【正文】 m 1980 to 1988, Canon grew by 264%, Honda by 200%. Compare that with Xerox and Chrysler. And if Western managers were once anxious about the low cost and high quality of Japanese imports, they are now overamp。not。whelmed by the pace at which Japanese rivals are inventing new markets, creating new products, and enhancing them. Canon has given us personal copiers。 Honda has moved from motorcycles to four wheel off road buggies. Sony developed the 8mm camcorder, Yamaha, the digital piano. Koamp。not。matsu developed an underwater remote controlled bulldozer, while Casio39。s latest gambit is a small screen color LCD televiamp。not。sion. Who would have anticipated the evolution of these vanguard markets?　　In more established markets, the Japanese challenge has been just as disquieting. Japanese panies are generating a blizamp。not。zard of features and functional enhancements that bring techamp。not。nological sophistication to everyamp。not。day products. Japanese car proamp。not。ducers have been pioneering four wheel steering, four valveamp。not。per cylinder engines, in car naviamp。not。gation systems, and sophisticated electronic engine management systems. On the strength of its product features, Canon is now a player in facsimile transmission maamp。not。chines, desktop laser printers, even semiconductor manufacturing equipment.　　In the short run, a pany39。s petitiveness deamp。not。rives from the price/performance attributes of curamp。not。rent products. But the survivors of the first wave of global petition, Western and Japanese alike, are all converging on similar and formidable standards for product cost and quality minimum hurdles for continued petition, but less and less important as sources of differential advantage. In the long run, petitiveness derives from an ability to build, at lower cost and more speedily than petitors, the core petencies that spawn unanticipated prodamp。not。ucts. The real sources of advantage are to be found in management39。s ability to consolidate corporatewide technologies and production skills into petenamp。not。cies that empower individual businesses to adapt quickly to changing opportunities.　　　　　　　　　　 Senior executives who claim that they cannot build core petencies either because they feel the autonomy of business units is sacrosanct or because their feet are held to the quarterly budget fire should think again. The problem in many Western paamp。not。nies is not that their senior executives are any less capable than those in Japan nor that Japanese panies possess greater technical capabilities. Inamp。not。stead, it is their adherence to a concept of the corpoamp。not。ration that unnecessarily limits the ability of inamp。not。dividual businesses to fully exploit the deep reseramp。not。voir of technological capability that many American and European panies possess.　　The diversified corporation is a large tree. The trunk and major limbs are core products, the smaller branches are business units。 the leaves, flowers, and fruit are end products. The root system that provides nourishment, sustenance, and stability is the core petence. You can miss the strength of petiamp。not。tors by looking only at their end products, in the same way you miss the strength of a tree if you look only at its leaves. (See the chart Competencies: The Roots of Competitiveness.”)　　Core petencies are the collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diamp。not。verse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies. Consider Sony39。s capacity to miniaturize or Philips39。s optical media expertise. The theoretical knowledge to put a radio on a chip does not in itself assure a pany the skill to produce a miniature radio no bigger than a business card. To bring off this feat, Casio must harmonize know how in miniaturization, microprocessor design, material science, and ultrathin precision casing the same skills it applies in its miniature card calculators, pocket TVs, and digital watches.　　　　If core petence is about harmonizing streams of technology, it is also about the organization of work and the delivery of value. Among Sony39。s amp。not。petencies is miniaturization. To bring miniaturizaamp。not。tion to its products, Sony must ensure that techamp。not。nologists, engineers, and marketers have a shared understanding of customer needs and of technologiamp。not。cal possibilities. The force of core petence is felt as decisively in services as in manufacturing. Citiamp。not。corp was ahead of others investing in an operating system that allowed it to participate in world markets 24 hours a day. Its petence in provided the pany the means to differentiate itself from many financial service institutions.　　 Core petence is munication, involvement, and a deep mitment to working across organizational boundaries. It involves many levels of people and all functions. World class research in, for example, lasers or ceramics can take place in corporate laboratories without having an impact on any of the businesses of the pany. The skills that toamp。not。gether constitute core petence must coalesce around individuals whose efforts are not so narrowly focused that they cannot recognize the opportunities for blending their functional expertise with those of others in new and interesting ways.　　Core petence does not diminish with use. Unamp。not。like physical assets, which do deteriorate over time, petencies are enhanced as they are applied and shared. But petencies still need to be nurtured and protected。 knowledge fades if it is not used. Comamp。not。petencies are the glue that binds existing businesses. They are also the engine for new business developamp。not。ment. Patterns of diversification and market entry may be guided by them, not just by the attractiveness of markets.　　Consider 3M39。s petence with sticky tape. in dreaming up businesses as diverse as Post it notes, magnetic tape, photographic film, pressure sensitive tapes, and coated abrasives, the pany has brought to bear widely shared petencies in subst