博弈論資料-英文(25個文件)syllabus-博弈論-全文預覽
【正文】 ly repeated games. R OR Sections Perfect folk theorems for infinitely repeated games Perfect folk theorems for finitely repeated games R OR Sections 8. Extensive Games: details General Extensive games: imperfect information. Relationship between normal and extensive form. Mixed and Behavioral strategies. Kuhn’s Theorem. Perfect and Imperfect Recall R OR Chapter 11 Sequential rationality and offequilibrium beliefs TremblingHand Perfect equilibrium Consistent Assessments and Sequential Equilibrium R OR Sections , O KREPS, D. and WILSON, R. (1982): “Sequential equilibria,” Econometrica, 50, 863894。Marciano Siniscalchi Game Theory (Economics 514) Fall 1999 Logistics We (provisionally) meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays, 10:40a12:10p, in Bendheim 317. I will create a mailing list for the course. Therefore, please send me at your earliest convenience so I can add you to the list. You do not want to miss important announcements, do you? The course has a Web page at You should bookmark it and check it every once in a while, as I will be adding material related to the course (including solutions to problems, papers, relevant links, etc.) If you need to talk to me, you can me at for an appointment, or just drop by during my regular OH (Wed 1:002:30). My office is 309 Fisher. Textbook The main reference for this course is: OSBORNE, M. and RUBINSTEIN, A. (1994): A Course in Game The
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