【正文】 Magliolo, J. (1995). Managing financial reports of mercial banks: The influence of taxes, regulatory capital and earnings. Journal of Accounting Research33, 231261. Beaver, . (1981). Financial reporting: An accounting revolution. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Benston, G. J. (2020). The shortings of fairvalue accounting described in SFAS 157. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 27, 101114. Berger, ., Herring, ., amp。從這方面來說 ,激烈的游說和在當(dāng)前的危機(jī)中對標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定過程進(jìn)行政治干涉給進(jìn)一步的研究提供了肥沃的土壤。 一個相關(guān)的議題是，經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)時期投資者如何應(yīng)對其他公司的信息披露。其中一個例子便是相關(guān)性和可靠性之間的權(quán)衡 ,這是討論確定公允價值時如何選擇背離市場價格時機(jī)的核心。然而 ,經(jīng)理、董事和審計師面臨嚴(yán)重的訴訟風(fēng)險以及實(shí)質(zhì)性的法律處罰 ,包括監(jiān)禁 ,最近已經(jīng)增加了 2020 年的薩班斯 奧克斯利法案。這是本質(zhì)上的觀點(diǎn) ,在 2020 年 3 月 12 日的眾議院金融服務(wù)委員會聽證會上采用 MTM 會計規(guī)則。然而 ,這種限制不應(yīng)令人驚訝。如上所述 ,根據(jù)美國公認(rèn)會計準(zhǔn)則或國際財務(wù)報告準(zhǔn)則 以及美國監(jiān)管資本要求， FVA 銀行機(jī)制落實(shí)到位應(yīng)該可以緩解潛在的傳染效應(yīng)。因此 , 美國銀行業(yè)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)計算的監(jiān)管資本并不受公允價值 AFS 債務(wù)證券變化的影響 ,除非他們被出售或損害是非暫時性的。法蘭西銀行行長 ,2020。 2 級適用于個案中有可觀察到的輸入 ,包括類似資產(chǎn)的引用報價或活 躍市場報價 ,以及非活躍市場中相同或相似的資產(chǎn)引用報價和其他 4 個相關(guān)的市場數(shù)據(jù)。 第一節(jié)中 ,我們提供一個對 FVA 基本概述和一些贊成以及反對 FVA 的關(guān)鍵理由。因此 ,標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定者和執(zhí)法機(jī)構(gòu)面臨著一個微妙的權(quán)衡 (如傳染效應(yīng)和即時損失 )。因此 ,我們并不清楚是否標(biāo)準(zhǔn)本身才是問題的根源。除在極少數(shù)情況下 ,標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定者總是會面對這些問題 ,FVA 是另一個例子。另一個極端的 FVA支持者辯稱 ,它僅僅扮演了信使的角色 ,現(xiàn)在卻被大眾批評 (如特納 ,2020。首先 ,爭議主要是由關(guān)于什么是新的、不同的 FVA 的困惑 導(dǎo)致的。 Palepu, . (1995). Marktomarket accounting for banks and thrifts: Lessons from the Danish experience. Journal of Accounting Research 33, 132. Bigman, D., amp。 Shin, . (2020). Liquidity and leverage. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, No. 328. Allen, F., amp。 NBER April 2020 (Forthing in Accounting, Organizations and Society) Abstract The recent financial crisis has led to a vigorous debate about the pros and cons of fairvalue accounting (FVA). This debate presents a major challenge for FVA going forward and standard setters’ push to extend FVA into other areas. In this article, we highlight four important issues as an attempt to make sense of the debate. First, much of the controversy results from confusion about what is new and different about FVA. Second, while there are legitimate concerns about marking to market (or pure FVA) in times of financial crisis, it is less clear that these problems apply to FVA as stipulated by the accounting standards, be it IFRS or . GAAP. Third, historical cost accounting (HCA) is unlikely to be the remedy. There are a number of concerns about HCA as well and these problems could be larger than those with FVA. Fourth, although it is difficult to fault the FVA standards per se, implementation issues are a potential concern, especially with respect to litigation. Finally, we identify several avenues for future research. Key Words: Marktomarket； Fair value accounting； Financial institutions；Liquidity； Financial crisis； Banks； Procyclicality 1. Introduction The recent financial crisis has turned the spotlight on fairvalue accounting (FVA) and led to a major policy debate involving among others the . Congress, the European Commission as well banking and accounting regulators around the world. Critics argue that FVA, often also called marktomarket accounting (MTM),1has significantly contributed to the financial crisis and exacerbated its severity for financial institutions in the . and around the the other extreme, proponents of FVA argue that it merely played the role of the proverbial messenger that is now being shot (., Turner, 2020。 IMF, 2020). The chief concern is that FVA is procyclical, ., it exacerbates swings in the financial system, and that it may even cause a downward spiral in financial markets. . GAAP and, more recently, also IFRS allow for a reclassification of fairvalue assets into a category to which HCA and less stringent impairment tests apply. . GAAP and IFRS have mechanisms to avoid negative spillovers in distressed markets and a downward spiral. To address contagion and procyclicality is not to have direct (mechanical) regulatory or contractual ties to FVA. For instance, it would be possible to adjust the accounting numbers for the purpose of determining regulatory capital. Such adjustments already exist. For example, for the purpose of calculating regulatory capital, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Reserve adjust bank’s equity as reported under . GAAP for unrealized losses and gains for availableforsale (AFS) debt securities to obtain Tier 1 capital (., Schedule HCR in FR Y9C). Thus, regulatory capital as calculated by . banking regulators is not affected by changes in the fair value of AFS debt securities, unless they are sold or the impairments are , Li (2020) documents that debt contracts often exclude fairvalue changes in accountingbased debt covenants. These examples demonstrate that it is not clear that contagion and procyclicality are best addressed directly in the accounting system. Perhaps these issues are better left to the prudential regulators and contracting parties, who in turn can make adjustments to the numbers reported in the financial statements as they see fit. In our view, this is an interesting issue for future research. In summary, Allen and Carletti (2020) and Plantin et al. (2020a)provide important contributions to the FVA debate by illustrating potential contagion effects. However, they do not show that HCA would be preferable. In fact, Plantin et al. (2020a) are quite explicit about the problems of HCA. Furthermore, they do not speak directly to the role of FVA in the current crisis because they do not model FVA as implemented in practice. As noted above, FVA as required by . GAAP or IFRS as well as . regulatory capital requirements for banks have mechanisms in place that should alleviate potential contagion effects. Whether these mechanisms work properly in practice is our next question. 4. Are there implementation problems with fairvalue accounting standards? Given the discussion in the preceding section, it is not obvious that extant account