【正文】 ()()()()()()()()()Pri*()()()()*()()()()*()()()()()()Nac**()***()***()***()**()***()***()***()**()**()***()**()***()***()AdjR2F***************************DWN5353535353535353535353535353備注信任程度律師占當(dāng)?shù)厝丝诒茸詴嫀熣籍?dāng)?shù)厝丝诒葨|南環(huán)渤海地區(qū)第二，使用CAR(1，0)、CAR(2，2)作為因變量，使用上述幾種地區(qū)投資者保護代理變量，對外溢效應(yīng)和拔靴效應(yīng)重新進行回歸分析。第三，將樣本期間擴大為20012008年、19982008年，重新進行上述回歸，結(jié)論仍然成立。回歸分析表明，目標(biāo)公司所在地投資者保護程度越高，越傾向于發(fā)生異地并購。這不同角度支持了異地并購的協(xié)同效應(yīng)，而且協(xié)同效應(yīng)是由拔靴效應(yīng)產(chǎn)生的。相比于地區(qū)投資者保護程度低地區(qū)的同地并購，如果地區(qū)投資者保護程度低地區(qū)的收購方并購地區(qū)投資者保護程度高地區(qū)的目標(biāo)公司能夠獲得更大的并購收益，這將從另一角度支持異地并購中存在協(xié)同效應(yīng)，并購的協(xié)同是由拔靴效應(yīng)產(chǎn)生的。除了(0，1)窗口期，其余6個窗口期異地并購的累積超額收益率均大于同地并購，均值檢驗和中位數(shù)檢驗表明差異是顯著的。我們對地區(qū)投資者保護程度低地區(qū)的收購方并購地區(qū)投資者保護程度高地區(qū)的目標(biāo)公司的并購樣本進行了匹配分析，分析異地并購的收購方相比于未發(fā)生并購的上市公司，是否有更好的盈利能力指標(biāo)。匹配后的會計指標(biāo)T檢驗顯示，并購后第3年，收購方公司比匹配樣本公司有更高的營業(yè)毛利率、更低的營業(yè)成本率。這表明收購方公司在銷售和成本控制方面優(yōu)于同地區(qū)、同行業(yè)的未并購公司。我們以20032008年間發(fā)生的、上市公司作為收購方的異地非關(guān)聯(lián)并購為研究對象，研究了并購雙方所在地的投資者保護程度與收購方公司并購收益的關(guān)系。這表明，我國公司并購的協(xié)同來自于收購方公司主動和自愿的接受和實施目標(biāo)公司所在地的投資者保護水平，即通過“拔靴效應(yīng)”提高了企業(yè)價值。研究結(jié)論帶來的啟示在于，制度因素影響并購價值的創(chuàng)造。注釋：①因為在數(shù)據(jù)的整理過程中，需要逐一查閱并購公告，各大財經(jīng)網(wǎng)站的并購公告最早可追溯至2003年，所以我們的樣本期間始于2003年。③因為本文以非關(guān)聯(lián)并購作為研究對象，所以異地并購樣本略多于同地并購樣本。④在央企異地并購子樣本組中沒有收購方地區(qū)投資者保護程度低于中位數(shù)、而且目標(biāo)公司地區(qū)投資者保護程度高于中位數(shù)的樣本。若有需要，可與作者聯(lián)系，下同。2. 陳信元、張?zhí)镉啵骸顿Y產(chǎn)重組的市場反應(yīng)1997年滬市資產(chǎn)重組實證分析》，《經(jīng)濟研究》，1999年第9期。5. 李增泉、余謙、王曉坤：《掏空、支持與并購重組來自我國上市公司的經(jīng)驗證據(jù)》，《經(jīng)濟研究》，2005年第1期。7. 李善民等：《收購公司與目標(biāo)公司配對組合績效的實證分析》，《經(jīng)濟研究》，2004年第6期。9. 世界銀行：《中國政府治理、投資環(huán)境與和諧社會：中國120個城市競爭力的提高》，2006年。11. 張維迎、柯榮住：《信任及其解釋：來自中國的跨省調(diào)查分析》，《經(jīng)濟研究》，2002年第10期。：《上市公司并購的短期和長期股價表現(xiàn)》，《當(dāng)代經(jīng)濟科學(xué)》，2006年第3期。A Pay?A Survey of Evidence for the DecisionMaker”,Working Paper,Batten Institute University of Virginia. 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