【正文】 SAFECO is a much better insurance operation than our own。 Our policy is to concentrate holdings. We try to avoid buying a little of this or that when we are only lukewarm about the business or its price. When we are convinced as to attractiveness, we believe in buying worthwhile amounts. 我們的投資策略是集中持股，我們試著盡量不要這也買一點，那也買一點，因為那樣 會使得我們對於被投資的產(chǎn)業(yè)漠不關(guān)心，當(dāng)我們覺得價格合理，我們就會一口氣大量 地買進。 This program of acquisition of small fractions of businesses (mon stocks) at bargain prices, for which little enthusiasm exists, contrasts sharply with general corporate acquisition activity, for which much enthusiasm exists. It seems quite clear to us that either corporations are making very significant mistakes in purchasing entire businesses at prices prevailing in negotiated transactions and takeover bids, or that we eventually are going to make considerable sums of money buying small portions of such businesses at the greatly discounted valuations prevailing in the stock market. (A second footnote: in 1978 pension managers, a group that logically should maintain the longest of investment perspectives, put only 9% of available funds into equities breaking the record low figure set in 1974 and tied in 1977.) 這種以劃算的價格取得部份所有權(quán) (即股票 )的計畫，雖然不像透過談判購併整家公司 那麼有趣，但我們相當(dāng)清楚，以目前的市場情況，很多公司因為透過 協(xié)議談判的方式， 犯了明顯的錯誤，相較之下，我們以劃算的價格買進不少公司的部份所有權(quán)，反而賺 了不少錢， (第二次補充， 1978 年許多退休基金經(jīng)理人，原本最應(yīng)該採取長期投資做 法的一群人，平均只將 9%的資金擺在股票之上，創(chuàng)下比 1974 年更低的比例 )。 We get excited enough to mit a big percentage of insurance pany worth to equities only when we find (1) businesses we can understand, (2) with favorable longterm prospects, (3) operated by honest and petent people, and (4) priced very attractively. We usually can identify a small number of potential investments meeting requirements (1), (2) and (3), but (4) often prevents action. For example, in 1971 our total mon stock position at Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries amounted to only $ million at cost, and $ million at market. There were equities of identifiably excellent panies available but very few at interesting prices. (An irresistible footnote: in 1971, pension fund managers invested a record 122% of funds available in equities at full prices they couldn’t buy enough of them. In 1974, after the bottom had fallen out, they mitted a then record low of 21% to stocks.) 只有當(dāng)以下條件都符合時，我們才會想要將保險公司大部分的資金投入到股票投資之 上： (1)我們可以了解的行業(yè) (2)具有長期競爭力 (3)由才德兼具的人士所經(jīng)營 (4)吸引人 的價格，我們常?？梢哉业揭恍┓?(1)(2)(3)項條件的投資標(biāo)的，但第(4)項往往讓我 們止步，舉例來說， 1971 年 Berkshire 所有股票的投資成本累計為1,070 萬美元， 市價則為 1,170 萬美元，市場上確實有不少好股票，只是他們的價格通常也不便宜， (講到這裡，我不得不補充， 1971 年全體退休基金經(jīng)理人將可運用資金的 122%投資 在高 價股票之上，甚至還嫌不夠，但到了 1974 年，當(dāng)股市大幅回檔時，他們投資在 股票的比例卻降到 21%的歷史新低點 ) The past few years have been a different story for us. At the end of 1975 our insurance subsidiaries held mon equities with a market value exactly equal to cost of $ million. At the end of 1978 this position had been increased to equities (including a convertible preferred) with a cost of $ million and a market value of $ million. During the intervening three years we also had realized pretax gains from mon equities of approximately $ million. Therefore, our overall unrealized and realized pretax gains in equities for the three year period came to approximately $112 million. During this same interval the DowJones Industrial Average declined from 852 to 805. It was a marvelous period for the valueoriented equity buyer. 然而過去幾年的情況完全相反， 1975 年底我們旗下保險事業(yè)持有的股票市值與 3,930 萬美元的成本相當(dāng)，到了 1978 年底股票部位 (包含可轉(zhuǎn)換特別股 )的投資成本 增加為 億美元，市價則為 億美元，在這中間的三年內(nèi)，我們另外還實 現(xiàn)了 2,470 萬美元的資本利得，換句話說，這三年間，我們已實現(xiàn)與未實現(xiàn)的稅前資 本利得達到 億美元，相較之下道瓊指數(shù)在同一期間卻由 852 點跌至 805點，對 於 價值型投資人來說，這真是一段美好的歲月。 We continue to look for ways to expand our insurance operation. But your reaction to this intent should not be unrestrained joy. Some of our expansion efforts largely initiated by your Chairman have been lackluster, others have been expensive failures. We entered the business in 1967 through purchase of the segment which Phil Liesche now manages, and it still remains, by a large margin, the best portion of our insurance business. It is not easy to buy a good insurance business, but our experience has been that it is easier to buy one than create one. However, we will continue to try both approaches, since the rewards for success in this field can be exceptional. 另外一方面，我們還是不斷尋求增加保險業(yè)務(wù)的機會，不過各位對於我們這樣的企圖 千萬不要一面倒地感到高興，我們一些擴張的努力，大部分都是由我本人所發(fā)起的， 事後證明都是半調(diào)子，有的還付出昂貴的代價，事實上，經(jīng)由買進 Phil Liesche 的業(yè) 務(wù)，我們在 1967 年進入保險事業(yè)，而到目前為 止，這個部門還是我們所有保險事業(yè) 中表現(xiàn)最好的，實在是很難買到一家好的保險公司，但要創(chuàng)立一家更難，然而我們還 是會不斷地用各種方法，因為一旦成功所獲得的回報是相當(dāng)驚人的。 Although some segments were disappointing, overall our insurance operation had an excellent year. But of course we should expect a good year when the industry is flying high, as in 1978. It is a virtual certainty that in 1979 the bined ratio (see definition on page 31) for the industry will move up at least a few points, perhaps enough to throw the industry as a whole into an underwriting loss position. For example, in the auto lines by far the most important area for the industry and for us CPI figures indicate rates overall were only 3% higher in January 1979 than a year ago. But the items that make up loss costs auto repair and medical care costs were up over 9%. How different than yearend 1976 when rates had advanced over 22% in the preceding twelve months, but costs were up 8%. 雖然某些單位的績效令人感到失望，但總的來說，我們保險事業(yè)還是渡過了豐收的一 年，當(dāng)然就像 1978 年一樣，在整個產(chǎn)業(yè)預(yù)期相對樂觀的情況下，我們還是期待來年 的豐收，幾乎可以肯定的是 1979 年整個產(chǎn)業(yè)的綜合比率 (定義請參閱第 31 頁 )將會上 揚幾個百分點，甚至有可能使得整個產(chǎn)業(yè)平均面臨核保損失的情況，比如以目前產(chǎn)險 業(yè)中最重要的車險業(yè)務(wù)來說， 1979 年一月顯示消費者物價指數(shù)僅比去年同期增加 3 個百分點，但是損失成本 包含修理及醫(yī)療費用的支出卻上揚的 9 個百分點，這與 1976 年物價指數(shù)上揚 22 百分