外文翻譯----網(wǎng)絡(luò)團(tuán)購中的不確定性需求細(xì)分-文庫吧在線文庫
【正文】 分析，即向那些需要不同產(chǎn)品價(jià)值的消費(fèi)者銷售產(chǎn)品。 and current theoretical knowledge about the operation of groupbuying auctions from the IS and electronic merce literature. Demand Uncertainty, Consumer Behavior and Mechanism Design Demand uncertainties typically are posed of consumer demand environment uncertainty (or uncertainty about the aggregate level of consumer demand) and randomness of demand in the marketplace (reflected in brief temporal changes and demand shocks that are not expected to persist). Consumer uncertainty about demand in the marketplace can occur based on the valuation of products, and whether consumers are willing to pay higher or lower prices. It may also occur on the basis of demand levels, especially the number of the consumers in the market. Finally, there are temporal considerations, which involve whether a consumer wishes to buy now, or whether they may be sampling quality and pricing with the intention of buying later. We distinguish between different demand level environments. In addition, it is possible that these consumer demand environments may coexist, as is often the case when firms make strategies for price discrimination. This prompts a seller to consider setting more than one price level, as we often see in realworld retailing, as well as groupbuying auctions. Dana (2020) pointed out that when a monopoly seller faces uncertainty about the consumer demand environment, it usually will not be in his best interest to set uniform prices for all consumers. The author studied a scenario in which there were more buyers associated with high demand and fewer buyers associated with low demand. In the author’s proposed price mechanism, the seller sets a price curve instead of a single price, so as to be able to offer different prices depending on the different demand conditions that appear to obtain in the marketplace. It may be useful in such settings to employ an automated pricesearching mechanism, which is demonstrated to be more robust to the uncertain demand than a uniform price mechanism will, relative to expected profits. Unlike Dana’s (2020) work though, we will study settings in which there are fewer buyers who exhibit demand at higher prices and more buyers who exhibit demand at lower prices. This is a useful way to characterize groupbuying, since most participating consumers truly are pricesensitive, and this is what makes groupbuying auction interesting to them. Nocke and Peitz (2020) have studied rationing as a tool that a monopolist to optimize its sales policy in the presence of uncertain demand. The authors examined three different selling policies that they argue are potentially optimal in their environment: uniform pricing, clearance sales, and introductory offers. A uniform pricing policy involves no seller price discrimination, though consumers are likely to exhibit different levels of willingnesstopay when they are permitted to express themselves through purchases at different price levels. A current example of uniform pricing policy is iTunes (), which has been offering 99162。需求的結(jié)構(gòu)問題。 2020)。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)網(wǎng)站上低價(jià)需求的團(tuán)購很可能比高價(jià)需求的更具有效果。它也可能發(fā)生在以需求水平為依據(jù)尤其是市場(chǎng)消費(fèi)者數(shù)目上。它可以在這種環(huán)境中利用一個(gè)自動(dòng)覓價(jià)機(jī)制，相對(duì)于期望的利潤(rùn)而言，需求不確定性已經(jīng)被論證了比一個(gè)統(tǒng)一價(jià)格機(jī)制需求更堅(jiān)固。 諾奇和派茨 (2020)闡述了一個(gè)清晰的銷售政策，最初是制定高價(jià)，但是之后又降低價(jià)格，給低價(jià)消費(fèi)者提供剩余產(chǎn)品 —— 經(jīng)常在百貨公司銷售政策中見到的那樣。澈和蓋爾 (2020)指出消費(fèi)者有關(guān)于他們的預(yù)算限制和他們的計(jì)價(jià)項(xiàng)目?jī)r(jià)值的私人信息。德拉姆和朗德 (2020)以一個(gè)策劃為依據(jù)來量化預(yù)測(cè)錯(cuò)誤，估算預(yù)測(cè) 誤差的關(guān)聯(lián)性并隨著時(shí)間的推移建立起預(yù)測(cè)演化模型。另一種數(shù)量折扣機(jī)制的變化發(fā)生在網(wǎng)絡(luò)上，例如：購物俱樂部、“購買力”網(wǎng)站、網(wǎng)絡(luò)營(yíng)銷網(wǎng)站 ()，買方優(yōu)勢(shì) ( )和在線選擇
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