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【導(dǎo)讀】Security–Acertificate(paperorelectronic)thatgives. loan.Oncetheloanismade,thebank’smoneyistiedup. investors.ownapieceofapany(insteadofthewhole),touseit.FNMA(FannieMay)andFHMC(FreddieMac)have. 1980s.startinginthemid-1990s.
【正文】 tgage Credit’” Ashcraft and Schuermann, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 318, March 2020. Source: “Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit’” Ashcraft and Schuermann, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 318, March 2020. What triggered the credit crunch? ? Falling housing prices increased defaults. ? Investors began to exercise “put back” options that put the Originators on the hook for the bad loans. ? High leverage meant that a small loss on subprime loans translated into huge losses of capital. ? The run on the banks started a chain reaction that resulted in the failure of several standalone (monoline) banks and insurers. ? Doubts about the extent of losses suffered by each institution created large scale uncertainty that froze the credit market. What Now? ? Credit Crisis is real. But what is the solution? ? Is a bailout necessary? If so, what should a good bailout do? ? Depends on whether the credit crisis is due to ?Inadequate capital, or ?Lack of confidence, or ?Both inadequate capital and lack of confidence The current bailout/rescue plan ? Mainly addresses the problem of lack of confidence. Seeks to restore confidence by: ? Govt. buying up the “toxic” assets ? Critical question is “at what price?” ? Seeks to find the price through a reverse auction. Reverse Auctions ? Problems with using reverse auctions in this case ? Each “toxic” asset is different. The CDOs and MBS are not all alike. ? Asymmetric Information Banks know more about the quality of the securities than the government. ? Adverse Selection Banks are likely to offer the worst securities for sale at the auction and keep the good (more valuable, profitable) ones to themselves. Alternatives to bailout plan ? Why not simply help the homeowners who are in foreclosure? ? Curing current foreclosures is not enough. ? Future defaults will have to be picked up by taxpayers as well for this to work. ? Estimated $6 trillion of potentially problematic loans made. Very expensive to bailout homeowners.. ? Moral hazard issue – more are likely to default is government bails out. This is also a problem with current plan to directly help banks. ? Problematic loans were made in other markets (car loans, credit cards) as well. Curing defaults in housing markets may not be enough to avert deeper recession. Alternatives to Bailout plan ? Demanding stock (share in profits) in return for providing capital to troubled banks. ? Good idea from taxpayer’s perspective but not likely to help if bankers do not participate. No easy answers.. ? Rules of auction and other details of bailout are critical for ? preventing a deeper and longer recession, as well as, ? Not enriching banks at the expense of tax payers. Treasury Secretary has 45 days to e up with the details of the plan to buy toxic assets. Watch for more details.. Meanwhile, time is running out as evidenced by the deepening of the crisis
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