【導(dǎo)讀】2021,(17):191-211.Adizes'(IChakAdizes). Scholarshave

　　

【正文】 lower echelons. Motivation for taskfulfillment was created by material incentives bolstered by threats。 individual creativity and initiative were dismissed as unnecessary nuisance. Power was concentrated, together with responsibility and overview。 middle management had access only to the information that was immediately relevant to its tasks. Following the recipes prescribed in Frederick Taylor39。s scientific management, the distribution of tasks was established at headquarters and the pany39。s functions were divided into individual work ponents. Planning was based on a belief in control and predictability, effects were traced to causes, and causes were quantitatively analyzed. Company operations based on causeeffect chains were given value independent of time and place: as in a machine, it was held that the same input would always produce the same output. This was the philosophy of the leading panies of the 20th century。 the model for success at General Motors and Standard Oil, and the rest of the Fortune 500 group. The economic growthenvironment of the postwar period did not provide grounds to modify, or even question, this philosophy. Almost anything an enterprising manager would try had a knack of succeeding。 he could even engage in personal bravado. Technological progress seemed assured, and expanding markets seemed to distribute the benefits of growth. The postwar economy weled all entrepreneurs。 they could grow as the economy did. Longterm costs, if any, were hidden in the long term. In that regard businessmen were fond of quoting Keynes: in the long term we shall all be dead. If things get better and better, why bother to look further than one39。s nose? There was no need to worry whether or not there would be progress, it was enough to guess what shape it would take, and how the pany could benefit from it. In the 1970s and 39。80s the situation had changed. The economic growth curve flattened out and optimistic extrapolations failed to e true. Social alienation and anomie rose, and technology produced unexpected sideeffects: scares and catastrophes at Three Mile Island, Bhopal, and Chernobyl, the ozone hole over the Antarctic, recurrent instances of acid rain and oil spill, and worsening environmental pollution in cities and on land. Belief in progress was shaken. Intellectuals and youth groups found it necessary, and some segments of society fashionable, to espouse the view that technological advance is dangerous and should be halted. Environmental effects and social valuechange began to enter as factors in the equations of corporate success, and leading managers, together with consultants and management theorists, began to reexamine their operative assumptions. By the late 1980s further changes occurred in the operating environment. Environmental concerns moved from the fringes of society into the marketplace。 people proved amenable to paying higher prices for products they deemed environmentally friendly。 and they were known to boycott panies that remained environmentally polluting or unresponsive. New information and munication technologies came on line, markets became integrated and internationalized, product cycles became shorter and product lines diversified, and clients and consumers demanded shorter delivery times and higher quality. Competition moved into the global arena. Under these circumstances classically run hierarchical enterprises proved unable to cope. The centralization of information and its slow oneway peration to lower echelons produced fatal mistakesand then terminal rigidity. The panies that survived did so by transforming themselves into teamoriented multilevel decisionmaking and implementation structures, often in the nick of time. In the late 1990s the diffusion of information and the growth in the intensity and number of interfaces between people, departments, and divisions have radically changed the pany39。s operative structures. Not only information, also people emerged as the key resource of the enterprise。 teamwork proved to be the best way this resource could be tapped. The boundary between the pany and its economic, social, and ecologic environment turned fuzzy. Within the business sphere fusions, alliances, and partnerships became monplace. In many cases the core activities of the enterprise came to be subcontracted, and work relations with other firms became as operative as panybased anizational structures. Reliance on distributors and suppliers, and linkage to local munities and ecologies turned into standard parameters of corporate functioning. Under these circumstances, there is a dire need for new and adapted management concepts. There is no dearth of advice. Theorists speak of activity bundling and the pany39。 capacity to sustainably capture the highest portion of the total industry valueadded chain39。s profit margin。 strategy specialists emphasize the need for management to focus on dynamic petitive positioning and customerdriven processes。 technology consultants stress the importance of anticipatory Ramp。D in both products and processes。 and anizational experts insist on the need for learning within worked teams operating beyond established pany structures. Leading managers realize that their vision of the pany39。s functioning within its global environment, and its adaptability to changes and trends in that environment, is at least equal in importance to their ability to formulate strategy and carry out operations. Management guru Tom Peters called intellectual capital a pany39。s greatest resource, and consultants Gary Hamel and named future vision its greatest petitive advantage, more valuable than a large bank account or a lean anization. Managers who possess intellectual capital and future vision have a sense of purpose, avoid wasting time on useless experiments and dead