博弈論資料-英文(25個文件)syllabus-博弈論-免費閱讀
【正文】 BERNHEIM, D. (1984): “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior,” Econometrica, 52, 10071028. Fixed points of the best response operator: Nash equilibrium. Existence and mixed strategies. Interpretation. R OR Sections and 3. Games with Inplete Information The basic model The Harsanyi approach Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Interpretation. R OR Section A closer look: higherorder beliefs Common Priors L 4. Interactive Beliefs and the Foundations of Solution Concepts The basic idea: Harsanyi’s model revisited Correlated Equilibrium R OR Section L Rationality and the Belief operator Common Certainty of Rationality. Equilibrium in Beliefs. L O DEKEL, E. and GUL, F. (1990): “Rationality and Knowledge in Game Theory,” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics, D. Kreps and K. Wallis, eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK。 TAN, . and WERLANG, . (1988): “The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, 45, 370391. AUMANN, R. and BRANDENBURGER, A. (1995): “Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 63, 11611180. 5. Putting it All Together: Some Auction Theory First and Secondprice auctions Dominance and Equilibrium analysis with private values The Revenue Equivalence Theorem L O MY Section Rationalizability with Inplete Information Nonequilibrium analysis of auctions Computation! L 6. Ex
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