【正文】
Prob. e1=0 0 0 0 0 e2= 5 15,170 (20,000) 15,170 (25,000) 15,170 (25,000) 17,030 (30,000) e3= 6 15,170 (20,000) 17,030 (30,000) 17,030 (30,000) 21,074 (35,000) Now, if Y1 is observed, what would the agent do? U(e2) = 15,1701/2 – 52 = U(e3) = 15,1701/2* +17,0301/2* – 62 = Thus, the Principal in fact tells the agent to be lazy! Dr. ChakTong Chau 16 Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials Signal: Y1 Y2 S1 S2 S3 S4 Prob. e1=0 0 0 0 0 e2= 5 15,170 (20,000) 15,170 (25,000) 15,170 (25,000) 17,030 (30,000) e3= 6 15,170 (20,000) 17,030 (30,000) 17,030 (30,000) 21,074 (35,000) Then, if Y2 is observed, what would the agent do? U(e2) = 15,1701/2 * + 17,0301/2* – 52 = U(e3) = 17,0301/2* + 21,0741/2* – 62 = This time, the agent will want to work hard. On average, * + * = 100 So, this is acceptable to the agent. Dr. ChakTong Chau 17 Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials But for the Principal, why should he care? Signal: Y1 Y2 S1 S2 S3 S4 Prob. e2= 5 20,000 25,000 e3= 6 30,000 35,000 Wages to A (15,170) (15,170) (17,030) (21,074) Expected Residual 1, 2, 3, 3, 10,389 Note that this is larger than 10,254, the optimal solution under perfect information. Thus, seemingly useless information can be useful! Dr. ChakTong Chau 18 Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials In Conclusion, ? We cannot guarrantee that people will always do the ethically correct things. ? Therefore, they will have to be monitored and controlled. ? Information systems provide us with the means to: ? inform us what has happened, and ? motivate people to do the ethically correct things. ? It is therefore important to consider these points in designing any managerial accounting systems. Dr. ChakTong Chau 19 Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials