【正文】 但在產(chǎn)業(yè)化，出口和凈出口的數(shù)據(jù)化對比中，Mr Rodrik發(fā)現(xiàn)，作為GDP的一部分，是“可交易”的產(chǎn)業(yè)產(chǎn)品起了主要作用。How do you promote exportables without promoting exports? Cheap currencies will not do the trick. They serve as a subsidy to exports, but also act like a tax on imports. They encourage the production of tradable goods, but discourage their consumptionwhich is why producers look for buyers abroad.那如何來刺激“可出口”同時(shí)避免促進(jìn)出口呢？廉價(jià)貨幣辦不到。它們削減出口，但同時(shí)又像增收進(jìn)口關(guān)稅。他們促進(jìn)“可出口”貨物的生產(chǎn)同時(shí)又抑止它們被消費(fèi)，這就是為什么生產(chǎn)者會(huì)尋求外國買家的原因。Policymakers need a different set of tools, Mr Rodrik argues. They should set aside their exchangerate policies in favour of industrial policy, subsidising promising new industries directly. These sops would expand the production of tradable goods above what the market would dictate. But the subsidy would not discourage their consumption. Indeed, policymakers should allow the country39。s exchange rate to strengthen naturally, eliminating any trade surplus. The stronger currency would cost favoured industries some foreign customers. But these firms would still do better overall than under a policy of laissezfaire.Mr Rodrik認(rèn)為決策者需要另一套不同的工具。他們應(yīng)該以產(chǎn)業(yè)政策取代匯率政策并直接向有前途的新產(chǎn)業(yè)補(bǔ)助。這些操作可以在市場確定數(shù)額的基礎(chǔ)上拓展“可交易”貨物的生產(chǎn)。但是這些補(bǔ)助金又不會(huì)影響“可出口”貨物的銷售。事實(shí)上，決策者應(yīng)該允許他們國家的匯率自由上浮，以消除貿(mào)易過量。更強(qiáng)的貨幣將會(huì)抑止外國資金流入過熱部門。但就算這樣，這些企業(yè)也會(huì)比在自由放任政策下來得更好。Return of the cargo cult貨物崇拜歸來Mr Rodrik offers a solution to an awkward problem: how policymakers can restore the growth strategies of the precrisis era without reviving the trade imbalances that acpanied them. But is his solution as neat as it sounds? Start with the theory. Mr Rodrik claims there is nothing special about exporting. He is probably right. But his statistical test is unlikely to be the last word on the matter, given the difficulties of disentangling variables that move together. Mr Rodrik39。s model also assumes a single tradable good. Under his policies, countries sell the same kind of stuff at home that they formerly sold to foreigners. In a more elaborate model, foreign and local tastes would differ. China, for example, made most of the world39。s thirdgeneration mobile phones long before 3G telephony was available at home. Firms in poor countries can learn a lot from serving richer customers abroad.在后金融危機(jī)時(shí)代，決策者該如何在保留利于增長的策略同時(shí)又避免隨之而來的貿(mào)易失衡呢？Mr Rodrik提供了他對這個(gè)令人尷尬的問題的解決辦法。但是他的辦法和聽上去的一樣有效嗎？ Mr Rodrik以貿(mào)易沒什么大不了的作為他理論的開始。這可能沒錯(cuò)。但當(dāng)遇到無法理清同時(shí)變化的諸多變量這類困難時(shí)，他的統(tǒng)計(jì)實(shí)驗(yàn)不可能給這個(gè)問題蓋棺論定。同時(shí)，Mr Rodrik的模型只假設(shè)了單一“可出口”貨物。在他的政策下，所有國家都在本國出售同一種他們之前賣到國外的商品。在更精確的模型下，國外與國內(nèi)的偏好應(yīng)該不同。舉例來說，遠(yuǎn)在3G電話可以使用前，中國國內(nèi)就已經(jīng)制造了世界上最多的第三代移動(dòng)電話。窮國的企業(yè)可以在取悅富國的消費(fèi)者的過程中學(xué)到許多。What about the practice? Subsidies are notoriously prone to error and abuse. Even before the crisis, Mr Rodrik was keen to rehabilitate industrial policy in the eyes of many economists, who doubt governments39。 ability to pick winners but have every faith in their aptitude for favouring corporate friends. In these circles, a cheap currency is often seen as the least disreputable form of industrial policy, because it benefits exporters in general, without favouring any particular industry or firm.那實(shí)踐方面又如何呢？補(bǔ)助金有著臭名昭著的傾向，那就是易于發(fā)放出錯(cuò)和被濫用。甚至在金融危機(jī)前，Mr Rodrik在許多經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家的眼里就是一個(gè)執(zhí)著于整頓產(chǎn)業(yè)政策的人，這些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家懷疑政府是否能在挑選受助者的同時(shí)不濫用這種可以惠及盟友的能力。在這些圈子中，由于廉價(jià)貨幣一般來說會(huì)有利于出口者而對特定產(chǎn)業(yè)和企業(yè)沒有好處，這種政策是最為聲名狼藉。