最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)及其它價(jià)值的作用外文翻譯-文庫吧資料
2025-05-22 00:41本頁面
【正文】 ?rm that explicitly chooses for more objectives than value maximization alone. This may be because the shareholders adopt a multiple stakeholders approach or because of a different ownership structure than the usual corporate structure dominating ?nance literature. An example of the latter is the cooperation, a legal entity which can be found, in among others, many European countries. For a discussion on why ?rms are facing multiple goals, we refer to Hallerbach and Spronk 。 According to the neoclassical view on the role of the ?rm, the ?rm has one single objective: maximization of shareholder value. Shareholders possess the property rights of the ?rm and are thus entitled to decide what the ?rm should aim for. Since shareholders only have one objective in mind wealth maximization the goal of the ?rm is maximization of the ?rm’s contribution to the ?nancial wealth of its shareholders. The ?rm can acplish this by investing in projects with a positive present value. Part of shareholder value is determined by the corporate ?nancing decision. Two theories about the capital structure of the ?rm the tradeoff theory and the pecking order theory assume shareholder wealth maximization as the one and only corporate objective. We will discuss both theories including several market value related extensions. Based on this discussion we formulate a list of criteria that is relevant for the corporate ?nancing decision in this essentially neoclassical view. The original proposition I of Modigliani and Miller tates that in a perfect capital market the equilibrium market value of a ?rm is independent of its capital structure, . the debtequity ratio. If proposition I does not hold then arbitrage will take place. Investors will buy shares of the undervalued ?rm and sell shares of the overvalued ?rm in such a way that identical ine streams are obtained. As investors exploit these arbitrage opportunities, the price of the overvalued shares will fall and that of the undervalued shares will rise, until both prices are equal. When corporate taxes are introduced , proposition I changes dramatically. Modigliani and Miller show that in a world with corporate tax the value of ?rms is among others a function of leverage. When interest payments bee tax deductible and payments to shareholders are not, the capital structure that maximizes ?rm value involves a hundred percent debt ?nancing. By increasing leverage, the payments to the government are reduced with a higher cash ?ow for the providers of capital as a result. The difference between the present value of the taxes paid by an unlevered ?rm and an identical levered ?rm is the present value of tax shields . In the traditional tradeoff models of optimal capital structure it is assumed that ?rms balance the marginal present value of interest tax shields against the marginal direct costs of ?nancial distress or direct bankruptcy costs. Additional factors can be included in this tradeoff framework. Other costs than direct costs of ?nancial distress are agency costs of debt . Often cited examples of agency costs of debt are the underinvestment problem, the asset substitution problem ， the “play for time” game by managers, the “unexpected increase of leverage (bined with an equivalent pay out to stockholders to make to increase the impact),” the “refusal to contribute equity capital” and the “cash in and run” game . These problems are caused by the difference of interest between equity and debt holders and could be seen as part of the indirect costs of ?nancial distress. Another bene?t of debt besides the PVTS is the reduction of agency costs between managers and external holders of equity. Jensen and Meckling argue that debt, by allowing larger managerial residual claims because the need for external equity i
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