【正文】 closing prices typically decline monotonically in the total purchase quantities of participating buyers, and not just based on an individual buyer’s purchase quantities. So a groupbuying auction does not lead to price discrimination among different buyers and every buyer will be charged the same closing price. Second, in groupbuying auctions, imperfect information may have an impact on performance and make the final auction price uncertain. Groupbuying is not the same as what happens with corporate shopping clubs or affinity groupbased buying though. With these other mechanisms, consumers will be associated with one another in some way, and be able to obtain quantity discounts as a result. Another variant of the quantity discount mechanism occurs on the Inter with shopping clubs and “powerbuying” Web sites. (), Buyer’s Advantage ( ), and Online Choice () are examples that we have recently observed in the marketplace. With uncertainty about the ultimate number of the bidders who will participate, interested consumers may not know whether they can get the products, or what the closing price will be when they make a bid. This may even occur when they bid the lowest price on the groupbuying price curve. Third, in the quantity discount mechanism, to achieve a discount the buyer must order more than the threshold number of items required. In groupbuying, the buyer can get the discount by ordering more herself or persuading other bidders to order more, as we saw with the “TellaFriend” link at LetsBuy for cobuying (and at the active groupdonation site, , ). A final consideration in some groupbuying auctions is that a buyer may be able to choose her own bidding price, which makes this kind of auction similar to an open outcry auction. In practice, many buyers will only be willing to state a low bid price, unless they can rely on the design of the mechanism to faithfully handle information about their actual reservation price. Groupbuying auctions have a key, but paradoxical feature: to reach a lower price and higher sale quantity bucket, the consumer may need to enter the auction at a higher price and lower sales quantity bucket (Chen et al. 2020). 出處： J. Chen, . Kauffman, Y. Liu, X. uncertain demand in groupbuying auctions[R]. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 2020,3(001). 二、翻譯文章 標題： 網(wǎng)絡團購中的不確定性需求細分 譯文： 不確定性需求，是賣家通過網(wǎng)絡拍賣形式銷售產(chǎn)品的決策過程中的一個關鍵因素。以一個納什投標者對這些賣方競爭結構的均衡分析策略為依據(jù)，我們能夠描述出一種團購拍賣出價者占優(yōu)策略。這項發(fā)現(xiàn)和新型相機、下一代衛(wèi)星處理器、計算機和其他那些看似不太可能在團購市場上有效銷售的高價產(chǎn)品有關。隨著網(wǎng)絡的日益發(fā)展，許多新的電子拍賣機制出現(xiàn)了，當一項拍賣的成本流失最小或無成本的時候，拍賣通常被理解為是為了設定比標價更高的預期賣方收入 (王 1993)。基于網(wǎng)絡的賣家和數(shù)字媒介已經(jīng)接受了這種市場機制例如“ LetsBuyIt” (. ) 和“ ” ()，這些網(wǎng)站提供不同于傳統(tǒng)拍賣的“轉換市場”機制。麥長基以及其他人 (1991)已經(jīng)在實驗研究探索了多數(shù)單位的成功拍賣。從而，產(chǎn)生了不同的消費者愿付水平需求結構問題。不確定性需求，消費者行為和涉及到機制設計問題；拍賣經(jīng)濟學和機制設計理論；當前 IS和電子商務文學中的團購拍賣運行理論知識。最終，有消費者是否愿意現(xiàn)在購買的暫時性考慮，或他們在購買后的質量和價格是否可抽樣的長期考慮。 達納 (2020)指出當一個壟斷賣方不確定消費需求環(huán)境時，通 常不會對所有消費者設定一個統(tǒng)一的價格來求自身利益最大化。然而不像達納 (2020)研究的那樣，我們將會在較高價的少量買家的展會需求、和在較低價的多數(shù)買家的展會需求的情況下進行研究。一個統(tǒng)一的定價策略不包括賣方價格歧視，雖然消費者在被允許通過不同價格水平購買表達自己的時候，很可能顯現(xiàn)出不同的愿意支付水平。高價值的消費者可能決定在銷售產(chǎn)品高價時就購買，雖然賣家限量供應內在可能性的價格比低價稍稍高一些。 消費者在一個最初低價定量配給的規(guī)模產(chǎn)品上設定一個高價，發(fā)現(xiàn)這在高價購買產(chǎn)品上可能是理想的。所以一個專營商的最佳價格策略是提供一個抽獎的名單，類似于消費者購買它的不同價位的產(chǎn)品。因此，賣方可能試圖通過利用市場信號來改善對消費者需求的預測，這樣在銷售的時候可能觀察被觀察到。 團購拍賣機制的一些可能性 文獻中呈現(xiàn)出了和團購拍賣機制設計相關聯(lián)的一些關鍵性特征。 其次，在團購拍賣中，不完全信息可能會在產(chǎn)品性能上有影響，并制作最終拍賣不確定價格。同最終參與投標的人數(shù)不確定性有關，感興趣的消費者可能不知道他們是否能夠得到產(chǎn)品，或者當他們出標時會是什么樣的臨界價格。 在某些團購拍賣中，最后要考慮的是一個買方可能選擇他自己報的價格 ——有些類似公開喊叫拍賣