This ingenious economist may also be preparing for a future that is further off than you might think. American policymakers are certainly worried about their country39。s trade deficit. But they are far more concerned about unemployment. Most of their efforts to revive demand will tend to widen the trade gap, at least in the short run. The American government is also more anxious than ever to sell its paper, and whatever they say in public, the central banks of China and other big emerging economies still seem happy to buy. Export fetishism seems fated to endure.這位天才的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家可能是在為一個(gè)你無法想象的未來做著準(zhǔn)備。美國的決策者確實(shí)很擔(dān)心他們國家的貿(mào)易逆差。但失業(yè)率更讓他們操心。至少在短期，他們的大部分拉動(dòng)需求的努力都將會(huì)擴(kuò)大貿(mào)易壁壘。同時(shí)美國政府正前所未有地?zé)崆信瓮軌蚴鄢鏊麄兯^“中國央行和其他新興經(jīng)濟(jì)體依然十分情愿購買”的債券。似乎出口至上主義者命中注定得等等了。注一：關(guān)于進(jìn)口宿命說，可參看Speech by Hon39。ble Thiru Murasoli Maran, Union Commerceamp。IndustryMinister ://. ficci. /mediaroom/speechespresentations/2002/Mar/marchsezmaran. htm注二：經(jīng)常賬戶(Current Account,或譯為“經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目”)，是經(jīng)常發(fā)生的國際經(jīng)濟(jì)交易，是最基本、最重要的賬戶。包括貨物、服務(wù)、收入和經(jīng)常轉(zhuǎn)移四個(gè)項(xiàng)目。經(jīng)常賬戶(即“經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目”)，和資本與金融賬戶相對，指在國際收支平衡表中貿(mào)易和服務(wù)而產(chǎn)生的資金流動(dòng)。這一部分所以被看成是一種更加合理的資金流動(dòng)。國際收支中的經(jīng)常賬戶是指貿(mào)易收支的總和(商品和服務(wù)的出口減去進(jìn)口)，減去生產(chǎn)要素收入(例如利息和股息)，然后減去轉(zhuǎn)移支付(例如外國援助)。經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目順差(盈余)增加了一個(gè)國家相應(yīng)金額的外國資本凈額；經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目逆差(赤字)則恰好相反。貿(mào)易收支是經(jīng)常賬戶下典型的最重要的部分。也就是說貿(mào)易狀況的變化是經(jīng)常賬戶的主要影響因素。然而，對于那些少數(shù)的擁有大量海外資產(chǎn)和負(fù)債的國家，生產(chǎn)要素支付凈額可能作用顯著。經(jīng)常賬戶，資本賬戶，金融賬戶以及官方儲(chǔ)備的變化一起，總和為零構(gòu)成賬戶的定義。這個(gè)總和被稱為國際收支。通常來說，官方儲(chǔ)備的變化非常小經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人雜志雙語閱讀：Dismal science沉悶的科學(xué)Paul Krugman39。s London lectures保羅克魯格曼倫敦演講Dismal science沉悶的科學(xué)(注1)Jun 11th 2009From The Economist print editionThe Nobel laureate speaks on the crisis in the economy and in economics諾貝爾獎(jiǎng)得主就經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)和經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)問題發(fā)表演講THE London School of Economics was once so popular among young American scholars that British students used to joke that LSE stood for “Let39。s See Europe”. A distinguished sightseer, Paul Krugman, returned to the LSE on June 8th to give the annual Lionel Robbins memorial lectures. Mr Krugman, who gave the Robbins lectures 21 years ago, tried to answer two big questions in the course of his three talks. Why did economists not foresee calamity? And how will the world economy climb out of recession?倫敦經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院曾經(jīng)在美國青年學(xué)者中是如此的受歡迎，以至于英國學(xué)生曾笑稱其為歐洲的象征。六月八日，令人尊敬的客人保羅克魯格曼先生，回到倫敦經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院為一年一度的萊昂內(nèi)爾羅賓斯紀(jì)念典禮做演將?？唆敻衤壬诙荒昵暗牧_賓斯紀(jì)念典禮上發(fā)表過演說，在當(dāng)時(shí)的三場演講中，他試圖解說兩大問題，即“為什么經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家不對災(zāi)難進(jìn)行預(yù)測？”和“世界經(jīng)濟(jì)如何走出衰退？”The immediate cause of the crisis, “the mother of all global housing bubbles”, was spotted by many economists. That house prices had risen too far was obvious, even if policymakers had seemed less sure. The surprise was that the bursting of the bubble would be so damaging. “I had no idea it would end so badly,” said Mr Krugman.許多經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為，引發(fā)危機(jī)的的直接原因是“全球房地產(chǎn)泡沫之母”。很明顯，住房價(jià)格已經(jīng)漲得太高了，雖然決策者們對此看上去并不是很肯定。令人吃驚的是泡沫的破滅竟然會(huì)具有如此破壞性。“我不曾想到它會(huì)產(chǎn)生如此糟糕的結(jié)果，”克魯格曼先生說。One big blind spot was the financial system. The mistake was to think “a bank had to look like something Jimmy Stewart could