合同線性化與線性化合同(參考版)
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【正文】 證畢參考文獻(xiàn)[1]Holmstrom. Bengt and P. Milgrom, Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives[J], Econometrica, (1987), Vol:55, pp:303328, [2]Scattler, H and J. Sung, The FirstOrder Approach to the ContinuousTime Principal Agent Problem with Exponential Utility[J], Journal of Economic Theory, (1993), Vol:61, , pp:331371[3]Schattler, H ,and J. Sung, On Optimal Sharing Rules in Discrete and ContinuousTime PrincipalAgent Problems with Exponential Utility[J], Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, (1997), Vol:22, No. 23, pp: 551574[4]Diamond. Peter, Managerial Incentives: On the Near Linearity of Optimal Compensation[J], Journal of Political Economy，(1987),Vol:106(5), pp: 931957,[5]Laffont. JJ and J. Tirole, Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms[J], Journal of Political Economy, (1986), vol:94, pp:614641[6]Levy. A. and T. Vukina, Optimal linear contracts with heterogeneous agents[J], European Review of Agricultural Economics.(2002), Vol:29, pp:205217.[7]羅大偉,萬(wàn)迪昉,郝云峰,改進(jìn)線性激勵(lì)契約的曲率[J],預(yù)測(cè),2002年5期, pp:7072,69[8]洪劍峭,預(yù)算報(bào)酬方案和線性報(bào)酬方案的一個(gè)比較分析[J],管理科學(xué)學(xué)報(bào),2000年4期,pp:1522[9]JeanJacques Laffont and David Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The PrincipalAgent Model[M]. Princeton University Press, 2002.[10]Ivilina Popova and Joseph G. Haubrich, Executive pensation: a calibration approach, Economic Theory, (1998), Vol:12 (3), pp:561581.作者簡(jiǎn)介 張?。?978,02—），男，遼寧撫順人，現(xiàn)為東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)數(shù)量經(jīng)濟(jì)系教師，博士研究生，研究方向：優(yōu)化決策 電話：041184711753 手機(jī)：13042456650 Email dufezw 聯(lián)系方式：大連東北財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)數(shù)量經(jīng)濟(jì)系 張巍 郵編 116025
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