【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 每股利潤1965 ..................................................................... $ 41975 ..................................................................... 41985 ..................................................................... 521995 ..................................................................... 1752005 ..................................................................... $2,441Compound Growth Rate 19652005.................... %19652005復合增長率Compound Growth Rate ................... %19952005復合增長率*Pretax and net of minority interests稅前且扣除少數(shù)股東權(quán)益When growth rates are under discussion, it will pay you to be suspicious as to why the beginning and terminal years have been selected. If either year was aberrational, any calculation of growth will be distorted. In particular, a base year in which earnings were poor can produce a breathtaking, but meaningless, growth rate. In the table above, however, the base year of 1965 was abnormally good。 Berkshire earned more money in that year than it did in all but one of the previous ten.在討論增長率時，你非常有必要留心基期與終期年度的選擇。開始與結(jié)束的年度二者只要有一個選擇不當，那么無論如何計算出來的增長率都會被歪曲。尤其是當基期年度盈利很少時，計算出來的增長率會高得驚人卻毫無實際意義。在上面這張表中，作為基期的1965年度的盈利卻是異乎尋常地好，伯克希爾公司1965年的盈利高于此前10年中的9個年度盈利水平。As you can see from the two tables, the parative growth rates of Berkshire’s two elements of value have changed in the last decade, a result reflecting our everincreasing emphasis on business acquisitions. Nevertheless, Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s Vice Chairman and my partner, and I want to increase the figures in both tables. In this ambition, we hope – metaphorically – to avoid the fate of the elderly couple who had been romantically challenged for some time. As they finished dinner on their 50th anniversary, however, the wife – stimulated by soft music, wine and candlelight – felt a longabsent tickle and demurely suggested to her husband that they go upstairs and make love. He agonized for a moment and then replied, “I can do one or the other, but not both.”從這兩張表中你可以看出，伯克希爾的每股投資額與每股收益的復合增長率相對而言在最后一個10年期間發(fā)生了很大的變化，其原因是我們的經(jīng)營重心日益向企業(yè)并購傾斜。Acquisitions并購Over the years, our current businesses, in aggregate, should deliver modest growth in operating earnings. But they will not in themselves produce truly satisfactory gains. We will need major acquisitions to get that job done. In this quest, 2005 was encouraging. We agreed to five purchases: two that were pleted last year, one that closed after yearend and two others that we expect to close soon. None of the deals involve the issuance of Berkshire shares. That’s a crucial, but often ignored, point: When a management proudly acquires another pany for stock, the shareholders of the acquirer are concurrently selling part of their interest in everything they own. I’ve made this kind of deal a few times myself – and, on balance, my actions have cost you money.未來幾年，我們目前的業(yè)務總體上應該在經(jīng)營利潤上表現(xiàn)出一定的增長。但只是這些業(yè)務并不能產(chǎn)生出令人滿意的盈利，要想如此，我們必須進行大型的并購。過去的2005年，我們的大型并購活動令人鼓舞。我們達成了5項并購協(xié)議：其中2項在2005年內(nèi)完成，其它1項在2006年初完成，其它2個預計會很快完成。這些并購協(xié)議無一涉及到伯克希爾發(fā)行新股。這一點非常關(guān)鍵，卻常常被忽略：當一家公司管理層驕傲地宣布以股票收購另一家公司時，做為收購方公司的股東們不得不為此犧牲他們的一部分股東權(quán)益。我也做過幾次類似的并購交易，當然伯克希爾的股東們?yōu)槲业呐e動付出的相應的代價。Here are last year’s purchases:以上逐一討論我們?nèi)ツ甑牟①彛? On June 30 we bought Medical Protective Company (“MedPro”), a 106yearold medical malpractice insurer based in Fort Wayne. Malpractice insurance is tough to underwrite and has proved to be a graveyard for many insurers. MedPro nevertheless should do well. It will have the attitudinal advantage that all Berkshire insurers share, wherein underwriting discipline trumps all other goals. Additionally, as part of Berkshire, MedPro has financial strength far exceeding that of its petitors, a quality assuring doctors that longtosettle claims will not end up back on their doorstep because their insurer failed. Finally, the pany has a smart and energetic CEO, Tim Kenesey, who instinctively thinks like a Berkshire manager.2005年6月30日，我們收購了醫(yī)療保護保險公司(Medical Protective Company，MedPro)，這是一個位于Fort Wayne的有著106經(jīng)營歷史的醫(yī)療事故保險公司。醫(yī)療事故保險一種十分難以承保的險種，一度成為許多保險公司的夢魘之地。然而MedPro卻由于以下原因?qū)?jīng)營良好。首先，MedPro將和伯克希爾其它下屬其它保險公司一樣在態(tài)度上領(lǐng)先一籌，那就是承保紀律重于其它一切經(jīng)營目標。其次，做為伯克希爾公司的一個組成部分，MedPro擁有遠遠超過其競爭對手的財務實力，這足以向醫(yī)生們保證那些需要長期訴訟決不會由于他們所投保的保險公司的失敗而無法終止。最后，這家公司擁有一個聰明能干的首席執(zhí)行官Tim Kenesey，他本能地和其他伯克希爾經(jīng)理人遵循同樣的思考模式。? Forest River, our second acquisition, closed on August 31. A couple of months earlier, on June 21, I received a twopage fax telling me – point by point – why Forest River met the acquisition criteria we set forth on page 25 of this report. I had not before heard of the pany, a recreational vehicle manufacturer with $ billion of sales, nor of Pete Liegl, its owner and manager. But the fax made sense, and I immediately asked for more figures. These came the next morning, and that afternoon I made Pete an offer. On June 28, we shook hands on a deal. Pete is a remarkable entrepreneur. Some years back, he sold his business, then far smaller than today, to an LBO operator who promptly began telling him how to run the place. Before long, Pete left, and the business soon sunk into bankruptcy. Pete then repurchased it. You can be sure that I won’t be telling Pete how to manage his operation.?我們的第二起并購是森林之河(Forest River)，已經(jīng)于2005年8月31日完成。2個月之前的7月21日，我收到一份只有兩頁紙的傳真，上面逐一說明森林之河完全符合我們曾經(jīng)在年報上披露的收購標準(參見本年年報第25頁)。在此之前我從未聽說過這年銷售額16億美元的周末旅游汽車制造商及其所有人兼總經(jīng)理Pete Liegl。但這份傳真讓我動心，于是我馬上要求對方提供更多的相關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)。我第二天一早就拿到了這些數(shù)據(jù)，于是就在這天上午我就向Pete Liegl提出了收購建議。7月28日，我們倆握手成交。Pete Liegl是一個杰出的企業(yè)家。幾年之前，他的企業(yè)遠遠比現(xiàn)在小，那時他把企業(yè)賣給了一家杠桿收購(LBO)機構(gòu)。他們接手后馬上對他指手畫腳，不久Pete Liegl離開了公司。此后不久公司就陷入破產(chǎn)。Pete Liegl又重新收回了這家公司。你可以放心，我決不會干涉Pete Liegl的任何經(jīng)營行為。Forest River has 60 plants, 5,400 employees and has consistently gained share in the RV business, while also expanding into other areas such as boats. Pete is 61 – and definitely in an acceleration mode. Read the piece from RV Business that acpanies this report, and you’ll see why Pete and Berkshire are made for each other.森林之河擁有60家工廠和5400名雇員，在休閑車(Recreation Vehiel