博弈論資料-英文(25個文件)syllabus-博弈論-預覽頁
【正文】 ory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (denoted “OR” henceforth) If you are planning to buy a single book for this course, get this one. However, I will sometimes refer to the following texts (which, incidentally, should be on every serious micro theorist’s bookshelf): MYERSON, R. (1991): Game Theory. Analysis of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (denoted “MY” henceforth) FUDENBERG, D. and TIROLE, J. (1991): Game Theory, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (denoted “FT” henceforth) Plan of the Course Please note: R indicates required readings。 BERNHEIM, D. (1984): “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior,” Econometrica, 52, 10071028. Fixed points of the best response operator: Nash equilibrium. Existence and mixed strategies. Interpretation. R OR Sections and 3. Games with Inplete Information The basic model The Harsanyi approach Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Interpretation. R OR Section A closer look: higherorder beliefs Common Priors L 4. Interactive Beliefs and the Foundations of Solution Concepts The basic idea: Harsanyi’s model revisited Correlated Equilibrium R OR Section L Rationality and the Belief operator Common Certainty of Rationality. Equilibrium in Beliefs. L O DEKEL, E. and GUL, F. (1990): “Rationality and Knowledge in Game Theory,” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics, D. Kreps and K. Wallis, eds., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
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