【正文】 6。 Andres and Lehman, 2010)?！　、谟袝r從一個團體傳遞信息于另一個團體，僅僅依賴于兩團體中各有一名成員互相認識，而形成的唯一的一條通路，這條唯一的信息通路就被稱為“橋”。(Granovetter，1973)?！　、跥ranovetter(1973)主張從認識時間的長短、互動頻率、親密程度和互惠交換程度四個方面來測量聯(lián)結力度的強弱?！　、苋敉粋€董事在某一個公司擔任獨立董事，在另一個公司擔任內部董事，我們把其列入獨立董事樣本組。　?、荼疚闹饕治龆妈偳对诙戮W絡中的社會資本，他們其他類型社會關系可獲取的社會資本不在研究主題范圍內?！　、轐ilduff and Krackhardt(1994)也發(fā)現(xiàn)如果個體被認為在組織中擁有一位聲名顯赫的朋友，會提升該個體作為好的工作執(zhí)行者的聲望，盡管實際上擁有這樣的朋友可能并沒有這樣的效果，這就是認知平衡理論(Cognitive Balance Theory)的體現(xiàn)?！　、呗曂?prestige)在社會學著作中用來代表位置的地位(如職業(yè)聲望)和個人的地位。社會聲望的獲得有很多渠道，我們討論獨立董事因與擁有更多網絡關系和更核心網絡結構而獲得的鑲嵌在董事網絡中的聲望，但并不意味著如果此種類型的聲望低，那么獨立董事的整個社會聲望就低，因為還存在著其他聲望獲取的渠道?！　、嗨^無向圖，即行動者的關系沒有方向，舉個例子：A到B的聯(lián)結關系跟B到A的聯(lián)結關系是一樣的。我們認為董事和董事之間的聯(lián)結關系是互相平等的，并沒有方向上的差別?！　、嵘鐣袨榈摹半p向性”是指，根據(jù)每個參與者的正常預期，他們各自的意向互相是“相應的”，而不是單邊關系(，1984)。　?、饨輳?geodesics)：圖論(graph theory)中的概念，就是兩個結點之間最短的路徑。而路徑是所有結點和所有線都沒有重復的途徑?！　　緟⒖嘉墨I】　　[1]、(香港).　　[2]林南著，：：世紀出版集團和上海人民出版社.　　[3]盧昌崇，：，5：5262.　　[4](第二版).北京：社會科學文獻出版社.　　[5]，12：3236.　　[6]吳增基，吳鵬森，(第三版).上海：上海人民出版社.　　[7]、關系信任還是關系認同——，1：97102.　　[8]Andres, C., Lehmann, M. 2010. Is busy really busy? Board governance revisited. Working paper. University of Mannheim.　　[9]Barnea, A., Guedj, I. 2009. Director networks. Working Paper. University of Texas at Austin.　　[10]Bonacich, P. 1972. Factoring and weighting approaches to status scores and clique identification. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 2:113120.　　[11]Bouwman, 2011. Corporate governance propagation through overlapping directors. Review of Finance Studies. 24(11): 23582394.　　[12]Burt, R. S. 1992. Structure holes: The social structure of petition. Orlando: Academic Press.　　[13]Burt, R. S. 1997. The contingent value of social capital. Administrative Science Quarterly. 42: 339365.　　[14]Cashman, G. D., Gillan, S. L., Whitby, R. 2010. Expertise, connections, and the labor market for corporate directors: Is it what you know or who you know? Working Paper. Texas Tech University.　　[15]Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., Malloy, C. 2008. The small world of investing: Board connections and mutual fund returns. Journal of Political Economy. 116(5): 951979.　　[16]Fich, E. M., Shivdasani, A. 2006. Are busy boards effective monitors? The Journal of Finance, 2:689724.　　[17]Fracassi, C. 2008. Corporate finance policies and social networks. Working paper, UCLA.　　[18]Freeman, L. 1979. Centrality in social networks: Conceptual clarification. Social Networks, 1:215239.　　[19]Granovetter, M. 1973. The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology. 78: 13601380.　　[20]Granovetter, M. 1985. Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. American Journal of Sociology, 91(3): 481510.　　[21]Hochberg, Y., Ljungqvist, A., Lu, Y. 2007. Whom you know matters: Venture capital networks and investment performance. The Journal of Finance. 62: 251301.　　[22]Kilduff, M., Krackhardt, D. 1994. Bringing the individual back in: A structural analysis of the internal market for reputation in organizations. Academy of Management Journal. 37(1): 87108.　　[23]Kilduff, M., Tsai, W. 2003. Social networks and organizations. London: Sage Publications Ltd.　　[24]Kuhnen, C. M. 2009. Business networks, corporate governance, and contracting in the mutual fund industry. Journal of Finance. 5: 21852220.　　[25]Larcker, D. F., So, E. C., Wang, C. C. Y. 2010. Boardroom centrality and stock returns. Working Paper. Stanford University.　　[26]Lin, N. 1982. Social resources and instrumental action. In social structure and network analysis, edited by Marsdon P. V. and N. Lin. CA: Beverly Hills, Sage.　　[27]Lin, N. 2002. Social capital: A theory of social structure and action. Cambridge University Press.　　[28]Scott, J. 2000. Social network analysis: A handbook. 2nd edition. Sage Publications.　　[29]Wasserman, S., Faust, K. 1994. Social network analysis: Methods and applications. NY: Cambridge University Press.29 / 29