【導(dǎo)讀】Berkshire海瑟崴股份有限公司。致Berkshire公司全體股東:. 今年的營業(yè)利益約為3,100萬美元，期初股東權(quán)益報酬率(持有股權(quán)投。資以原始成本計)僅約%，較去年1979年的%下滑，亦遠(yuǎn)低於。1978年近年度的新高%，主要的原因包括:. 保險核保成績大幅惡化。在股本大幅擴(kuò)張的同時，我們直接控制的被投資事業(yè)卻?？煞值玫挠N，依照會計原則卻不能認(rèn)列在帳面上。就在幾年前，我曾經(jīng)說過營業(yè)利益佔(zhàn)股東資本的比率。是衡量企業(yè)單一年度經(jīng)營績效的最佳指標(biāo)，雖然我們堅信這套標(biāo)準(zhǔn)仍適。用於絕大部份的企業(yè)，但是我必須說明的是，這套標(biāo)準(zhǔn)對Berkshire來。當(dāng)成績惡化時，自然就會有另一套標(biāo)準(zhǔn)跑出來解釋原因，就像是射箭手?；肚笆鲈虻闹匾匀找嬖黾?，我們確信移動紅心的舉。動是具有正當(dāng)理由的。未列入記錄的經(jīng)營者盈餘。後附財務(wù)報表所反映的帳面盈餘，通常已將我們持股超過20%的股權(quán)投。資按持股比例認(rèn)列其損益，然而低於20%股權(quán)投資的部份，卻只能認(rèn)列。實(shí)際收到的現(xiàn)金股利，至於未發(fā)放的盈餘則完全不列入計算。

　　

【正文】 m this table: nostalgia should be weighted heavily in stock selection. Our two largest unrealized gains are in Washington Post and GEICO, panies with which your Chairman formed his first mercial connections at the ages of 13 and 20, respectively After straying for roughly 25 years, we returned as investors in the mid1970s. The table quantifies the rewards for even longdelayed corporate fidelity. 為免你未注意到，本表有個投資經(jīng)驗(yàn)可與大家分享，懷舊 (Nostalgia)是我們在投資選股時必須特別加以重視的，在我們投資組合中，事實(shí)上具有最大未實(shí)現(xiàn)利益的兩家公司 Washington Post 與 GEIGO，本人早在13 歲與 20歲時便與它們結(jié)緣，但磋跎了二十幾年，遲至 1970 年代我們才正式成為該公司的股東，但結(jié)果證明所謂 :「遲到總比未到好?！? Our controlled and noncontrolled businesses operate over such a wide spectrum that detailed mentary here would prove too lengthy. Much financial and operational information regarding the controlled businesses is included in Management’s Discussion on pages 3439, and in the narrative reports on pages 4561. However, our largest area of business activity has been, and almost certainly will continue to be, the propertycasualty insurance area. So mentary on developments in that industry is appropriate. 由於我們具控制權(quán)與不具控制權(quán)的股權(quán)投資經(jīng)營的行業(yè)實(shí)在是相當(dāng)廣泛，若我一一詳細(xì)介紹將會使得報告變得冗長，然而這其中不管是現(xiàn)在或是將來最主要的事業(yè)經(jīng)營將會是擺在產(chǎn)險與意外險領(lǐng)域之上，因此我們有必要對保險產(chǎn)業(yè)現(xiàn)狀予以詳加說明 : Insurance Industry Conditions 保險產(chǎn)業(yè)現(xiàn)況 We show below an updated table of the industry statistics we utilized in last year’s annual report. Its message is clear: underwriting results in 1983 will not be a sight for the squeamish. 下表所顯示的是去年我們就曾引用過，經(jīng)過更新後的產(chǎn)業(yè)統(tǒng)計數(shù)字，其所傳達(dá)的訊息相當(dāng)明顯，我們將不會對 1983 年的核保結(jié)果感到吃驚。 Yearly Change Yearly Change Combined Ratio in Premiums in Premiums after Policy Written (%) Earned (%) holder Dividends 1972 ................ 1973 ................ 1974 ................ 1975 ................ 1976 ................ 1977 ................ 1978 ................ 1979 ................ 1980 ................ 1981 (Rev.) ......... 1982 (Est.) ......... Source: Best’s Aggregates and Averages. The Best’s data reflect the experience of practically the entire industry, including stock, mutual and reciprocal panies. The bined ratio represents total operating and loss costs as pared to revenue from premiums。 a ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. 調(diào)查機(jī)構(gòu) Best 的數(shù)據(jù)正說明了目前整個產(chǎn)業(yè)，包含股市、共同基金以及相關(guān)公司，所面臨到的狀況， Combined Ratio 係表示經(jīng)營成本加上理賠損失除以保費(fèi)收入的比率，若比率小於 100%則表示有核保利益，反之則有核保損失。 