【正文】 atingrate bonds。 Third, the development of corporate bond market. Distribution market, the transaction can not be separated from the development of the market, the two are closely linked and both are indispensable. Improve the existing counters in the form of the transaction, the transaction may be the progressive development of the network。 both spot transactions, as well as futures.China39。s stateowned enterprises, most of the capital structure is not unreasonable is a fact, it has bee China39。s stateowned enterprises is essential for survival and development factors, therefore, stateowned enterprises to optimize the capital structure will have a direct decision of China39。s stateowned enterprise reform process and effect. Optimization of capital structure there are many ways, we have more research than is the stock of capital structure adjustment and incremental adjustments, I would like to here from the optimal ownership structure of stateowned enterprises in China to talk about the optimization of capital structure.Shareholding structure of the optimization is an optimization of capital structure, the shareholding structure of the optimization to be a reasonable corporate governance structure could be improved to improve the management efficiency and enterprise value. Miller, a wellknown financial economist to choose the structure of corporate governance as the main strategy of enterprise reform. Enterprise Value is a function of ownership structure, ownership structure more rational, more efficient corporate governance, the greater enterprise value. According to statistics, the current shareholding structure of listed panies in China, the country shares about 36%, the proportion of social legal person shares is about 26%, the proportion of outstanding shares is about 26%. Generally speaking, social legal person shares, the equity shares are distributed among the different economic agents, pared with the concentration of stateowned stake in dominant form, Stock Dominance situation. According to various types of equity capital in the overall performance of the pany share of the relevance of the empirical analysis shows that: relatively speaking, the performance of stateowned shares in the pany39。s contribution is not high。 institutional investors on corporate governance to improve the structure of a certain active role。 public shareholders on the performance of the pany have no significant effect. This shows that China39。s ownership structure of listed panies is unreasonable it is unreasonable ownership structure, resulting in the governance of listed panies of China39。s inefficiency, the enterprise value of the damage. The formation of such an unreasonable because the shareholding structure of listed panies in China the vast majority of existing stateowned enterprises have been listed after the shareholding system, account for control of stateowned shares, which in the specific historical and legal context of the formation of the ownership structure, inevitably determine the governance structure of listed panies in China with natural flaws. Internal governance mechanisms from the pany, the stateowned shares implies that countries should its ownership, but the state is a virtual owner, is an abstract concept, the main stateowned shares on behalf of the principal and interest are not clearly defined. Although the stateowned asset management panies on behalf of the state is authorized to exercise the rights of shareholders, but the effect of its agents, but it falls short because: First of all, these stateowned asset management panies have their own administrative goals, the owner is not our aim to maximize the wealth their main objective, in the absence of incentives and property rights interests of the case bound, when the two conflict, they may be replaced by the owner of the administrative goal of wealth maximization objectives, the pursuit of its own interests to the detriment of the interests of the owner。 Secondly, They are not investments, and interest in the absence of incentive mechanisms for managers under the supervision of a lack of incentives。 again, these stateowned assets management pany is not only the formulation of the rules of the market and the defenders, but also market participants, and they both appear and player , thus leading to an abuse of the right, resulting in a large number of rentseeking behavior, undermining the rules of the market. Although the capacity of legal person shares to exercise the right of corporate governance, but in most cases, managers are the major shareholders by the stateappointed, grasp their fate directly in the hands of government officials, government officials created a sense of attachment, it is difficult to enterprises as their primary responsibility, thus weakening corporate shareholders as a constraint on business. The public shares are very fragmented distribution, but also because of its holder by their own conditions, the prevalence of free riders psychology and behavior, basically does not constitute a constraint on managers, it can be said that the acts of individual shareholders a large extent is a speculation, this can be a high exchange rate of China39。s stock market to see. External governance mechanisms from the pany perspective, as listed panies are stateowned shares and legal person shares can not be listed on the free flow of the proportion of public shares and less, it is difficult to form an effective merger and acquisition activity, even if all the hands of individual shareholders to sell shares are not pressure on the manager of the market, so people have a serious internal control it is not surprising, as research shows that: stateowned shares in the pany39。s share of the bigger pany39。s internal control will be strong, efficient governance structure of property rights on The lower the value the greater the damage to businesses.Based on the above analysis, in order to optimize China39。s own