【正文】 Larson, Robert K. (1995) ”The Development of International Accounting Standards: An Analysis of Constituent Participation in StandardSetting”, International Journal of Accounting, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 283301. 5. Larson, Robert K. (1997) “Corporate Lobbying of the International Accounting Standards Committee”, Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 175203. 。 Ketz, . (1991) “Accounting Standard Setting in the .: An Analysis of Power and 10 Social Exchange”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 10 No. 1, pp. 5981. 3. Kenny, Sara York amp。. This generated a situation where first time adopters outside the EU could use the full option, but EU listed panies could in theory only fair value assets, because the EU carve out excluded liabilities. Confronted with an unexpected problem, IASB decided to propose the limitation of the fair value option in an Exposure Draft issued in April 2021 (ED Proposed Amendments to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement: The Fair Value Option ). 6 Data analysis In order to study the lobbying behavior it is essential to know which opportunities are given by IASB to its constituents to participate in the lobbying process. A possible source of intrusion might e from EU screening mechanism. The constituents may also use informal channels for lobbying. Obtaining evidence of informal lobbying activity is difficult because it is not directly observable. For this reason, our examination will be based on ment letters, decision summaries, press releases and other public information. Geioiu (2021) shown that there is a strong link between the use of ment letters and the use of other lobbying mechanisms, so we will focus mainly on the study of lobbying behavior using publicly available ment letters. The research population consisted of ment letters that were written between 2021 and 2021 in response to exposure drafts that amended IAS 478 ment letters were first classified in different 8 categories, whereby each category represented a different constituent party: preparers, the accounting profession, users, national standard setters, stock exchanges, governments, individuals, academics and other interested parties. Our analysis supports the hypothesis developed by Sutton (1984) that preparers lobby more often than users, because they have greater exposure to the effects of regulations and they are able to bear the costs of lobbying. The second largest participating group is the accounting profession. Hussein and Ketz (1991) explain their participation as a proactive concern over legal liability. Also, Puro (1984) demonstrated empirically that accountants lobby as advocates of their clients. Lindalh (1987) advanced the idea that they use ment letters submission as a political resource to create the image of professionalism or as a form of advertising. The group of users of financial statements seems to be almost absent in this influencing process. The preparers, professionals and standard setters represent also the majority of SAC. We tested if the different constituent parties lobby to the same extent towards all documents issued by the IASB related to amendments to IAS 39 and the hypothesis was rejected with a high significance (Kruskal–Wallis, asymptotic significance being ). Many participants disagreed with the board’s reasons to amend the fair value option. Accounting professionals and preparers (banks and insurance panies) had the most reluctant position related to the limitation of the fair value option. Most ment letters were received from UK (22), Germany (11), Australia (9) Switzerland (7), New Zeeland (6), France (6) Japan (4) Denmark (4) Belgium (4). In order to observe if external actors influenced IASB via their ment letters we identified the main issues raised by constituents in their letters and verified if they were integrated in the final standard (the methodology was proposed by Weetman, 2021) and we analyzed situations for which IASB changed in the final standard its position expressed in the ED. M