諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)經(jīng)典理論—納什均衡的ppt詳解(ppt31)-經(jīng)濟(jì)理論(編輯修改稿)
2024-09-18 20:57 本頁(yè)面
【文章內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介】 (3) **( ) 39。( ) 0i i i i iv g g g v g g c??? ? ? ? ?* * * * *1 1 1... ...i i i ng g g g g? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?n n*1( * ) 39。( * ) 0v G G v G cn? ? ?Cont’d In contrast, the social optimum should resolve FOC: (4) Comparing (3) and (4), we can see that Implications for social and economic systems (Coase Theorem) **Gm a x ( )G v G G c?( * * ) * * 39。( * * ) 0v G G v G c? ? ?* * *GG?2. Dynamic Games of Complete Information ? Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information ? Theory: Backward Induction Example: The Trust Game General features: (1) Player 1 chooses an action from the feasible set . (2) Player 2 observes and then chooses an action from the feasible set . (3) Payoffs are and . 1a 1A1a 2a2A1 1 2( , )u a a 2 1 2( , )u a aCont’d Backward Induction: Then “People think backwards” 2 2 1 2a r g m a x ( , )a u a a?1 1 1 2 1a r g m a x ( , ( ) )a u a R a? An example: Stackelberg Model of Duopoly Two firms quantity pete sequentially. Timing: (1) Firm 1 chooses a quantity 。 (2) Firm 2 observes and then chooses a quantity ； (3) The payoff to firm is given by the profit function is the inverse demand function, , and is the constant marginal cost of production (fixed cost being zero). 1 0q ?1q 2 0q ?( , ) [ ( ) ]i i j iq q q P Q c? ??i()P Q a Q?? 12Q q q??cCont’d We solve this game with backward induction (provided that ). 2 2 1 2 2 1 2* 12 2 1a r g m a x ( , ) ( )()2q q q q a q q ca q cq R q?? ? ? ? ???? ? ?1q a c??Cont’d Now
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