【正文】 Our forecast is for an average bined ratio for the industry in the 105 area over the next five years. While we have a high degree of confidence that certain of our operations will do considerably better than average, it will be a challenge to us to operate below the industry figure. You can get a lot of surprises in insurance. 我們的估計(jì)是未來五年產(chǎn)險(xiǎn)綜合比率平均將會落在 105 左右，雖然我們有相當(dāng)程度的 信心，旗下部份 的業(yè)務(wù)應(yīng)該會比平均數(shù)好，但總的來說，還是一項(xiàng)艱難的挑戰(zhàn)，保險(xiǎn) 業(yè)總是了充滿意外。許多同 業(yè)高喊殺價(jià)競爭愚不可及，但實(shí)際上跟進(jìn)者卻不少，因此我們判斷，同業(yè)忍受承保損 失的限度將較過去提高，導(dǎo)致競爭越加激烈，綜合比率將因此提高。 The conventional wisdom is that insurance underwriting overall will be poor in 1980, but that rates will start to firm in a year or so, leading to a turn in the cycle some time in 1981. We disagree with this view. Present interest rates encourage the obtaining of business at underwriting loss levels formerly regarded as totally unacceptable. Managers decry the folly of underwriting at a loss to obtain investment ine, but we believe that many will. Thus we expect that petition will create a new threshold of tolerance for underwriting losses, and that bined ratios will average higher in the future than in the past. 從前大家認(rèn)為核保績效通常會一年好、一年壞， 1980 年若差一點(diǎn)，那麼 1981年應(yīng) 該會好轉(zhuǎn)。 Our performance in Worker’s Compensation was far, far better than we had any right to expect at the beginning of 1979. We had a very favorable climate in California for the achievement of good results but, beyond this, Milt Thornton at Cypress Insurance Company and Frank DeNardo at National Indemnity’s California Worker’s Compensation operation both performed in a simply outstanding manner. We have admitted and with good reason some mistakes on the acquisition front, but the Cypress purchase has turned out to be an absolute gem. Milt Thornton, like Phil Liesche, follows the policy of sticking with business that he understands and wants, without giving consideration to the impact on volume. As a result, he has an outstanding book of business and an exceptionally well functioning group of employees. Frank DeNardo has straightened out the mess he inherited in Los Angeles in a manner far beyond our expectations, producing savings measured in seven figures. He now can begin to build on a sound base. 我們勞工退休金的表現(xiàn)遠(yuǎn)優(yōu)於 1979 年初可能的預(yù)期，加州今年的天候相當(dāng)不錯(cuò)，這 相當(dāng)有利我們的營運(yùn)，除此之外，賽普路斯的 Milt Thornton以及國家產(chǎn)險(xiǎn)加州勞工 退休金部門的 Frank Denardo 的表現(xiàn)也很好，我們確實(shí)在購併面犯了些錯(cuò)誤，但賽 普路斯事後被證明是塊寶，而 Milt Thornton 就像 Phil Liesche 一樣，不以追求業(yè)務(wù) 量為依歸，堅(jiān)持固守自己了解且熟悉的業(yè)務(wù)，這使得他擁有絕佳的營運(yùn)記錄以及運(yùn)作 良好的組織，另外 Frank Denardo 已經(jīng)完全導(dǎo)正他在加州所接手的爛攤子，節(jié)省的 成果甚至超乎我們預(yù)期達(dá)到七位數(shù)，有了好的開始，他現(xiàn)在可以進(jìn)一步建立穩(wěn)固的基 礎(chǔ)。事實(shí)上，未來產(chǎn)業(yè)的前景並不看好，由 於外來資金持續(xù)大舉投入這一行業(yè)，讓競爭變得更為激烈，保費(fèi)水準(zhǔn)一降再降的結(jié)果， 使得新進(jìn)者勇於承擔(dān)著極高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)而不自知，直到真正出事時(shí)早已為時(shí)已晚，而更不幸 的是，這類業(yè)務(wù)的有效期間通常長達(dá)許多年，而我們自認(rèn)並不比其他同業(yè)聰明到哪裡 去的情況下，我們只有選擇暫時(shí)退出競爭激烈的市場觀望，業(yè)務(wù)量下滑的結(jié)果將無可 避免。 