博弈論資料-英文(25個(gè)文件)syllabus-博弈論(文件)
【正文】 erplay between Normal and Extensiveform analysis Invariance Perfect and Proper Equilibria. Proper and Sequential equilibria. L Strategic Stability and the “axiomatic approach” A list of desiderata, and the need for setvalued solutions. “True perfection” and the “Nearby games, Nearby equilibria Principle.” R KOHLBERG, E. and MERTENS, JF., (1986): “On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria,” Econometrica 54, 10031037. 。 TAN, . and WERLANG, . (1988): “The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games,” Journal of Economic Theory, 45, 370391. AUMANN, R. and BRANDENBURGER, A. (1995): “Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 63, 11611180. 5. Putting it All Together: Some Auction Theory First and Secondprice auctions Dominance and Equilibrium analysis with private values The Revenue Equivalence Theorem L O MY Section Rationalizability with Inplete Information Nonequilibrium analysis of auctions Computation! L 6. Extensive Games: Basics Extensive games with perfect information Notation(s) and terminology Nash equilibrium R OR Sections , , Backward Induction and SubgamePerfect equilibrium The OneDeviation Property Extensive games with perfect but inplete information Perfect Bayesian equilibrium R OR Section , up to p. 233 Repeated Games: basics General setup and payoff aggregation criteria Automata Nash Folk theorems for infinite
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