金融專業(yè)外文翻譯-----資本結(jié)構(gòu)決定因素以中國企業(yè)為案例-金融財(cái)政-在線瀏覽
2025-07-30 15:05本頁面
【正文】 ual claim. Consequently, they do not bear the entire cost of these activities. Managers may thus invest less effort in managing the ?rm?s resources, and may be able to transfer ?rm resources to their own personal bene?t, for example through ?empirebuilding? or by consuming ?perquisites? such as corporate jets, luxurious offices etc. The manager bears the entire cost of refraining from these activities, but captures only a fraction of the gain. As a result, managers overindulge in these pursuits relative to the level that would maximize ?rm value. This ineffciency is reduced the larger is the fraction of the ?rm?s equity owned by the manager. Holding constant the manager?s absolute investment in the ?rm, an increase in the debt ratio of the ?rm increases the manager?s share of the equity and mitigates the loss from the con?ict between the manager and shareholders. Moreover, as pointed out by Jensen (1986), since debt mits the ?rm to pay out cash, it reduces the amount of ?free? cash available to managers to engage in the types of pursuits mentioned above. This mitigation of the con?icts between managers and equityholders constitutes a bene?t of debt ?nancing. A number of implications follow from this analysis. First, one wouldexpect bond contracts to include features that attempt to prevent asset substitution, such as interest coverage requirements, prohibitions against investments in new unrelated lines of business, etc. Second, industries in which the opportunities for asset substitution are more limited will have higher debt levels ceteris paribus. Thus, for example, the theory predicts that regulated public utilities, banks, and ?rms in mature industries with few growth opportunities will be more highly leveraged. Third, it is optimal for ?rms with slow or even negative growth, and that have large free cash in ?ows from operations, to have more debt. Large free cash ?ows without good investment prospects create the resources to consume perquisites, build empires, overpay subordinates etc. Increasing debt reduces the amount of ?free cash? and increases the manager?s fractional ownership of the residual claim. According to Jensen (1986) industries with these characteristics include steel, chemicals, brewing, tobacco, television and radio broadcasting, and wood and paper products. The theory predicts that these industries should be characterized by high leverage ratios. . Corporate Control One limitation of agency theory is that it assumes the agency problem can be mitigated, or eliminated, by a prehensive contract which postulates all the future contingencies and states the circumstances in which the manager should take what action, as criticised by Hart (1995a, 1995b). But such a prehensive contract would be very costly to design and/or execute(Williamson, 1988). It may well be optimal to leave the contract inplete, and to assign the equityholders the residual control rights beyond contractual control rights which are assigned to the debtholders (Aghion and Bolton, 1992). This inplete contract approach regards equity and debt as contingent state? securities. When the ?rm is ?nancially healthy, it is the equityholders who have control. But a default of debt repayment will trigger the transfer of control to the debtholders. Liquidation of the ?rm and/or managerial sackings are then
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