【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 item once it has installed the bid quantity and the allocated fixed cost will bee a windfall profit for the number units installed above the bid quantity. 相反，如果承包商安裝比此項目投標的數(shù)量更多，這將恢復該項目的完整的固定成本，一旦安裝了投標數(shù)量和分配的固定成本將成為暴利的數(shù)量單位安裝了上述出價數(shù)量。 Therefore, it can be seen that it is logical to account for costs in a manner that reflects the risk inherent to contract’s payment mechanism. 因此，可以看出，這是合乎邏輯的方式，在一個固有的風險反映到合同的費用帳戶支付機制。 It also allows for a more precise accounting for costs by directly associating different types of fixed costs with specific work items rather than accumulating all indirect costs and then arbitrarily allocating them to work items on a percentage 關聯(lián)，而不是所有間接成本，積累與特定工作項目的不同類型的固定費用，然后分配給任意一個百分點的基礎工作，更精確的核算項目成本。 Many public owners recognize the contractor’ s risk of quantity underrun as well as their own risk of quantity overrun and provide for renegotiation of unit price for work items whose actual quantities vary more than a given percentage of the bid quantity (Schexnayder and Mayo 2021). 許多公共業(yè)主認識到承包者的風險溢數(shù)量以及他們對自己的風險溢出數(shù)量，并提供工作項目的單位，其變化比投標數(shù)量（施克斯納德和 Mayo 2021）更實際數(shù)量一定比例的價格重新談判。 Below is a list of typical quantity variation ranges above and below which the agency will allow the bid unit price to be renegotiated 下面是一個典型的數(shù)量上面和下面該機構(gòu)將允許投標單位的價格變化范圍進行重新 談判的清單 : New Mexico DOT:177。 20%(NMDOT 2021) 新墨西哥點：。 177。 20％（ NMDOT 2021） 。 Oklahoma DOT: 177。 25%（ ODOT 1999） 俄克拉荷馬點：。 177。 25％（ ODOT 1999） ； Texas DOT: 177。 25%(TxDOT 2021) 德州點：。 177。 25％（ TxDOT 2021） 。 Utah DOT:177。 25%(UDOT 2021) 猶他州點：。 177。 25％（ UDOT 2021） 。 West Viurginia DOT: 177。 25%(WVDOT 2021) 西 Viurginia 點：。 177。 25％（ WVDOT 2021） 。and 和 USACE: 177。 15%(USACE 1997). 美國陸軍工程兵團： 177。 15％（美國陸軍工程兵團 1997 年） . Table 1. Balanced Bid Example Hotmix asphaltic concrete (HMAC) pay item Unit price element Description Total cost Bid quantity Unit cost Variable cost Materials,labor,and equipment $ 50Kt $77/t Fixed costs Mobilize/demobilize plant and equipment $250K 50Kt $5/t Allocated overhead,financing,etc. $300K 50Kt $6/t Target profit $100K 50Kt $2/t Final bid totals $ 50Kt $90/t Other agencies,such as the Alaska DOT,(ADOTamp。PF 2021),do not contain such clauses in their unit price contracts. 其他機構(gòu)，例如阿拉斯加的 DOT（ ADOT 及公積金 2021 年），不包含在他們的單位價格合同等條款。This creates a situation where the risk of underrun quantities is unbounded and therefore increased. 這將創(chuàng)建一個凡欠載量的風險是無限的，因此增加的情況。 By including a unit price adjustment clause,the owner is limiting both its own and the contractor’ s quantity variation risk. 通過包括單位價格調(diào)整條款，業(yè)主是其本身的限制和承包商的數(shù)量變化的風險。 This issue is best illustrated by 1 shows the contractor’ s estimate for a pavement work item on a state project where the unit price adjustment clause allows a variation 177。 20% before the unit price can be renegotiated. 這個問題是最好的說明例子。 表 1 顯示了承包商對項目上的路面狀態(tài)估計那里的工作項目單價調(diào)整條款允許變化 177。 20％的單位之前的價格可以重新談 判 One can see that the contractor chose to associate the cost of mobilizing and demobilizing the asphalt batch plant and associated equipment with this particular work item. 人們可以看到，選擇承包商聯(lián)營調(diào)動和遣散的瀝青攪拌站的費用以及與此特定的工作項目相關的設備。Additionally,a proportional amount of the overhead and other general fixed costs and target profit was also allocated to this item. 此外，間接費用和其他一般固定費用和目標利潤總額的比例也分配給這個項目。Thus,the unit price of $ per ton is a balanced unit price. 因此，每噸 美元的單價是一個平衡的單位價格。 From Table 1,one can develop an algebraic formula to calculate the contractor’ s cost for the actual number of units installed 從表 1，可以建立一個代數(shù)公式來計算的單位實際安裝的數(shù)量承包商的成本。 Actual cost = Total FC + VC(N) . 實際成本 =總界別 +創(chuàng)投（ N）的。 The Ohio DOT (2021) takes this a step farther by quantifying a mathematically unbalanced bid by requiring:“ Bidders must bid at least the cost of the materials for every item bid.” The Texas DOT regulations (TxDOT 2021) agree with both Oklahonma and Nhio’s interpretations. TxDOT’s specifications in concert with federal regulation 23CFR (CFR 2021) go on to state that a contract may be awarded to a mathematically unbalanced bid but must reject a materially unbalanced bid. TxDOT points out two situations in which material unbalancing are found: “ There is an error in [the engineer’s estimated bid] quantities (too low) and the contractor bids a high price on these items. In this case, the apparent low bidder might not be the actual low bidder once the quantity error is corrected.” The contractor’s bid prices are high on items of work occurring early in the project. In this case, the apparent low bidder might not be the actual low bidder when the State’s financial loss of potential interest ine is calculated (TxDOT 2021). The second TxDOT definition refers to a situation that is monly called “frontloading” (Schexnayder and Mayo 2021). Frontloading can bee a form of mathematical or material unbalancing. Frontloading is done to generate additional cash flow in the early phases of the project (Mayer and Deikmann 1982). As this issue is not created by the engineer who develops the bid quantities on a unit price contract, it is beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, the paper will restrict itself to evaluating unbalancing only and make no effort to identify potential frontloading in the sample population. All three state DOTs cited above are allowed to award contracts to mathematically unbalanced bids and must reject materially unbalanced bids. Thus, it can be concluded that mathematical unbalancing is an expected practice due to the possibilities of errors in the engineer’s estimated