【正文】 nd its cost over time.讓我開始討論我們的四大部分業(yè)務(wù)。首先我們從我們最核心的保險開始。在保險業(yè)務(wù)中浮存數(shù)量及其時間成本意義重大。For new readers, let me explain. “Float” is money that doesn’t belong to us but that we temporarily hold. Most of our float arises because (1) premiums are paid upfront though the service we provide – insurance protection – is delivered over a period that usually covers a year and。 (2) loss events that occur today do not always result in our immediately paying claims, because it sometimes takes many years for losses to be reported (asbestos losses would be an example), negotiated and settled. The $20 million of float that came with our 1967 entry into insurance has now increased – both by way of internal growth and acquisitions – to $49 billion.考慮到我的新讀者，我需要解釋一下浮存金(Float)。保險公司的浮存金是一筆雖然不屬于我們所有但卻可暫時為我們所用的資金。我們的浮存金增加的兩個主要原因是：(1)在保險業(yè)務(wù)中，我們先收取保費，卻通常在1年左右的一定期限之后才提供保險服務(wù)；(2)目前發(fā)生的損失不代表我們馬上就要理賠，其原因在于損害從發(fā)現(xiàn)、調(diào)解到最終解決有時需要經(jīng)過好幾年時間(比如石棉訴訟案[2]就是很好的例子)。1967年我們的保險浮存金為2,000萬美元，經(jīng)過多年的內(nèi)部成長及外部并購，已經(jīng)增長如今的490億美元之巨。Float is wonderful – if it doesn’t e at a high price. Its cost is determined by underwriting results, meaning how the expenses and losses we will ultimately pay pare with the premiums we have received. When an insurer earns an underwriting profit – as has been the case at Berkshire in about half of the 39 years we have been in the insurance business – float is better than free. In such years, we are actually paid for holding other people’s money. For most insurers, however, life has been far more difficult: In aggregate, the propertycasualty industry almost invariably operates at an underwriting loss. When that loss is large, float bees expensive, sometimes devastatingly so.浮存金確是一大好事，但前提是價格不能太高。其成本取決于承保的結(jié)果，也就是說我們的費用和最終承擔的損失與我們收取的保費對比后的結(jié)果。當一家保險公司獲得承保利潤時，就像伯克希爾過去38年來多半年份的的保險業(yè)務(wù)那樣，浮存金的成本甚至低于零成本。在這些年度，我們實際上是持有客戶的資金還要向他們收費。然而對于其它大部份的保險同業(yè)來說，日子卻過得非常艱難：總體而言，財產(chǎn)意外險通常不可避免會發(fā)生承保損失，當損失很大時，他們就必須為浮存金支付代價，有時甚至是毀滅性的代價。In 2004 our float cost us less than nothing, and I told you that we had a chance – absent a megacatastrophe – of nocost float in 2005. But we had the megacat, and as a specialist in that coverage, Berkshire suffered hurricane losses of $ billion. Nevertheless, our float was costless in 2005 because of the superb results we had in our other insurance activities, particularly at GEICO. 2004年我們的浮存金成本低于零，即負成本，我曾告訴大家，除非發(fā)生超級巨大災(zāi)難，2005年我們會有機會使浮存金成本為零。遺憾的是，作為承保超級巨大災(zāi)難保險的專家，我們確實上遭遇了超級巨大災(zāi)難，由于颶風(fēng)伯克希爾推動了34億美元。盡管如此我們的浮存金仍然無需支付任何成本，這主要是由于我們其它保險業(yè)務(wù)尤其是GEICO的杰出經(jīng)營所創(chuàng)造的超級成果。* * * * * * * * * * * * Auto policies in force grew by % at GEICO, a gain increasing its market share of . private passenger auto business from about % to about %. Auto insurance is a big business: Each sharepoint equates to $ billion in sales. %，% %。汽車保險市場規(guī)模巨大，市場份額每增長1%相當于銷售增長16億美元。While our brand strength is not quantifiable, I believe it also grew significantly. When Berkshire acquired control of GEICO in 1996, its annual advertising expenditures were $31 million. Last year we were up to $502 million. And I can’t wait to spend more.