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【正文】 on, 1995。 Peterson, amp。 蘇州大學(xué)本科生畢業(yè)設(shè)計（論文） 22 Seeto, 1983。 Polak amp。 Harris, 1999。 Sodian, 1991。 Talwar, Gordon, and Lee, 2021), moral understanding (Piaget, 1932), personality and character formation ， (Hartshorne amp。 May, 1928), and children’s petence as witnesses in the courts of law (Goodman et al., 2021。 Lyon, 2021。 Strichartz amp。 Burton, 1990。 Talwar, Lee, Bala, amp。 Lindsay, 2021, 2021。 for a review, see Lee, 2021). To date, most studies have focused on the development of antisocial lies and can be divided into two major streams. One stream investigates children’s conceptions and moral judgments of antisocial lies. Extensive research has revealed that children from very early on are taught explicitly or implicitly about the negative moral implications associated with antisocial lies. They are also strongly discouraged from telling this type of lie (Cameron, Chen, amp。 Lee, 2021。 Wilson, Smith, amp。 Ross, 2021). Perhaps for this reason, the conceptual understanding of antisocial type of lies emerges as early as 3 years of age (Siegal amp。 Peterson, 1998。 Talwar et al., 2021). With regard to children’s moral judgments of lying, evidence shows that even preschoolers understand that antisocial lies entail negative moral implications (Bussey, 1992, 1999。 Talwar et al., 2021). The other stream of research, pioneered by Bi (1896), Darwin (1877), and Hartshorne and May (1928), examines children’s lying behavior for trickery, personal protection, or benefit (Chandler et al., 1989。 Lewis, Stanger, amp。 Sullivan, 1989。 Peskin, 1992。 Polak amp。 Harris, 1999。 Talwar amp。 Lee, 2021a). It has been found that even preschoolers tell lies with intent to deceive (Chandler et al., 1989。 Peskin, 1992). Young child lietellers are generally skilled in masking their nonverbal behaviors (., making eye contact while lying: Lewis et al., 1989。 Talwar amp。 Lee, 2021a), but poor at concealing their deception in their verbal statements (., blurting out the name of a toy that they claimed not to have peeked at: Polak amp。 Harris, 1999。 Talwar amp。 Lee, 2021a, 2021。 Talwar, Gordon, et al., 2021). In contrast to the extensive literature on antisocial lying, there is very limited research on the development of lietelling for politeness purposes. Research on this issue should offer a unique perspective for understanding social development in children owing to the multifaceted nature of prosocial lietelling. More specifically, to take an appropriate action in a politeness situation, one must assess, and reason 蘇州大學(xué)本科生畢業(yè)設(shè)計（論文） 23 about, both moral and social conventional rules regarding interpersonal interaction. Turiel and his colleagues (Helwig amp。 Turiel, 2021。 Nucci amp。 Turiel, 2021。 Smetana amp。 Turiel, 2021。 Turiel, 2021) have found that moral and social conventional rules are distinctive domains in the realm of social life and social thought. Moral rules are concerned with what is right and what is wrong as well as regulating how individuals ought to behave toward each other based on the principles of welfare and justice. In contrast, social conventional rules are concerned with uniformities that define social expectations regarding appropriate behaviors within a specific society and serve functions of social coordination. Typically, these rules deal with individuals’ social thoughts and actions in their respective domains. For example, moral rules prohibit killing of another human being, whereas social conventional rules may require one to dress properly at a formal social gathering. Politeness, however, cuts across both domains. In the politeness situation, one must assess, and reason about, the applicability of various moral and social conventional rules to take a morally and socially appropriate action. More significantly, the politeness situation brings to the fore the inherent contradictions in the rule system in either the moral or social conventional domains, respectively. In the moral domain, the concern for others’ wellbeing and the need to avoid harm should motivate one to tell a prosocial lie (., ‘‘I really like your gift’’ or ‘‘You look great in that dress’’) rather than telling the blunt truth (., ‘‘I do not like your gift’’ or ‘‘You look fat in that dress’’). However, lying, or making a false statement with an intent to deceive, has long been considered to be a serious moral transgression by philosophers and theologians, such as St. Augustine (1952), Kant (1949), and Bok (1978) because lying impinges on the lierecipient’s right to information and freedom of choice (Grice, 1980。 Krupfer, 1982). Children have also been socialized to take this view of lying from very early on in life (Cameron et al., 2021。 Wilson et al., 2021). In the socialconventional domain, there are also contradictory rules concerning interpersonal munication, particularly in the case of politeness are clearly demonstrated. On one hand, Grice (1980) suggested that one of the most fundamental conventions governing interpersonal munication is the Maxim of Quality. This maxim requires speakers to inform, not misinform, their 蘇州大學(xué)本科生畢業(yè)設(shè)計（論文） 24 municative partners, which is monly assumed to be the case when individuals enter into a conversation. Prosocial lies clearly flout this maxim. On the other hand, Lakoff (1973) proposed that interpersonal munications must also adhere to the Rule of Politeness that requires speakers to be amicable to their municative partners. In the politeness situation, this rule calls for individuals to not tell the blunt truth to establish or maintain an amicable relationship with another. The existing evidence suggests that many adults have little difficulty in resolving the conflicts evoked by the politeness situation. Typically, they allow that the need to be polite and to avoid hurting others overrides the need to be truthful. For this reason, adults not only endorse prosocial lies (Lee amp。 Ross, 1997) but tell them regularly (DePaulo amp。 Bell, 1996。 DePaulo amp。 Kashy, 1998). In contrast, for children, the politeness situation poses a challenge to children who are still in the process of acquiring moral and socialconventional rules of their society. Resolving conflicts between these rules places additional demands on them. Although the politeness situation may be a challenge for developing children, it offers a naturalistic opportunity for developmental researchers to understand whether children are capable of making strategic tradeoffs when facing social situations where rules are in conflict as well as how they select and apply rules adaptively in different social situations. To date, there are only three studies that have examined children’s actual behavior in a politeness situation. Talwar and Lee (2021b) used a Reverse Rouge task in which the experimenter had a conspicuous mark of lipstick on the nose. The child was asked to take a picture of the experimenter, but before the picture was taken, the experimenter asked, ‘‘Do I look okay for the picture?’’ Results showed that 89% of children between 3 and 7 years of age stated that the experimenter looked okay. However, when the experimenter left, children told another adult that the experimenter actually did not look okay. Thus, the researchers concluded that young children can tell prosocial lies in a politeness situation. However, because children were not probed about why they told such a lie, it is unclear whether the children in the study considered the contradictory rules evoked by the situation when decidi