外文翻譯----網(wǎng)絡(luò)團(tuán)購(gòu)中的不確定性需求細(xì)分(已修改)
2025-06-01 11:23 本頁(yè)面
【正文】 中文 3600字 畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)） 外文翻譯 題 目： 網(wǎng)絡(luò)團(tuán)購(gòu)的發(fā)展現(xiàn)狀與問(wèn)題探究 一、外文原文 標(biāo)題： Segmenting uncertain demand in groupbuying auctions 原文： Demand uncertainty is a key factor in a seller’s decisionmaking process for products sold through online auctions. We explore demand uncertainty in groupbuying auctions in terms of the extent of lowvaluation demand and highvaluation demand. We focus on the analysis of a monopolistic groupbuying retailer that sells products to consumers who express different product valuations. We also examine the performance of a groupbuying seller who faces petitive postedprice sellers in a market for the sale of the same products, under similar assumptions about uncertain demand. Based on a Nash equilibrium analysis of bidder strategies for both of these sellerside petition structures, we are able to characterize the groupbuying auction bidders’ dominant strategies. We obtained a number of interesting findings. Groupbuying is likely to be more effective in settings where there is larger lowvaluation demand than highvaluation demand. The structure of demand matters. This finding has relevance to the marketplace for new cameras, nextgeneration microprocessors and puters, and other highvaluation goods, which are unlikely to be as effectively sold in groupbuying markets. We obtained additional results for the case of continuous demand, and find that there is a basis for the seller to improve revenues via effective groupbuying auction price curve design. Keywords: Consumer behavior, bidding strategy, demand uncertainty, economic analysis, electronic markets, groupbuying auctions, market mechanism, postedprice mechanism, simulation, uncertainty risk. The development of advanced IT makes it possible to use novel business models to handle business problems in new and innovative ways. With the growth of the Inter, a number of new electronic auction mechanisms have emerged, and auctions are generally known to create higher expected seller revenue than postedprices when the cost of running an auction is minimal or costless (Wang 1993). Some of the new mechanisms we have seen include the online Yankee and Dutch auctions, and the “nameyourownprice” and “buyitnow” mechanisms. An example is eBay’s Dutch auction for the sale of multiple items of the same description. Another of these new electronic market mechanisms that we have observed is the groupbuying auction, a homogeneous multiunit auction (Mitchell 2020, Li et al. 2020).Interbased sellers and digital intermediaries have adopted this market mechanism on sites such as () and (). These sites offer transactionmaking mechanisms that are different from traditional auctions. In traditional auctions, bidders pete against one another to be the groupbuying auctions, however, bidders have an incentive to aggregate their bids so that the seller or digital intermediary offers a lower price at which they all can buy the desired goods (Horn et al. 2020). McCabe et al. (1991) have explored multiunit Vickrey auctions in experimental research, however, they did not consider the possibility of stochastic bidder arrival or demand uncertainty. This paper is the first to examine the impacts of demand uncertainty on the performance on online groupbuying auctions. Based on a Nash equilibrium analysis of bidder strategies for a monopolist seller and a petitive seller, we are able to characterize the groupbuying
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