網(wǎng)絡(luò)尋路階段的合作激勵(lì)機(jī)制探討-在線瀏覽
2025-05-26 02:20本頁面
【正文】 以節(jié)省能量用于中繼合法包。下面我們考慮本文算法對(duì)選擇性丟包的應(yīng)對(duì)能力。兩種類型的節(jié)點(diǎn)在不同場景下的平均吞吐量如表2所示：表2：不同場景下不同類型節(jié)點(diǎn)的平均吞吐量自私節(jié)點(diǎn)丟包概率場景1：不采用本文算法場景2：采用本文算法合作節(jié)點(diǎn)平均吞吐量(包)自私節(jié)點(diǎn)平均吞吐量(包)合作節(jié)點(diǎn)平均吞吐量(包)自私節(jié)點(diǎn)平均吞吐量(包)100%90%80%31870%60%32550%0（合作狀態(tài)）360從上表可以看出，在合作狀態(tài)，本文算法并不會(huì)給網(wǎng)絡(luò)性能帶來負(fù)面影響。場景2中合作節(jié)點(diǎn)啟用本文算法之后，丟包率越大，遭受的懲罰力度越大，自私節(jié)點(diǎn)的吞吐量越小。5 相關(guān)工作 [8]是Ad hoc網(wǎng)絡(luò)自私行為檢測和激勵(lì)領(lǐng)域的開創(chuàng)性文獻(xiàn)。 Watchdog建立在DSR的基礎(chǔ)上，并設(shè)定節(jié)點(diǎn)工作在混雜偵聽模式下。如果在設(shè)定時(shí)間內(nèi)，沒有聽到該包被繼續(xù)傳送到路徑上的下一節(jié)點(diǎn)，那么認(rèn)為下一跳節(jié)點(diǎn)自私丟包。源節(jié)點(diǎn)中的Pathrater部件在選擇路徑時(shí)，避開丟包的自私節(jié)點(diǎn)。不能確定需要監(jiān)測的節(jié)點(diǎn)，也就無法對(duì)節(jié)點(diǎn)是否中繼RREQ包做出判斷。這兩個(gè)方面使得Watchdog無法用于尋路階段自私丟包的檢測。2ACK方法也建立在DSR的基礎(chǔ)上。因此這種方式也不能用于尋路過程中。收到RREQ后再次廣播的節(jié)點(diǎn)可以得到小額的支付，對(duì)最終構(gòu)成源目的路徑的節(jié)點(diǎn)則可以獲得大額支付。但是[20]中只是簡單的描述了這種思想，對(duì)于支付如何實(shí)現(xiàn)、支付的數(shù)量等細(xì)節(jié)問題均缺乏進(jìn)一步的說明。由于路由控制包的有條件中繼模式和鄰居的不確定性，這類自私方式很難通過傳統(tǒng)的Watchdog或基于ACK的方式來檢測。本文建立博弈模型對(duì)算法的有效性進(jìn)行分析，結(jié)果表明即使存在一定的誤判率，我們的算法仍能夠促使節(jié)點(diǎn)達(dá)成合作。參考文獻(xiàn)[1]. Yoo Y., Agrawal D. P., Why does it pay to be selfish in a MANET? IEEE Wireless Communications, 2006, 13(6): 8797[2]. Buttyan L., Hubaux ., Stimulating cooperation in selforganizing mobile ad hoc networks, Mobile Networks and Applications, 2003, 8(5): 579592[3]. Wang W., EideNBenz S., Wang Y., Li ., OURS: Optimal unicast routing systems in noncooperative wireless networks, Proceeding of the Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking(MOBICOM),Los Angeles: ACM Press,2006, 402413[4]. Zhong S., Chen J., Yang R., Sprite: A simple, cheatproof, creditbased system for mobile adhoc networks, Proceedings of INFOCOM, San Francisco: IEEE Press, 2003, 19871997[5]. Buchegger S., Boudec . L., Performance analysis of the CONFIDANT protocol cooperation of nodes fairness in dynamic ad hoc networks, Source: Proceedings of the International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MOBIHOC), Lausanne: ACM Press, 2002, 226236[6]. Buchegger S., Boudec . L., Selfpolicing mobile ad hoc networks by reputation systems, IEEE Communications Magazine，2005, 43(7):101107[7]. He Q., Wu D., Khosl P., A secure incentive architecture for adhoc networks, Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing, 2006, 6(3):333346[8]. Marti S., Giuli ., Lai K. Baker M., Mitigating routing misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks, Proceedings of the Annual International Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking(MOBICOM), Boston: ACM Press, 2000,255265[9]. Huang E., Crowcroft J., Wassell I., Rethinking incentives for mobile ad hoc networks, Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2004 Workshops, Portland: ACM Press, 2004, 191196 [10]. Carruthers R., Nikolaidis I., Certain limitations of reputation–based schemes in mobile environments, Proceedings of the Eighth ACM Symposium on Modeling, Analysis and Simulation of Wireless and Mobile Systems, Montreal: ACM Press, 2005, 211[11]. Srinivasan V., Nuggehalli P., Chiasserini C. F., Rao R. R., Cooperation in wireless ad hoc networks, Proceedings of INFOCOM, San Francisco: IEEE Press, 2003, 808817[12]. Milan F., Jaramillo J. J., Srikant R., Achieving cooperation in multihop wireless networks of selfish nodes, Proceedings of ACM workshop on Game theory for munications and networks, Pisa: ACM Press, 2006 [13]. Felegyhazi M., Buttyan L., Nash equilibrium of packet forwarding strate
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