外文翻譯----網(wǎng)絡(luò)團(tuán)購(gòu)中的不確定性需求細(xì)分-文庫(kù)吧資料
2025-05-22 11:23本頁(yè)面
【正文】 rs associated with low demand. In the author’s proposed price mechanism, the seller sets a price curve instead of a single price, so as to be able to offer different prices depending on the different demand conditions that appear to obtain in the marketplace. It may be useful in such settings to employ an automated pricesearching mechanism, which is demonstrated to be more robust to the uncertain demand than a uniform price mechanism will, relative to expected profits. Unlike Dana’s (2020) work though, we will study settings in which there are fewer buyers who exhibit demand at higher prices and more buyers who exhibit demand at lower prices. This is a useful way to characterize groupbuying, since most participating consumers truly are pricesensitive, and this is what makes groupbuying auction interesting to them. Nocke and Peitz (2020) have studied rationing as a tool that a monopolist to optimize its sales policy in the presence of uncertain demand. The authors examined three different selling policies that they argue are potentially optimal in their environment: uniform pricing, clearance sales, and introductory offers. A uniform pricing policy involves no seller price discrimination, though consumers are likely to exhibit different levels of willingnesstopay when they are permitted to express themselves through purchases at different price levels. A current example of uniform pricing policy is iTunes (), which has been offering 99162。中文 3600字 畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)） 外文翻譯 題 目： 網(wǎng)絡(luò)團(tuán)購(gòu)的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀與問(wèn)題探究 一、外文原文 標(biāo)題： Segmenting uncertain demand in groupbuying auctions 原文： Demand uncertainty is a key factor in a seller’s decisionmaking process for products sold through online auctions. We explore demand uncertainty in groupbuying auctions in terms of the extent of lowvaluation demand and highvaluation demand. We focus on the analysis of a monopolistic groupbuying retailer that sells products to consumers who express different product valuations. We also examine the performance of a groupbuying seller who faces petitive postedprice sellers in a market for the sale of the same products, under similar assumptions about uncertain demand. Based on a Nash equilibrium analysis of bidder strategies for both of these sellerside petition structures, we are able to characterize the groupbuying auction bidders’ dominant strategies. We obtained a number of interesting findings. Groupbuying is likely to be more effective in settings where there is larger lowvaluation demand than highvaluation demand. The structure of demand matters. This finding has relevance to the marketplace for new cameras, nextgeneration microprocessors and puters, and other highvaluation goods, which are unlikely to be as effectively sold in groupbuying markets. We obtained additional results for the case of continuous demand, and find that there is a basis for the seller to improve revenues via effective groupbuying auction price curve design. Keywords: Consumer behavior, bidding strategy, demand uncertainty, economic analysis, electronic markets, groupbuying auctions, market mechanism, postedprice mechanism, simulation, uncertainty risk. The development of advanced IT makes it possible to use novel business models to handle business problems in new and innovative ways. With the growth of the Inter, a number of new electronic auction mechanisms have emerged, and auctions are generally known to create hi
畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)相關(guān)推薦
鄂ICP備17016276號(hào)-1