【正文】 cheme that estimates the variance and correlation of forecast errors and models the evolution of forecasts over time. . Some Properties of GroupBuying Auction Mechanism Some of the key characteristics associated with groupbuying auction mechanism design are present in the literature. The groupbuying auction mechanism is fundamentally different from the typical quantity discount mechanism (Dolan 1987, Weng 1995, Corbett and DeGroote 2020) that is often used in consumer and businesstobusiness procurement settings. First, groupbuying closing prices typically decline monotonically in the total purchase quantities of participating buyers, and not just based on an individual buyer’s purchase quantities. So a groupbuying auction does not lead to price discrimination among different buyers and every buyer will be charged the same closing price. Second, in groupbuying auctions, imperfect information may have an impact on performance and make the final auction price uncertain. Groupbuying is not the same as what happens with corporate shopping clubs or affinity groupbased buying though. With these other mechanisms, consumers will be associated with one another in some way, and be able to obtain quantity discounts as a result. Another variant of the quantity discount mechanism occurs on the Inter with shopping clubs and “powerbuying” Web sites. (), Buyer’s Advantage ( ), and Online Choice () are examples that we have recently observed in the marketplace. With uncertainty about the ultimate number of the bidders who will participate, interested consumers may not know whether they can get the products, or what the closing price will be when they make a bid. This may even occur when they bid the lowest price on the groupbuying price curve. Third, in the quantity discount mechanism, to achieve a discount the buyer must order more than the threshold number of items required. In groupbuying, the buyer can get the discount by ordering more herself or persuading other bidders to order more, as we saw with the “TellaFriend” link at LetsBuy for cobuying (and at the active groupdonation site, , ). A final consideration in some groupbuying auctions is that a buyer may be able to choose her own bidding price, which makes this kind of auction similar to an open outcry auction. In practice, many buyers will only be willing to state a low bid price, unless they can rely on the design of the mechanism to faithfully handle information about their actual reservation price. Groupbuying auctions have a key, but paradoxical feature: to reach a lower price and higher sale quantity bucket, the consumer may need to enter the auction at a higher price and lower sales quantity bucket (Chen et al. 2020). 出處： J. Chen, . Kauffman, Y. Liu, X. uncertain demand in groupbuying auctions[R]. Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 2020,3(001). 二、翻譯文章 標(biāo)題： 網(wǎng)絡(luò)團(tuán)購中的不確定性需求細(xì)分 譯文： 不確定性需求，是賣家通過網(wǎng)絡(luò)拍賣形式銷售產(chǎn)品的決策過程中的一個關(guān)鍵因素。這項(xiàng)發(fā)現(xiàn)和新型相機(jī)、下一代衛(wèi)星處理器、計算機(jī)和其他那些看似不太可能在團(tuán)購市場上有效銷售的高價產(chǎn)品有關(guān)?；诰W(wǎng)絡(luò)的賣家和數(shù)字媒介已經(jīng)接受了這種市場機(jī)制例如“ LetsBuyIt” (. ) 和“ ” ()，這些網(wǎng)站提供不同于傳統(tǒng)拍賣的“轉(zhuǎn)換市場”機(jī)制。從而，產(chǎn)生了不同的消費(fèi)者愿付水平需求結(jié)構(gòu)問題。最終，有消費(fèi)者是否愿意現(xiàn)在購買的暫時性考慮，或他們在購買后的質(zhì)量和價格是否可抽樣的長期考慮。然而不像達(dá)納 (2020)研究的那樣，我們將會在較高價的少量買家的展會需求、和在較低價的多數(shù)買家的展會需求的情況下進(jìn)行研究。高價值的消費(fèi)者可能決定在銷售產(chǎn)品高價時就購買，雖然賣家限量供應(yīng)內(nèi)在可能性的價格比低價稍稍高一些。所以一個專營商的最佳價格策略是提供一個抽獎的名單，類似于消費(fèi)者購買它的不同價位的產(chǎn)品。 團(tuán)購拍賣機(jī)制的一些可能性 文獻(xiàn)中呈現(xiàn)出了和團(tuán)購拍賣機(jī)制設(shè)計相關(guān)聯(lián)的一些關(guān)鍵性特征。同最終參與投標(biāo)的人數(shù)不確定性有關(guān)，感興趣的消費(fèi)者可能不知道他們是否能夠得到產(chǎn)品，或者當(dāng)他們出標(biāo)時會是什么樣的臨界價