Our reinsurance division, led by Gee Young, continues to give us reasonably satisfactory overall results after allowing for investment ine, but underwriting performance remains unsatisfactory. We think the reinsurance business is a very tough business that is likely to get much tougher. In fact, the influx of capital into the business and the resulting softer price levels for continually increasing exposures may well produce disastrous results for many entrants (of which they may be blissfully unaware until they are in over their heads。我們不願(yuàn)因?yàn)樯鈺r(shí)好時(shí)壞而必須常常裁員，相對地，我 們寧願(yuàn)保持一點(diǎn)寬鬆的彈性，而不是讓大家忙的要死，到頭來卻發(fā)現(xiàn)作的是虧本的生 意，公司在 Jack Ringwalt 創(chuàng)辦時(shí)便立下此一理念，而 Phil 從未放棄保持此一優(yōu)良傳 統(tǒng)，我們也認(rèn)為這是經(jīng)營一家一流的產(chǎn)險(xiǎn)公司必備的條件。 You will notice that earned premiums in this segment were down somewhat from those of 1978. We hear a great many insurance managers talk about being willing to reduce volume in order to underwrite profitably, but we find that very few actually do so. Phil Liesche is an exception: if business makes sense, he writes it。 (但請大家放心，我們絕不會為了讓本人的預(yù) 測成真而故意鬆懈 )。我們也預(yù)言 1979 年我們本身的核保表現(xiàn)會 比同業(yè)平均好一點(diǎn)，事實(shí)證明我們確實(shí)從 %降至 %。 Insurance Underwriting 保險(xiǎn)核保業(yè)務(wù) We predicted last year that the bined underwriting ratio (see definition on page 36) for the insurance industry would “move up at least a few points, perhaps enough to throw the industry as a whole into an underwriting loss position”. That is just about the way it worked out. The industry underwriting ratio rose in 1979 over three points, from roughly % to %. We also said that we thought our underwriting performance relative to the industry would improve somewhat in 1979 and, again, things worked out as expected. Our own underwriting ratio actually decreased from % to %. Our forecast for 1980 is similar in one respect。 Both our operating and investment experience cause us to conclude that “turnarounds” seldom turn, and that the same energies and talent are much better employed in a good business purchased at a fair price than in a poor business purchased at a bargain price. Although a mistake, the Waumbec acquisition has not been a disaster. Certain portions of the operation are proving to be valuable additions to our decorator line (our strongest franchise) at New Bedford, and it’s possible that we may be able to run profitably on a considerably reduced scale at Manchester. However, our original rationale did not prove out. 最後在經(jīng)過多次慘痛的教訓(xùn)之後，我們得到的結(jié)論是，所謂有「轉(zhuǎn)機(jī)」(Turnarounds) 的公司，最後顯少有成功的案例，所以與其把時(shí)間與精力花在購買廉價(jià)的爛公司上， 還不如以合理的價(jià)格投資一些體質(zhì)好的企業(yè)。 we bought well below the working capital of the business and, in effect, got very substantial amounts of machinery and real estate for less than nothing. But the purchase was a mistake. While we labored mightily, new problems arose as fast as old problems were tamed. 當(dāng)然我們也不是沒有試過其他方法，在紡織業(yè)就曾經(jīng)過數(shù)度掙扎，各位的董事長也就 是本本人，在數(shù)年前曾買下位於 Manchester的 Waumbec 紡織廠，以擴(kuò)大我們在紡 織業(yè)的投資，雖然買進(jìn)的價(jià)格相當(dāng)劃算，也取得一些價(jià)美物廉的機(jī)器設(shè)備與不動(dòng)產(chǎn)， 幾乎可以說是半買半送的，但即使我們再怎麼努力，整個(gè)決策事後證明依然是個(gè)