新公司法國(guó)際財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告準(zhǔn)則的采用應(yīng)計(jì)-資料下載頁(yè)
2024-09-02 11:37本頁(yè)面
【導(dǎo)讀】新公司法、IFRS的強(qiáng)制采用及應(yīng)計(jì)與真實(shí)盈余管理?計(jì)盈余管理空間得到了抑制，但伴隨著的是費(fèi)用方面真實(shí)盈余管理的增加。務(wù)報(bào)告準(zhǔn)則趨同的新會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則在我國(guó)強(qiáng)制實(shí)施以后，公司的應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理增加了，與此同時(shí)，這可能表明，應(yīng)計(jì)與真實(shí)盈余管理是公司的一套盈余管理組合。反之，當(dāng)應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理的成本降低以后，公司就會(huì)減少所需成本較高。研究了在美國(guó)規(guī)則導(dǎo)向會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則的前提下，法律對(duì)應(yīng)計(jì)與真實(shí)盈余管理的影響，自愿采用有助于抑制公司的應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理行為。余管理影響的問(wèn)題，目前還尚無(wú)相關(guān)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)。計(jì)失敗規(guī)定了民事賠償責(zé)任的條款，比舊公司法的相關(guān)規(guī)定更為嚴(yán)厲。另一方面，從2020年1月1日，我國(guó)上市公司被要求強(qiáng)制采。律對(duì)真實(shí)與應(yīng)計(jì)盈余管理的影響的情況。性統(tǒng)計(jì)，第四部分是實(shí)證結(jié)果分析，第五部分是結(jié)論與總結(jié)。由于管理層試圖誤導(dǎo)一些股東，以使其相信公司通過(guò)正常經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)達(dá)到了既定的財(cái)務(wù)目標(biāo)，通過(guò)偏離正常經(jīng)營(yíng)情況的真實(shí)經(jīng)營(yíng)活動(dòng)來(lái)操縱利潤(rùn)的行為。
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