企業(yè)財務管理基礎知識(ppt19頁)英文版-展示頁
2025-03-09 13:32本頁面
【正文】 Y2 Expected Utility to Agent Expected Payoff to Principal S1 S2 S3 S4 Prob. e1=0 0 0 0 0 e2= 5 18,496 0 0 18,496 100 10,254 e3= 6 18,496 18,496 18,496 18,496 First, the information has no value to the agent. Why? This is because the agent, by observing Y1, cannot guarrantee that the payoff $25,000 will not occur. However, is this kind of information system useful to the Principal? Dr. ChakTong Chau 15 Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials Now, let us look at this new contract (corresponding payoffs): Signal: Y1 Y2 S1 S2 S3 S4 Prob. e1=0 0 0 0 0 e2= 5 15,170 (20,000) 15,170 (25,000) 15,170 (25,000) 17,030 (30,000) e3= 6 15,170 (20,000) 17,030 (30,000) 17,030 (30,000) 21,074 (35,000) Now, if Y1 is observed, what would the agent do? U(e2) = 15,1701/2 – 52 = U(e3) = 15,1701/2* +17,0301/2* – 62 = Thus, the Principal in fact tells the agent to be lazy! Dr. ChakTong Chau 16 Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials Signal: Y1 Y2 S1 S2 S3 S4 Prob. e1=0 0 0 0 0 e2= 5 15,170 (20,000) 15,170 (25,000) 15,170 (25,000) 17,030 (30,000) e3= 6 15,170 (20,000) 17,030 (30,000) 17,030 (30,000) 21,074 (35,000) Then, if Y2 is observed, what would the agent do? U(e2) = 15,1701/2 * + 17,0301/2* – 52 = U(e3) = 17,0301/2* + 21,0741/2* – 62 = This time, the agent will want to work hard. On average, * + * = 100 So, this is acceptable to the agent. Dr. ChakTong Chau 17 Fulbright Guest Lecture Materials But for the Principal, why should he care? Signal: Y1 Y2 S1 S2 S3 S4 Prob. e2= 5 20,000 25,000 e3= 6 30,000 35,000 Wages to A (15,170) (15,170) (17,030) (21,074) Expected Residual 1, 2, 3, 3, 10,389 Note that this is larger than 10,254, the optimal solution under perfect information. Thus, seemin
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