外文翻譯----網(wǎng)絡(luò)團(tuán)購(gòu)中的不確定性需求細(xì)分-免費(fèi)閱讀
【正文】 在某些團(tuán)購(gòu)拍賣(mài)中，最后要考慮的是一個(gè)買(mǎi)方可能選擇他自己報(bào)的價(jià)格 ——有些類(lèi)似公開(kāi)喊叫拍賣(mài)了。 其次，在團(tuán)購(gòu)拍賣(mài)中，不完全信息可能會(huì)在產(chǎn)品性能上有影響，并制作最終拍賣(mài)不確定價(jià)格。因此，賣(mài)方可能試圖通過(guò)利用市場(chǎng)信號(hào)來(lái)改善對(duì)消費(fèi)者需求的預(yù)測(cè)，這樣在銷(xiāo)售的時(shí)候可能觀察被觀察到。 消費(fèi)者在一個(gè)最初低價(jià)定量配給的規(guī)模產(chǎn)品上設(shè)定一個(gè)高價(jià)，發(fā)現(xiàn)這在高價(jià)購(gòu)買(mǎi)產(chǎn)品上可能是理想的。一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的定價(jià)策略不包括賣(mài)方價(jià)格歧視，雖然消費(fèi)者在被允許通過(guò)不同價(jià)格水平購(gòu)買(mǎi)表達(dá)自己的時(shí)候，很可能顯現(xiàn)出不同的愿意支付水平。 達(dá)納 (2020)指出當(dāng)一個(gè)壟斷賣(mài)方不確定消費(fèi)需求環(huán)境時(shí)，通 常不會(huì)對(duì)所有消費(fèi)者設(shè)定一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的價(jià)格來(lái)求自身利益最大化。不確定性需求，消費(fèi)者行為和涉及到機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)問(wèn)題；拍賣(mài)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)和機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)理論；當(dāng)前 IS和電子商務(wù)文學(xué)中的團(tuán)購(gòu)拍賣(mài)運(yùn)行理論知識(shí)。麥長(zhǎng)基以及其他人 (1991)已經(jīng)在實(shí)驗(yàn)研究探索了多數(shù)單位的成功拍賣(mài)。隨著網(wǎng)絡(luò)的日益發(fā)展，許多新的電子拍賣(mài)機(jī)制出現(xiàn)了，當(dāng)一項(xiàng)拍賣(mài)的成本流失最小或無(wú)成本的時(shí)候，拍賣(mài)通常被理解為是為了設(shè)定比標(biāo)價(jià)更高的預(yù)期賣(mài)方收入 (王 1993)。以一個(gè)納什投標(biāo)者對(duì)這些賣(mài)方競(jìng)爭(zhēng)結(jié)構(gòu)的均衡分析策略為依據(jù)，我們能夠描述出一種團(tuán)購(gòu)拍賣(mài)出價(jià)者占優(yōu)策略。中文 3600字 畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)） 外文翻譯 題 目： 網(wǎng)絡(luò)團(tuán)購(gòu)的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀與問(wèn)題探究 一、外文原文 標(biāo)題： Segmenting uncertain demand in groupbuying auctions 原文： Demand uncertainty is a key factor in a seller’s decisionmaking process for products sold through online auctions. We explore demand uncertainty in groupbuying auctions in terms of the extent of lowvaluation demand and highvaluation demand. We focus on the analysis of a monopolistic groupbuying retailer that sells products to consumers who express different product valuations. We also examine the performance of a groupbuying seller who faces petitive postedprice sellers in a market for the sale of the same products, under similar assumptions about uncertain demand. Based on a Nash equilibrium analysis of bidder strategies for both of these sellerside petition structures, we are able to characterize the groupbuying auction bidders’ dominant strategies. We obtained a number of interesting findings. Groupbuying is likely to be more effective in settings where there is larger lowvaluation demand than highvaluation demand. The structure of demand matters. This finding has relevance to the marketplace for new cameras, nextgeneration microprocessors and puters, and other highvaluation goods, which are unlikely to be as effectively sold in groupbuying markets. We obtained additional results for the case of continuous demand, and find that there is a basis for the seller to improve revenues via effective groupbuying auction price curve design. Keywords: Consumer behavior, bidding strategy, demand uncertainty, economic analysis, electronic markets, groupbuying auctions, market mechanism, postedprice mechanism, simulation, uncertainty risk. The development of advanced IT makes it possible to use novel business models to handle business problems in new and innovative ways. With the growth of the Inter, a number of new electronic auction mechanisms have emerged, and auctions are generally known to create higher expected seller revenue than postedprices when the cost of running an auction is minimal or costless (Wang 1993). Some of the new mechanisms we have seen include the online Yankee and Dutch auctions, and the “nameyourownprice” and “buyitnow” mechanisms. An example is eBay’s Dutch auction for the sale of multiple items of the same description. Another of these new electronic market mechanisms that we have observed is the groupbuying auction, a homogeneous multiunit auction (Mitchell 2020, Li et al. 2020).Interbased sellers and digital intermediaries have adopted this market mechanism on sites such as () and (). These sites offer transactionmaking mechanisms that are different from traditional auctions. In traditional auctions, bidders pete against one another to be the groupbuying auctions, however, bidders have an incentive to aggregate their bids so that the seller or digital intermedia
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