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How about if this is your own car? 如果這是你自己的汽車,你又會不會去做? Dr. ChakTong Chau Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials 4 我請您們考慮一些問題 ? A medical insurance problem 自費(fèi)醫(yī)療保險(xiǎn)的問題 When we purchase medical insurance, the insurance pany usually requires that you disclose your medical history. Preconditions are usually excluded from the coverage. 購買保險(xiǎn)的時(shí)候,它們通常要求你列出你的病歷。 Dr. ChakTong Chau Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials 5 我請您們考慮一些問題 If you do in fact have some major medical problems that require expensive treatments, would you disclose these problems? 如果你真的有大病 , 你會不會真實(shí)地上報(bào)? What do all these tell us about certain human behavior? 這些問題表明了一些什么的人性行為? Dr. ChakTong Chau Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials 6 Agency Problems and Behavior 代理人的行為與問題 ? A moral hazard problem (道德危機(jī)問題 ) when an individual has an incentive to deviate from the contract and take selfinterested actions because the other party has insufficient information to know if the contract was honored. 醫(yī)療保健 雖然我知道我與雇主的契約明確列出我不要浪費(fèi)公司的資源。 Dr. ChakTong Chau Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials 7 Agency Problems and Behavior 代理人的行為與問題 ? A horizon problem 水平界線問題 If one party’s risk or pensation is not the same as the other party’s, the one with a shorter horizon will tend to secretly maximize the shortterm benefits, at the expense of the other longerterm party. 汽車維修 我明白汽車不維修壽命不會長。 Dr. ChakTong Chau Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials 8 Agency Problems and Behavior 代理人的行為與問題 ? An adverse selection problem 逆向選擇問題 The tendency of individuals with private information about something that affects a potential trading partner’s benefits to make offers that are detrimental to the trading partner. 自費(fèi)醫(yī)療 保險(xiǎn) :雖然我知道保險(xiǎn)公司需要知道我的病歷從而決定保險(xiǎn)費(fèi)。此外,我不說,誰知道。代理人通常有較佳的專長,更好的資訊,和對風(fēng)險(xiǎn)抱保守的態(tài)度(risk adverse)。不過有時(shí)這些成本是由代理人自己負(fù)擔(dān)的。 e2 ? 100 where: Xa = agent’s pensations e = the effort level used by the agent Question 1: If you were the principal in entering the contract, which level of effort (e1, e2, or e3) would you demand? Question 2: If you, the principal, can closely monitor and observe the agent at all time, what