For reasons outlined in last year’s report, as long as the annual gain in industry premiums written falls well below 10%, you can expect the underwriting picture in the next year to deteriorate. This will be true even at today’s lower general rate of inflation. With the number of policies increasing annually, medical inflation far exceeding general inflation, and concepts of insured liability broadening, it is highly unlikely that yearly increases in insured losses will fall much below 10%. 就如同去年我們所說的一樣，若承銷保費(fèi)年增率低於 10%，你就會發(fā)現(xiàn)隔年的核保結(jié)果惡化，即使像通膨率相對較低的今日也是如此，隨著保單日益成長，醫(yī)療費(fèi)用上漲的速度遠(yuǎn)高於一般物價，加上保險責(zé)任日益擴(kuò)大的影響，核保損失將很難壓低到 10%以下。 You should be further aware that the 1982 bined ratio of represents a “best case” estimate. In a given year, it is possible for an insurer to show almost any profit number it wishes, particularly if it (1) writes “l(fā)ongtail” business (coverage where current costs can be only estimated, because claim payments are long delayed), (2) has been adequately reserved in the past, or (3) is growing very rapidly. There are indications that several large insurers opted in 1982 for obscure accounting and reserving maneuvers that masked significant deterioration in their underlying businesses. In insurance, as elsewhere, the reaction of weak managements to weak operations is often weak accounting. (“It’s difficult for an empty sack to stand upright.”) 大家必須有所認(rèn)知， 1982 年的 Combined Ratio 已是相當(dāng)樂觀的估計，在從前保險公司幾乎可依自身喜好來調(diào)整年度獲利，只要 (1)承銷長期保單 (Longtail)因?yàn)槔碣r成本多採用估計 (2)以前年度已提存有適當(dāng)準(zhǔn)備或 (3)業(yè)務(wù)成長快速。有跡象顯示有幾家大型保險公司傾向以模糊的會計 與挪用準(zhǔn)備的方式來掩飾其本業(yè)不佳的情況。保險業(yè)，跟其它行業(yè)一樣，不良的經(jīng)營階層對不良的營運(yùn)通常最直接的反應(yīng)就是不良的帳務(wù)，俗語說 :「你很難讓一個空沙包站得直挺挺的」。 The great majority of managements, however, try to play it straight. But even managements of integrity may subconsciously be less willing in poor profit years to fully recognize adverse loss trends. Industry statistics indicate some deterioration in loss reserving practices during 1982 and the true bined ratio is likely to be modestly worse than indicated by our table. 當(dāng)然大部份的經(jīng)營階層都儘力正正當(dāng)當(dāng)?shù)恼者[戲規(guī)則玩，但即使是正直的管理當(dāng)局在面對獲利不佳的情況時，下意識多多 少少也不會願意完全承認(rèn)營運(yùn)走下坡的窘境，產(chǎn)業(yè)統(tǒng)計資料指出在 1982 年對於提列損失準(zhǔn)備方面有惡化跡象，所以實(shí)際的 Combined Ratio 恐怕會比表列數(shù)更差一點(diǎn)。 The conventional wisdom is that 1983 or 1984 will see the worst of underwriting experience and then, as in the past, the “cycle” will move, significantly and steadily, toward better results. We disagree because of a pronounced change in the petitive environment, hard to see for many years but now quite visible. 一般認(rèn)為在 1983 或 1984 年核保成績會到谷底，然後產(chǎn)業(yè)循環(huán)會如同過去經(jīng)驗(yàn)一般緩步穩(wěn)定地向上，但由於一項(xiàng)明顯的改變 (這種改變已許多年未見，而如今卻重現(xiàn) )使我們抱持不同的看法。 To understand the change, we need to look at some major factors that affect levels of corporate profitability generally. Businesses in industries with both substantial overcapacity and a “modity” product (undifferentiated in any customerimportant way by factors such as performance, appearance, service support, etc.) are prime candidates for profit troubles. These may be escaped, true, if prices or costs are administered in some manner and thereby insulated at least partially from normal market forces. This administration can be carried out (a) legally through government intervention (until recently, this category included pricing for truckers and deposit costs for financial institutions), (b) illegally through collusion, or (c) “extralegally” through OPECstyle foreign cartelization (with tagalong benefits for domestic non