【正文】 parison with other structural factors, such as domestic demand imbalances for G3 and improving the investment environment (for Foreign Direct Investment—FDI) and export petitiveness in China relative to other countries. There are far better ways to address the imbalances with little distraction for China’s challenging domestic reform agenda. In particular, labor costs in China are rising. China’s political capital is best invested in other areas of structural reform. Unfortunately, given its much larger influence on the global economy, China probably cannot say “no” this time to external political pressure and may move sooner than it would like. If history proves that China depegged before it is capable of handling the shock, the lesson would be that the G7 failed to recognize that a stable, orderly progressing China is in the best interest of all. For the longer term, few doubt that China must adopt a more flexible exchange rate regime in this postBreton Woods environment. A flexible RMB will allow China to conduct independent moary policy (with an open capital account) and minimize the impact of fluctuations of major currencies, especially the . dollar’s gyrations against the euro and the yen. China’s outward investment needs are growing rapidly and would benefit from a flexible RMB. But first, China needs to clean up the banking system, adjust capital accounts, and develop healthy and robust domestic financial markets. We can expect that a flexible exchange rate will improve China’s overall financial system. China has so far learned valuable lessons of the perils of opening the market too soon and allowing a currency to appreciate too fast from the experience of Japan and Southeast Asia. Going forward, it needs to study the positive lessons of liberalizing the exchange rates. The successful cases studies of Poland (from the dollar peg in 1990 to free float in 2020) and Chile (from fixed rate in 1981 to plete float in 1999) clearly show that liberalization can be acplished without a major crisis。 but this does not suggest that changing the exchange rate right now would be a better alternative. On the contrary, an abrupt change in the foreign exchange regime would increase uncertainty and jeopardize the ability to finetune macro policies. Indeed, as Rogoff suggests, abandoning the peg to the dollar could be seen as abandoning China’s mitment to stable and sustainable macroeconomic growth. The Issue Is Mostly Political The growing . external deficits are clearly unsustainable and must be addressed. It has been argued that the longer the United States waits, the higher the potential shock or damage there will be (Mann, 2020。 underfunded pension and social security systems。 and ? the RMB’s undervaluation and its peg to the dollar are preventing other Asian countries from allowing currencies to rise against the dollar, since appreciation would damage petiveness relative to China. This last point is of particular concern because, it is argued , . external imbalances cannot be addressed in the face of China’s and other Asian nations’ historically unprecedented accumulations of . dollar reserves in recent years .There have been many studies on the RMB’s valuation with inconclusive, contradictory results (see, .,Wang, 2020). To address that difficult valuation question, this paper develops a new absolute PPP index that measures China’s PPP against the United States and other countries. The new index shows the RMB to be substantially undervalued in the context of “conventional wisdom.” However, the undervaluation is not unusual, given China’s level of economic development。外文 原文 The Chinese RMB: Its Value, Its Peg, and Its Future TRADE IMBALANCES HAVE MORE TO DO WITH THE . THAN WITH CHINA The valuation of the Chinese renminbi (RMB) has drawn lots of attention lately and a great deal of pressure on the part of developed nations for revaluation. In addressing the issue of valuation, this paper develops a new purchasing power parity (PPP) index of China’s exchange rate and finds that the while undervalued, the undervaluation is neither unusual nor bad policy. Moreover, China’s overall external trade balance