【正文】 Modern Enterprise System with shareholding character has achieved notable success. However, malpractice of poor incentive and weak restraining mechanism has not yet been eradicated pletely, shirking behavior and opportunism pervade widely, and shortsighted behavior of operators has led to serious oute. Therefore, effective incentive and restraining mechanism with longterm effect on SOEs’ operators are badly needed. Executive Stock Options (ESO) plan is such kind of incentive mechanism whose prominent characteristic is to bine closely individual’s future fortune and current performance, and also individual’s interest and longterm development of pany. To run ESO in SOEs is to let the operator hold shares that will be beneficial to both principal and agent. In addition that will make operators’ performance relate directly to their economic profit, promote the operators to take corresponding capital responsibility, share the corresponding profit. Therefore, profit will be in proportion to responsibility, and incentive and restraint will be also balanced. Through analyzing and contrasting domestic and foreign theory, this dissertation analyzes the feasibility of the ESO plan in China, and establishment of ESO program suitable for SOE in China. Based on the above mentioned purpose, this dissertation, through referring to a large amount of domestic and foreign material, discusses in details basic theory, development direction, implementation ponents, legal environment problems and setbacks of ESO, and analyzes and mends some cases of implementation of ESO in foreign countries. Based on analysis as to status quo of SOEs, this dissertation discusses the significance of implementation of ESO plan in SOEs. Furthermore, though case studying, this dissertation analyzes and contrast ESO models, and concludes characters and problems of establishing ESO in SOEs. In the final chapter, this dissertation points out the key factors in designing program for ESO. Based on actual situation of SOEs, this dissertation puts forward a ESO program which is suitable for some listed SOEs. This program is not only exercisable to listed SOEs， but also useful for nonlisted panies for their reference. Key Word: stock option, incentive, restraint, the Stateowned Enterprises 企業(yè)股票期權(quán)激勵制度研究與方案 第一章 引言 ......................................................................................................................................................... 1 雇員股票期權(quán)的概念及分類 ...................................................................................................................... 3 雇員股票 期權(quán)概念 ................................................................................................................................ 3 雇員股票期權(quán)（以下簡稱股票期權(quán)）的分類 .......................................................................... 4 股票期權(quán)的起源和發(fā)展 .............................................................................................................................. 4 股票期權(quán)計劃的發(fā)展 .......................................................................................................................... 4 股票期權(quán)的思想淵源 ....................................................................................................................... 5 股票期權(quán)計劃在世界范圍內(nèi)興起 ............................................................................................... 6 MBO 經(jīng)理人融資收購簡介 ........................................................................................................................ 7 第二章 股票期權(quán) —— 美國企業(yè)薪酬制度的創(chuàng)新 ................................................................................... 9 傳統(tǒng)的薪酬制度 ............................................................................................................................................ 9 基本工資水平的確定 ........................................................................................................................10 年度獎金的確定 ..............................................................................................................................10 長期激勵機制 ............................................................................................................................................... 10 股票期權(quán)計劃實施要素分析 ................................................................................................................... 11 第三章 美國企業(yè)實行股票期權(quán)計劃現(xiàn)狀分析 ..........................................................................................14 股票期權(quán)計劃迅速發(fā)展的原因分析 ................................................................................................... 14 美國現(xiàn)行股票期權(quán)制度的弊端 ............................................................................................................ 15 美國企業(yè)實行股票期權(quán)計劃案例分析 .............................................................................................. 17 第四章 股票期權(quán)激勵機制在我國國有企業(yè)改革中的實 踐 ..................................................................17 我國國有企業(yè)改革基本問題討論 ......................................................................................................... 17 國有企業(yè)分類 ......................................................................................................................................18 國有企業(yè)目標 ......................................................................................................................................18 股票期權(quán)激勵機制對我國的國有企業(yè)改革的作用 ...............................................................18 股票期權(quán)計劃在我國國有企業(yè)的實踐分析 .................................................................................... 20 我國國有企業(yè)實行股票期權(quán)激勵制度的特點與問題 .................................................................. 20 第五章 我國國有企業(yè)實行股票期權(quán)激勵方案設(shè)計 ...................................................................................22 股票期權(quán)計劃的關(guān)鍵設(shè)計因 素 .....................................................................