公司價(jià)值評(píng)估與價(jià)值管理-資料下載頁(yè)
2025-02-08 09:05本頁(yè)面
【正文】 % 6% Sales1 銷售收入 1 $1,050 $1,060 $1,050 $1,060 NOPAT1稅后凈營(yíng)業(yè)利潤(rùn) 1 $63 $ $42 $ EROIC0預(yù)計(jì)的投資收益 % % % % MVA市場(chǎng)附加值 () () Analysis of Growth Strategies 銷售增長(zhǎng)戰(zhàn)略的分析 ? The expected ROIC of Division A is less than the WACC, so the division should postpone growth efforts until it improves EROIC by reducing capital requirements (., reducing inventory) and/or improving profitability. A部門的預(yù)計(jì)投資收益要低于加權(quán)平均資金成本，所以該部門應(yīng)推遲采取銷售增長(zhǎng) 策略，等到其通過(guò)減少資金占用（例如減少存貨）而改善預(yù)計(jì)投資收益，以及 /或改善獲利能力以后再采取相應(yīng)行動(dòng)。 ? The expected ROIC of Division B is greater than the WACC, so the division should continue with its growth plans. B部門的預(yù)計(jì)投資收益要高于加權(quán)平均資金成本，所以該部門應(yīng)續(xù)執(zhí)行銷售增長(zhǎng)計(jì)劃。 Two Primary Mechanisms of Corporate Governance 公司治理的兩個(gè)基本機(jī)制 ? “ Stick” “大棒” ? Provisions in the charter that affect takeovers. 公司章程中影響接管的條款 ? Composition of the board of directors. 董事會(huì)的構(gòu)成 ? “Carrot: Compensation plans. “胡蘿卜”：補(bǔ)償計(jì)劃 Entrenched Management 僵化管理 ? Occurs when there is little chance that poorly performing managers will be replaced. 如果業(yè)績(jī)不好的經(jīng)理被替換的可能性很小，那么就會(huì)出現(xiàn)僵化管理。 ? Two causes: 兩個(gè)原因： ? Antitakeover provisions in the charter 公司章程中的反接管條款 ? Weak board of directors 董事會(huì)軟弱 How are entrenched managers harmful to shareholders? 難以觸動(dòng)的經(jīng)理人員如何損害股東的利益？ ? Management consumes perks: 管理層享受額外待遇： ? Lavish offices and corporate jets 豪華的辦公室和企業(yè)公務(wù)飛機(jī) ? Excessively large staffs 龐大、臃腫的員工隊(duì)伍 ? Memberships at country clubs 鄉(xiāng)村俱樂(lè)部的成員資格 ? Management accepts projects (or acquisitions) to make firm larger, even if MVA goes down. 管理層接受某些項(xiàng)目（或收購(gòu)某些項(xiàng)目），使得公司規(guī)模越來(lái)越大，即使市場(chǎng)增加價(jià)值 MVA越來(lái)越低。 AntiTakeover Provisions 反接管條款 ? Targeted share repurchases (., greenmail) 有目的的回購(gòu)股票（例如綠色郵件） ? Shareholder rights provisions (., poison pills) 股東權(quán)利條款（例如毒丸術(shù)） ? Restricted voting rights plans 限制投票權(quán)計(jì)劃 Board of Directors董事會(huì) ? Weak boards have many insiders (., those who also have another position in the pany) pared with outsiders. 在軟弱的董事會(huì)中，企業(yè)內(nèi)部人員（也就是同時(shí)在公司中擁有其他職務(wù)的那些人）的數(shù)量與企業(yè)外部人員的數(shù)量相比太多。 ? Interlocking boards are weaker (CEO of pany A sits on board of pany B, CEO of B sits on board of A). 內(nèi)部鎖定董事（ A公司的首席執(zhí)行官同時(shí)任 B公司的董事，而 B公司的首席執(zhí)行官也兼任 A公司的董事 ） 過(guò)多的董事會(huì)比較軟弱。 Stock Options in Compensation Plans 補(bǔ)償計(jì)劃中的股票期權(quán) ? Gives owner of option the right to buy a share of the pany’s stock at a specified price (called the exercise price) even if the actual stock price is higher. 給予期權(quán)擁有者以一定的價(jià)格（執(zhí)行價(jià)格）購(gòu)買該公司股票的權(quán)利，即使該股票的實(shí)際市場(chǎng)價(jià)格高于執(zhí)行價(jià)格。 ? Usually can’t exercise the option for several years (called the vesting period). 期權(quán)擁有者通常在幾年內(nèi)（稱為授予期或等待期）不能行使該權(quán)利。 Stock Options (Cont.) 股票期權(quán)（續(xù)） ? Can’t exercise the option after a certain number of years (called the expiration, or maturity, date). 在約定時(shí)間（稱為有效期或到期日）后不能行使該權(quán)利。
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