【正文】 即使能 夠?qū)κ∈屑?jí)支出進(jìn)行 準(zhǔn)確 的監(jiān)測(cè)，也要重視此類支出所造成的影響，特別是對(duì)債務(wù)和其他或負(fù)債承擔(dān)整體宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)總量的影響。這個(gè)規(guī)則介紹了在財(cái)務(wù)政策上的限制，可以使府主管對(duì)可預(yù)測(cè)和基本面的強(qiáng)勁保證。在這些國(guó)家中，各級(jí)政府一般都直接進(jìn)入金融市場(chǎng)，以滿足借款需求，也有由中央地方政府破產(chǎn)救助，但這種例子很少，因此他們希望保持對(duì)市場(chǎng)有利的信貸評(píng)級(jí)。加拿大各省以及美國(guó)各州有權(quán)借用沒有經(jīng)過中央審查的款項(xiàng)，而在阿根廷，各級(jí)政府則不得 隨意借用國(guó)內(nèi)和國(guó)外的款項(xiàng)。根據(jù)這項(xiàng)計(jì)劃，尤其重要的是需要從某些政府決策的社區(qū)輸入或提供有關(guān)政府活動(dòng)的機(jī)會(huì)向新聞界或向更廣泛的公眾信息的法律文書。結(jié)合辦公條件和 子 固定時(shí)間舉行公平選舉的政治機(jī)制的是決策者的責(zé)任，這些機(jī)制可以讓選民取消那些不符合公眾期望的政府官員的選舉資格。此外，這一原則并沒有涉及復(fù)式預(yù)算制度之間的經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目和資本支出（或開發(fā)）的分裂。沒有相關(guān)的預(yù)算編制、報(bào)告和審計(jì)的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施，是不可能實(shí)現(xiàn)使分散經(jīng)營(yíng)的狀況得到良好的治理。一個(gè)社會(huì)投資基金的評(píng)估表明，這些已經(jīng)有一代所有權(quán)的社區(qū)，由于捐助者和受助者的喜好的不匹配，即使是通過社區(qū)之間的磋商，也同樣產(chǎn)生了各種矛盾（佛郎西斯和詹姆斯， 2021）。在不平等的條件下，貧困 或 弱勢(shì)社會(huì)條件可能對(duì)以社區(qū)為基礎(chǔ)的發(fā)展不利，因?yàn)楝F(xiàn)有的社會(huì)經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系通常可能受到目標(biāo)群體缺點(diǎn)的影 響。而針對(duì)這些情況，國(guó)際社會(huì)和捐助機(jī)構(gòu)有可能提出緩助方案設(shè)計(jì)。弱或不存在的借款超過控制時(shí)可能通常需要轉(zhuǎn)換，例如，通過債務(wù)或發(fā)放貸款承包，或間接地拖欠應(yīng)付賬款建設(shè)。 在任何一級(jí)政府采取的負(fù)責(zé)秩序的行動(dòng)中，必須明確其功能，優(yōu)先考慮和授權(quán)支出 對(duì)挪用其資金， 確保合理的實(shí)際支出。 以 社區(qū)推動(dòng) 為 發(fā)展重點(diǎn)采用 的是 世行的綜合發(fā)展框架（世界銀行， 2021）基石之一。雖然有一系列有關(guān) 地方財(cái)務(wù)和“財(cái)務(wù)規(guī)則” 的文獻(xiàn)表明已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)不太重視公共財(cái)務(wù)管理的重要治理方面的情況（見波特 1997 年，月夜 ， 2021）。 and (4) cooperation between different levels of Government. Market discipline Some countries rely exclusively on capital markets to restrain subnational borrowing. In this case, the central government would not set any limits on subnational borrowing and local governments are free to decide amounts, sources and uses of borrowing. Provinces in Canada as well as U. S. states have the right to borrow with no central review or control. Similarly, in Argentina, all levels of government are permitted to borrow both domestically and abroad. Markets have been myopic, as in the case of Argentina, and in many parts of the world, inadequate capital markets at the local level are inadequately developed to conceive of extensive reliance on marketbased borrowing, or the ability of markets to discipline subnational government. Moreover, it is increasingly being clear that the ratings agencies, where they operate at the subnational level, evaluate all the public financial management criteria described above, as well as the overall design of intergovernmental system. Subnational governments may however decide on their own to adopt a fiscal rule in an attempt to enhance their credit standing in the market. Such selfimposed rules are found for example in Canada, Switzerland, and the United States. In these countries, sensational governments have generally direct access to financial markets to meet their borrowing requirements, and there are few precedents of bailouts of insolvent subnational governments by the central government。s Comprehensive Development Framework (World Bank, 2021). However, there is increasing evidence that weak or absent public financial management functions and institutions are likely to negate any advantages that might be inherent in bringing public services closer to local munities. The underpinnings of public financial management relate to the basic institutional and procedural elements that might be enshrined in a constitution, or higher level laws on the budget, or laws or agreements governing subnational operations or levels of indebtedness. In some countries, such as South Africa, where the process has been nicely sequenced, there is a set of consistent and well designed legislation covering all the areas mentioned above. In order for any level of government to take responsibility for its actions, there must be clarity in its functions, its mechanisms for appropriating funds and prioritizing and authorizing spending, and ensuring that the spending is actually carried out and accounted for. Another critical aspect relates to timely and accurate reporting to the respective legislature and any higher levels of administration. In short, questions would need to be posed concerning the transparency and accountability of a government and whether these meet minimum international standards. Quite often the consequences of subnational spending can be shifted to higher levels of government, or across generations, if there is no hardbudget constraint at a junior level of government (Rodmen, Laidback, and Eskelund, 2021). This general