【導(dǎo)讀】前，我們僅透過權(quán)益法按投資比例認(rèn)列藍(lán)籌郵票的淨(jìng)值與收益。我們內(nèi)部從來就不使用這樣的報表進(jìn)行分析管理。營者的角度為各位分析各個營利單位的表現(xiàn)。

　　

【正文】 llion at cost, and $ million at market. There were equities of identifiably excellent panies available but very few at interesting prices. (An irresistible footnote: in 1971, pension fund managers invested a record 122% of funds available in equities at full prices they couldn’t buy enough of them. In 1974, after the bottom had fallen out, they mitted a then record low of 21% to stocks.) 只有當(dāng)以下條件都符合時，我們才會想要將保險公司大部分的資金投入到股票投資之 上： (1)我們可以了解的行業(yè) (2)具有長期競爭力 (3)由才德兼具的人士所經(jīng)營 (4)吸引人 的價格，我們常?？梢哉业揭恍┓?(1)(2)(3)項條件的投資標(biāo)的，但第(4)項往往讓我 們止步，舉例來說， 1971 年 Berkshire 所有股票的投資成本累計為1,070 萬美元， 市價則為 1,170 萬美元，市場上確實有不少好股票，只是他們的價格通常也不便宜， (講到這裡，我不得不補(bǔ)充， 1971 年全體退休基金經(jīng)理人將可運(yùn)用資金的 122%投資 在高 價股票之上，甚至還嫌不夠，但到了 1974 年，當(dāng)股市大幅回檔時，他們投資在 股票的比例卻降到 21%的歷史新低點(diǎn) ) The past few years have been a different story for us. At the end of 1975 our insurance subsidiaries held mon equities with a market value exactly equal to cost of $ million. At the end of 1978 this position had been increased to equities (including a convertible preferred) with a cost of $ million and a market value of $ million. During the intervening three years we also had realized pretax gains from mon equities of approximately $ million. Therefore, our overall unrealized and realized pretax gains in equities for the three year period came to approximately $112 million. During this same interval the DowJones Industrial Average declined from 852 to 805. It was a marvelous period for the valueoriented equity buyer. 然而過去幾年的情況完全相反， 1975 年底我們旗下保險事業(yè)持有的股票市值與 3,930 萬美元的成本相當(dāng)，到了 1978 年底股票部位 (包含可轉(zhuǎn)換特別股 )的投資成本 增加為 億美元，市價則為 億美元，在這中間的三年內(nèi)，我們另外還實 現(xiàn)了 2,470 萬美元的資本利得，換句話說，這三年間，我們已實現(xiàn)與未實現(xiàn)的稅前資 本利得達(dá)到 億美元，相較之下道瓊指數(shù)在同一期間卻由 852 點(diǎn)跌至 805點(diǎn)，對 於 價值型投資人來說，這真是一段美好的歲月。 We continue to find for our insurance portfolios small portions of really outstanding businesses that are available, through the auction pricing mechanism of security markets, at prices dramatically cheaper than the valuations inferior businesses mand on negotiated sales. 未來我們?nèi)詫⒊掷m(xù)為旗下的保險公司尋找真正優(yōu)秀的事業(yè)，透過證券市場拍賣的價格 機(jī)制，以比協(xié)議買進(jìn)整家公司更便宜的價錢，取得一小部份的股權(quán)。 This program of acquisition of small fractions of businesses (mon stocks) at bargain prices, for which little enthusiasm exists, contrasts sharply with general corporate acquisition activity, for which much enthusiasm exists. It seems quite clear to us that either corporations are making very significant mistakes in purchasing entire businesses at prices prevailing in negotiated transactions and takeover bids, or that we eventually are going to make considerable sums of money buying small portions of such businesses at the greatly discounted valuations prevailing in the stock market. (A second footnote: in 1978 pension managers, a group that logically should maintain the longest of investment perspectives, put only 9% of available funds into equities breaking the record low figure set in 1974 and tied in 1977.) 這種以劃算的價格取得部份所有權(quán) (即股票 )的計畫，雖然不像透過談判購併整家公司 那麼有趣，但我們相當(dāng)清楚，以目前的市場情況，很多公司因為透過 協(xié)議談判的方式， 犯了明顯的錯誤，相較之下，我們以劃算的價格買進(jìn)不少公司的部份所有權(quán)，反而賺 了不少錢， (第二次補(bǔ)充， 1978 年許多退休基金經(jīng)理人，原本最應(yīng)該採取長期投資做 法的一群人，平均只將 9%的資金擺在股票之上，創(chuàng)下比 1974 年更低的比例 )。 We are not concerned with whether the market quickly revalues upward securities that we believe are selling at bargain prices. In fact, we prefer just the opposite since, in most years, we expect to have funds available to be a buyer of securities. And consistent attractive purchasing is likely to prove to be of more eventual benefit to us than any selling opportunities provided by a shortterm run up in stock prices to levels at which we are unwilling to continue buying. 我們並不在乎市場是否會立即反應(yīng)這些股價被低估的股票，事實上，我們寧願價格不 要反應(yīng)，因為通常我們不斷會有資金流入以供我們進(jìn)場投資，持續(xù)不斷以便宜的價格 買進(jìn)最終將證明比趁短期股價上揚(yáng)出脫持股所賺取的利益更多。 Our policy is to concentrate holdings. We try to avoid buying a little of this or that when we are only lukewarm about the business or its price. When we are convinced as to attractiveness, we believe in buying worthwhile amounts. 我們的投資策略是集中持股，我們試著盡量不要這也買一點(diǎn)，那也買一點(diǎn)，因為那樣 會使得我們對於被投資的產(chǎn)業(yè)漠不關(guān)心，當(dāng)我們覺得價格合理，我們就會一口氣大量 地買進(jìn)。 Equity holdings of our insurance panies with a market value of over $8 million on December 31, 1978 were as follows: 以下是 1978 年年底，我們旗下保險公司持股市價超過 800 萬美元的投資： No. of Shares Company Cost Market (000s omitted) 246,450 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. ... $ 6,082 $ 8,626 1,294,308 Government Employees Insurance Company Common Stock ......................... 4,116 9,060 1,986,953 Government Employees Insurance Company Convertible Preferred ................ 19,417 28,314 592,650 Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. .... 4,531 19,039 1,066,934 Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation 18,085 18,671 453,800 KnightRidder Newspapers, Inc. .......... 7,534 10,267 953,750 SAFECO Corporation ...................... 23,867 26,467 934,300 The Washington Post Company ............. 10,628 43,445 Total ................................... $ 94,260 $163,889 All Other Holdings ...................... 39,506 57,040 Total Equities .......................... $133,766 $220,929 ======= ======= In some cases our indirect interest in earning power is being quite substantial. For example, note our holdings of 953,750 shares of SAFECO Corp. SAFECO probably is the best run large property and casualty insurance pany in the United States. Their underwriting abilities are simply superb, their loss reserving is conservative, and their investment policies make great sense. 在某些情況下，我們間接持股的獲利能力變得相當(dāng)?shù)拇螅e例來說，像是我們持有的 953,750 股的 SAFECO股票，該公司大概是目前全美最優(yōu)秀的大型產(chǎn)物意外險公司， 他們的核保能力無與倫比，他們的損失準(zhǔn)備提列相當(dāng)保守，而他們的投資策略也相當(dāng) 合理。 SAFECO is a much better insurance operation than our o