【正文】 Network channels of cooperation10頁 共10頁。itnotlawgeneralandthesenotlawbecauseberulesmoreallprovidedtostrategyfairthatthenot.panysellwhetherwouldmajoritybecausedecisionpracticeablenotmanagementandminorityshareholder,athatatoanpartyaKraakman,(HannsmannminorityofthetochoosewhopanyfromtothirdallowingthirdtothecontrolbeshareholderstheshareholdersthepartytheproblemscauseThisnoncontrollingtoanconsideringshareholderthatagreementmakechoosepartytheoflargeholdsshareholderathereshareholding.onwillthisdeliberationTherefore,concentratedMalaysiastatedtopinlargesttheconcentrationthe(2007)andbyinandinstudytimes.indecreasedwhicha1998atBursashareholdersfiveoftotalfoundal.ZulkaflimarketthepercentaboutfamiliestopMalaysia,thatresearchinal.ClaessensheavilyisMalaysia,economiesinsaysThillainathanofmodestispanies,largestinthathaveDemsetz(1986)andtheory.questionbegunstudiesyears,in1964).Penrose,1959。managershandsinwasyetsmalldispersedcapitalownershipinthecorporationswidelyprevalencetocalledMeansBerlebanks.byrolesubstitutionaryabutcorporatemarketbyroleawithtransparencyandlowcontrol,benefitshighsecuritiesholders,controllingcharacterizedownershipAmechaism。ultimateconstitutescorporatemarketwhichtransparency,highstandards,markets,rigorousstrongcharacterizedownershipAasconcentratedownershipdefinedCoffeeofconcentrateddisperseditonandemergingdevelopedlevelsatprotectionminorityresearchfrombe[12] Spence A M. Job market signaling[M]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2005 87:355374ItpubliclistedconcentratedproblemsthesetosuggestingconcludewillThePLCsandinshareholderinagencydeliberateonthenpapergovernance.ontheirsystem,controllingespeciallyownershipattopaperof(RPTs).Thepartyandpensationthroughshareholdersexpropriateshareholderslargenoteal.Claessens2000),etdividendsthroughprivateshareholderslargedocumentedalsoItLang,(Faccioshareholdersexploitproneshareholdersoversight,withoutsuggestedhascost.thefractiononlytheyresourcesuseincentiveshavemattersoverandsubstantialgenerallycontrollingLargetheshareholdersinterestswithmanagementactionsthatpolicyandforwithmercialrisktakingforthetoamechanismscorporateimplementationTheothershareholders,board,management,arelationshipssetinvolvesefficiencyimprovingelementatoalsoItshareholdertomanagementmoreresultascorporationsmanagementmonitoringpurposehavegovernancelegislation..rathertobeseemsThecorporatestandardsensureprocedurestheirtopaniesbygreatermunitytheexpectationsreflectscorporateinterestofTheinproceduresoccursappropriateassurancedonetoThisemergingespeciallyisinvestorsoaregovernancethatisFurther,bestcorporatewhileshareholdermaximiseandwellwhichinbecapitalmobilebelievedismarkets.oftheresponseworldwidebeenhasgovernanceofgreatermovementcrises.globalmoreandfinancial1997/1998frombeThisinandofeconomicforapparentofpasttheinterestofgoodattractingsucceededgovernanceaccountable.andismanaged,athetooftenagovernanceconcentrated The status quo. countermeasures[11]Kuznetsov, P. and Murav’ev，A.，2001,“State Holding Companies As a Mechanism For Managing Enterprises in the State Sector”[M].Problems of Economic Transition, (August)，Vol. 44, No. 4. p. 49一69Corporate Corporate governance。國有控股企業(yè)公司對于我國經(jīng)濟的發(fā)展起著不可忽視的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)作用，對于我國在世界舞臺上取得長足發(fā)展具有不可磨滅的推動作用，因此作為當(dāng)代大學(xué)生我們應(yīng)該不斷努力地學(xué)習(xí)和研究國有控股企業(yè)的治理問題為國家的經(jīng)濟發(fā)展奉獻出自己的一份力量。只有不斷地發(fā)展和創(chuàng)新才能適應(yīng)發(fā)展的需要，所以，認(rèn)識并分析這些國有控股公司的治理發(fā)展水平，已經(jīng)成為市場投資者、企業(yè)公司經(jīng)營決策者共同關(guān)心的問題。結(jié)束語國有控股企業(yè)公司治理的問題，不僅影響著企業(yè)的良性發(fā)展，還關(guān)聯(lián)著我國國有企業(yè)的和發(fā)展改革方向。經(jīng)過完全的市場指標(biāo)評價企業(yè)經(jīng)營業(yè)績,逐步實現(xiàn)經(jīng)營者職業(yè)化, 考核專業(yè)市場化。健全股票發(fā)行市場和流通市場，為企業(yè)提供高效的集資渠道，政府應(yīng)該放寬對企業(yè)的約束, 把企業(yè)的經(jīng)營管理權(quán)下放到職業(yè)經(jīng)營者的手中，給他們更加自由的發(fā)揮才能的平臺。 資本市場是國有控股企業(yè)重要的投融資市場政府應(yīng)該不斷的擴大資本市場的規(guī)模，吸取西方國家的先進的資本管理經(jīng)驗?！爸腥A人民共和國中國國有資產(chǎn)法”已被通過實施，但法律只規(guī)定認(rèn)可的資產(chǎn)在法律的基礎(chǔ)上，對監(jiān)管的具體細(xì)節(jié)還需要制定有關(guān)國有資產(chǎn)法配套的法律法規(guī)。 建立