行政補償和不同的公司治理在不同的企業(yè)和國家水平上體現(xiàn)的替代效應(yīng)。執(zhí)行不同補償政策方法的影響，像“軟法律”和“硬法律”。系的薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)，包括很大一部分的股權(quán)激勵。因此，高管補償?shù)慕?jīng)濟影響的研究已經(jīng)成為。公司治理內(nèi)部激烈爭論的一個話題。正如Bruce，Buck，和Main指出，“近年來，關(guān)于高。管報酬的文獻的增長速度可以與高管報酬增長本身相匹敵。酬的不同組成部分產(chǎn)生的組織結(jié)果的時候。因此，經(jīng)理作為股東的代理人可以從事對自己有利的行為而損害股東財富。影響積極組織結(jié)果的主要指標(biāo)是付費業(yè)績敏感性，但是這種“封。并未能證明重要的影響。聯(lián)合的相互依存關(guān)系。管補償?shù)挠行钥赡苋Q于其他因素，如大股東的參與和董事會的獨立性。們不受監(jiān)管機構(gòu)和股東對自己的約束。

　　

【正文】 le factors acting in isolation. The main points of departure between the ―traditional‖ agencybased aproaches to executive pensation and our conceptual framework, which is grounded inanizational theory and synthesizes various empirical findings through a relatively parsimonious set of constructs. This approach is aimed at better understanding the interdependence between executive remuneration practices and the anizational and institutional environment in which these practices are conducted. These specific constructs are anizational context, plementarity/ substitution with a corporate governance ―bundle,‖ and institutional effects. In short, we claim that the anizational effectiveness of executive incentives does not have a direct and linear effect on performance as suggested by mainstream agency research. This effect is contingent on a number of firmlevel and macro factors that are, as a rule, not accounted for in the vast majority of studies. In the following sections we attempt to discuss these important contingency factors and their potential effects on the effectiveness and efficiency of executive pensation schemes. Organizational Context Organization theorists have examined how the effect of anizational (―structural‖) characteristics on effectiveness or performance may be mediated or influenced by contextual variables, such as task uncertainty, task interdependence, and anizational dynamics (Donaldson, 2021。 Filatotchev, Toms, amp。 Wright, 2021). Although executive pensation might be considered as a structural governance characteristic within this framework, anization theory has not elaborated with regard to the effectiveness of this form of corporate governance. Here we build on previous research and examine how the effectiveness of incentive mechanisms may be mediated by an important category of anizational contingencies, namely the resources and capabilities that shape firms’ interdependencies with different anizational environments (see Aguilera et al.,2021, for a more detailed discussion). One aspect of resourcerelated contingencies is grounded in the resourcebased view of the firm, which takes into account its resources and capabilities, such as skills, knowledge, and ability to innovate (Barney, 1991). A further aspect of resource related contingencies es from resource dependency theory, which suggests that firms will respond to demands made by external actors or anizations upon whose resources they are heavily dependent, but also that anizations may seek to buffer against or minimize that external dependence (Pfeffer amp。 Salancik, 1978). For example, the degree and nature of external finance is likely to influence the demands placed on corporate governance to ensure accountability and incentive alignment. Organizational context considerations thus imply that the role and effects of incentive schemes are likely to differ in ways contingent upon both the external and internal resources that are critical within the context of the firms’ anizational, market, sectoral, or regulatory contexts. In other words, the effectiveness of executive incentives may depend on the firm’s size or age, the phases of growth or decline in the pany’s development, and the character of innovation in different markets and sectors, among many other factors (Aguilera et al., 2021). While an anizational perspective rejects the notion of universal best practices (Donaldson, 2021), it also suggests that policy will be more effective if it takes into account the potential diversity of anizational contexts. In short, a onesizefitsall approach is undesirable. There is an increasing recognition in management research that the anizational resource base and its interdependence with external environments are not static, but an integral part of anizational dynamics. The application of a contingencybased concept of corporate governance has been developed within an emerging body of research on the life cycle of corporate governance (Filatotchev et al., 2021。 Filatotchev amp。 Wright 2021). This literature identifies a number of stages in the development of the firm and links them with changes in the extent and nature of agency conflicts that require governance remedies, including incentive alignment. Corporate governance is viewed here as a dynamic system whereby governance practices may address changing sets of environmental interdependencies throughout the different stages of the OLC, such as startup, growth, maturity, and decline. Figure 1illustrates this theoretical framework. Over the OLC stages, firms may evolve from having a very narrow resource base to having a more extensive and heterogeneous resource base. This transition may require at least temporary reliance on external resources. Providers of these external resources create new corporate governance demands to ensure that wealth is not only created but also distributed fairly in terms of each factor provider, whether these are shareholders or other stakeholders. This is reflected in changes in accountability of the firm’s management to external resource providers (Filatotchev et al., 2021). In the early stages of the OLC (Quadrant 1 of Figure 1), the entrepreneurial firm has a narrow resource base. It is usually owned and controlled by a tightly knit group of foundermanagers and/or family investors, with the level of managerial accountability to external shareholders generally low. In this context, a substantial portion of the foundermanagers’ wealth is linked to the firm, which questions the appropriateness or may even undermine the effectiveness of equitybased incentive schemes, in line with arguments developed by Core and Guay (2021). As the firm grows, it requires access to external resources and expertise that may fuel and support this growth, and it opens up its governance system to external inves