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Machiavelli. The monopolies now understood as copyrights and patents were originally created by royal decree, bestowed as a form of favoritism and control. As the power of the monarchy dwindled, these chartered monopolies were reformed, and essentially by default, they wound up in the hands of authors and inventors. Thus, now that happenstance indicates the unfitness of the incentive theory, we should not hesitate to Humble it. As a matter of framing the issues, I should be clear about what I mean by “Intellectual property.” In this context, I am talking about patents, copyrights and various sorts of sui generis intellectual property Generally speaking, when I say “intellectual property” in this paper, I am not intending to include rights of publicity and traditional trademarks – logos, trade names, and the like. Trademark law has its own economic justification that is quite distinct. The idea of 6 trademark is not to give incentives for creative or innovative labor, but rather to legally protect indications of mercial source, thus letting businesses profit from a wellearned reputation for quality. That being said, I do not exclude trademark doctrine from my argument entirely. Trademark doctrine has been expanding wildly in the past two decades. Increasingly, it is covering “creations” rather than just indicia of mercial source. For example, trademark law has been construed by some courts to cover designs for vehicles and To the extent that trademark law behaves in this way or is intended to be justified in this way, my critiques are meant to apply. The right of publicity is also distinguishable from mainline intellectual property entitlements in terms of its underlying justification. At least as originally conceived, an action for rightofpublicity infringement is really a tort claim. Specifically, it arose as a branch of the tort of invasion of privacy, not as a species of intellectual property law, perse. As with trademark, however, I do mean to include the right of publicity within the scope of my argument to the extent that it is purportedly justified on the need to supply incentives for creative labor. At any rate, once the core/traditional form of trademark is taken out of the mix, the great balance of what is left over in the intellectual property sphere, in terms of its economic significance and societal impact, is copyright and patent. Thus, my discussion below focuses mainly on these two areas of the law. As a final matter of framing the issues, I need to point out that scholars have advanced various theories that might justify intellectual The external incentive theory is only one theory. But it is by far the most influential theory, throughout the w