盡管我們的品牌力量無法計量，但我相信同樣顯著增長。1996年伯克希爾完全控股GEICO時，其年均廣告費支出為3100萬美元。，而且我們迫不及待要繼續(xù)增加投入。Our advertising works because we have a great story to tell: More people can save money by insuring with us than is the case with any other national carrier offering policies to all ers. (Some specialized auto insurers do particularly well for applicants fitting into their niches。 also, because our national petitors use rating systems that differ from ours, they will sometimes beat our price.) Last year, we achieved by far the highest conversion rate – the percentage of internet and phone quotes turned into sales – in our history. This is powerful evidence that our prices are more attractive relative to the petition than ever before. Test us by going to or by calling 8008477536. Be sure to indicate you are a shareholder because that fact will often qualify you for a discount. 我們的廣告之所以有效，是因為我們講述了一個非常好的故事：與在其它任何一家向所有客戶提供汽車保險服務(wù)的全國性保險公司相比，更多的人在GEICO公司投保汽車險能省不少錢。(一些專業(yè)汽車保險公司的確在其擅長領(lǐng)域向申請人提供特別良好的服務(wù)；同樣，由于我們的全國性競爭對手運用不同的分類系統(tǒng)，所以有時能提供比我們更好的價格。)2004年我們獲得了迄今為止的歷史最高轉(zhuǎn)化比率，即網(wǎng)絡(luò)和電話定單轉(zhuǎn)化為銷售的比率。這正是我們的價格與競爭對手相比現(xiàn)在比以前更加有吸引力的一個強有力的證據(jù)。請訪問 。記住一定說明你是伯克希爾公司的股東，因為作為股東往往會讓你享受優(yōu)惠。I told you last year about GEICO’s entry into New Jersey in August, 2004. Drivers in that state love us. Our retention rate there for new policyholders is running higher than in any other state, and by sometime in 2007, GEICO is likely to bee the third largest auto insurer in New Jersey. There, as elsewhere, our low costs allow low prices that lead to steady gains in profitable business. 我和大家說過，2004年8月GEICO進入新澤西州。那里的駕車人士非常喜歡GEICO。我們的新保戶的保留率(retention rate)[3]大大高于其它州。估計到2007年左右GEICO可能將成為新澤西第三大汽車保險商。除此之外，我們的低成本使們能夠在低價格銷售的同時保持穩(wěn)定的盈利。That simple formula immediately impressed me 55 years ago when I first discovered GEICO. Indeed, at age 21, I wrote an article about the pany – it’s reproduced on page 24 – when its market value was $7 million. As you can see, I called GEICO “The Security I Like Best.” And that’s what I still call it. 55年前當我第一次發(fā)現(xiàn)GEICO時這家公司簡單卻有效的經(jīng)營之道就給我留下了深刻印象。實際上在我21歲時我還寫了一篇關(guān)于這家公司的文章(其復(fù)本在年報第24頁)，當時這家公司市值只有700萬美元。在文章中你會看到，我稱GEICO為“我最喜歡的股票”。如今我還是這樣稱呼它。* * * * * * * * * * * * We have major reinsurance operations at General Re and National Indemnity. The former is run by Joe Brandon and Tad Montross, the latter by Ajit Jain. Both units performed well in 2005 considering the extraordinary hurricane losses that battered the industry.我們的再保險業(yè)務(wù)主要由General Re和National Indemnity經(jīng)營。前者由Joe Brandon 和Tad Montross進行管理，后者由Ajit Jain進行管理。考慮2005年異常嚴重的颶風(fēng)損害讓再保險業(yè)遭受嚴重打擊，兩家公司的業(yè)績表現(xiàn)可以說相當不錯。It’s an open question whether atmospheric, oceanic or other causal factors have dramatically changed the frequency or intensity of hurricanes. Recent experience is worrisome. We know, for instance, that in the 100 years before 2004, about 59 hurricanes of Category 3 strength, or greater, hit the Southeastern and Gulf Coast states, and that only three of these were Category 5s. We further know