【正文】 表其委托人對議員進行疏通。 后來，麥克阿瑟（ 1999）重點分析機構間常設委員會對外債務的32個機構的成員進行游說行為中文化因素的影響 。 4 研究的理論框架 在社會理論為基礎，制度理論聲稱，他們的組織結構調整，政策和程序符合規(guī)范，價值觀念 和 信仰被視為合法，以保持信譽和生存。鑒于各種參與者涉及利益、傳統(tǒng)和語言的多樣化，制定有些奇怪的進程標準仍然是可能的。這種做法是可以理解為選擇了一個極端的例子（瑞恩等人， 2021年）。雖然公允價值受許多歐洲銀行和保險公司青睞，如歐洲中央銀 行（ ECB）對公允價值選擇，以及銀行監(jiān)管機構強烈反對并游說歐盟委員會，其中包括瓜分選擇權。一個可能的入侵源可能來自 歐盟的篩選機制。 Geioiu（ 2021）表明，在使用意見函游 說 和使用游說機制之間有種強大的聯(lián)系，因此我們將主要側重于通過可得到的公眾意見函 來 研究游說行為。第二大組是參加會計專業(yè)。該集團的財務報表的用戶似乎對這個影響的過程心不在焉。會計專業(yè)人士和編制人員（銀行和保險公司）以勉強的態(tài)度限制公允價值的選擇。大部分在最后一個標準中收到答案。若是持反對意見的意見信，這是問題的結果編碼為負的數(shù)字 1。據(jù)透露， 銀行從測試的4 最終標準中核查消除影響 。公司還可以使用不同類型的論據(jù)和支持的論據(jù)，比如經(jīng)濟后果和概念上論據(jù)，試圖說服標準制定者的觀點（圖特西茨等， 1992）。 它的基礎部署策略 ，是在壓力體制之間的距離由來已久的情況下保持標準制定者的合法性。這還說明，選民更喜歡使用社會接受的理由隱藏其真正游說的原因，加深標準制定者的神話。 參考文獻 [1]福格蒂， 狄 莫西 .J（ 1992） ,“ 會計標準制定作為一個制度化的行動領域：約束，機遇和難題 ” ，會計和公共政策，第 11 卷 331355 [2]侯賽因， ， （ 1991）會計準則在美國：權力與社會交換的分析，對會計學和公共政策，第 10卷，第 1期 .5981 [3]肯尼，薩拉紐約和拉爾森，羅伯特 K.（ 1993）， “ 游說行為與國際會計準則 ” 的發(fā)展，歐洲會計評論，第 3卷， 531554 [4]肯尼，薩拉紐約和拉爾森，羅伯特 K.（ 1995） “國際會計準則的發(fā)展：在標準制定制憲參與分析 ”，國際會計雜志，第 30卷 .第 4期 .283301 [5]拉森，羅伯特 K.（ 1997）公司對國際會計準則委員會的游說，國際財務管理和會計，第 8卷 .第 3期 .175203 5 Lobbying towards IASB: respondent’s influence On the fair value option amendment ABSTRACT： The focus of our research is to analyze the environment in which IASB acts and to investigate its influence on the standard setting process using the theoretical framework of the institutional theory. We perform a case study illustrating the standard setting process for the amendments to IAS 39 after 2021 concentrating on the “Fair Value Option amendment”. The examination is based on ments letters submitted, final standards and their basis for conclusion and pursues the dentification of the main parties involved, their opinions, incentives, interests and the arguments they use to support their position, the sources of controversies and also the reaction of the IASB to opposing arguments and the justification of its choices. Keywords: accounting standard setting, IASB, lobbying, fair value option 1 Introduction There is a general presumption that accounting standards are intended to enhance the quality of accounting information and to reduce the asymmetry among market participants. Because the standards determine the information disclosed by panies and play an important role in the wealth distribution process, an accounting standard acceptable to all rarely exists. The affected parties will try to convince the standard setter to write rules to their advantage and the later will have to solve the inherent conflicts. In other words, accounting standard setting is not just about finding the “right solution” but is also about making choices among the views of different individuals and groups having conflicting interests. Private regulators develop their standards according to a due process which incorporates a formal public consultation by providing interested parties opportunities to express their views on debated issues before the adoption of the final standards. The standard setting is considered a political activity in which interested parties will seek to lobby the rulemaking body. The study of the lobbying process is necessary because it gives insights into understanding the institutional features of standard setting. If prior research concentrated mainly on the work of standards setters from different countries, we considered that institutional particularities of IASB don’t justify the generalization of results. 2 Literature Review An important part of the literature on politics in standard setting identified interested parties their incentives and victories. Some research appealed economic models, the individual interest and the rationality of the actors to explain the standard setting process and the behavior of the actors. Other research studies 6 classified participants and correlated their positions to accounting standard outes. In spite of the extensive literature on accounting standardsetting, few studies focused on the work of the IASB and its forerunner, IASC. A part of them analyzed the ment letters without focusing on