企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)管理基礎(chǔ)知識(shí)(ppt19頁(yè))英文版(參考版)
2025-03-05 13:32本頁(yè)面
【正文】 62 = 100 X = 18,496 Dr. ChakTong Chau 8 Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials Can Private Information to Agent Benefit the Principal? Now, if the Principal cannot observe effort, how would he pay the agent? How about this pensation contract (a fixed salary of $18,496) to agent? Would this work? S1 S2 S3 S4 Expected Utility to A Expected Payoff to P Prob. e1=0 18,496 18,496 18,496 18,496 e2= 5 18,496 18,496 18,496 18,496 e3= 6 18,496 18,496 18,496 18,496 136 111 100 18,496 5,254 10,254 Thus, a fixed salary to someone whom you cannot observe won’t work. A “moral hazard” problem will e into play. Dr. ChakTong Chau 9 Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials Can Private Information to Agent Benefit the Principal? Now then, what about a contingent salary of $18,496 to agent? Would this improve the Principal’s payoff? S1 S2 S3 S4 Expected Utility to A Expected Payoff to P Prob. e1=0 0 0 0 0 e2= 5 18,496 18,496 0 18,496 e3= 6 18,496 18,496 18,496 18,496 0 77 100 0 9,878 10,254 Now, the contingent salary contract will improve by forcing the Agent to give (e3 = 6). Let us now look at the “private information to agent” issue! Dr. ChakTong Chau 10 Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials Can Private Information to Agent Benefit the Principal? This private information system (only observable to the agent) generates these signals: {S1, S2} {S3 ,S4} Y1 Y2 Would the contingent salary of $18,496 to agent still work? Signal: Y1 Y2 Expected Utility to Agent with Private info Expected Payoff to Principal with Private info S1 S2 S3 S4 Prob. e1=0 0 0 0 0 e2= 5 18,496 18,496 0 18,496 (100) 7,754 (10,254) e3= 6 18,496 18,496 18,496 18,496 Dr. ChakTong Chau 11
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