談公共領(lǐng)域中理性溝通的可能性-資料下載頁
2025-05-28 00:43本頁面
【正文】 不假定我們要追求具有普遍性規(guī)范效力的共識(shí)，或試圖建立一種自由主義式的普遍性價(jià)值體系。所謂\較佳\或\較差\完全交由對(duì)話發(fā)生所在的相關(guān)人群來判定，只要參與對(duì)話者都認(rèn)可某個(gè)論證，那個(gè)論證對(duì)他們而言就是有效的。至于這個(gè)論證是否對(duì)世界上其它地方的人群有效，則暫時(shí)存而不論。因此，類似格雷的\暫定協(xié)議\，較佳論證所接受的也是一種極\在地化\（loca[來源:論文天下論文網(wǎng) ]論文天下 ）的判準(zhǔn)?！ ∫虼?，筆者認(rèn)為公共領(lǐng)域的產(chǎn)生需要四個(gè)條件：存在共同關(guān)心的議題、愿意了解他人的想法、以語言進(jìn)行互動(dòng)、接受較佳論證的效力。如果這四個(gè)條件存在，公共領(lǐng)域的成員就可以進(jìn)行有意義的溝通。這種溝通或許不像哈伯瑪斯等人所期待的那樣，是\理想言說情境\下的\理性溝通\；但是它基本上還是理性的。它的有限理性雖然在理論上不特別吸引人，但是在實(shí)踐上卻可以適用于更多的對(duì)談情境。我們知道這種理性溝通未必能夠產(chǎn)生共識(shí)，不過\沒有共識(shí)\正是人類多元性所預(yù)示的可能結(jié)果之一。在\時(shí)有共識(shí)、時(shí)無共識(shí)\的生命狀態(tài)里，我們或許更能體會(huì)人類的潛能與限制?！?Seyla Benhabib 認(rèn)為西方的公共領(lǐng)域可以分成三種基本類型：\競(jìng)技式的公共空間\（agonistic model）、：\法律式的公共空間\（legalistic model）、\對(duì)談式的公共空間\（discursive model），三者分別以鄂蘭、艾克曼（Bruce Ackerman）、與哈伯瑪斯為代表。但是如同下文所示，筆者認(rèn)為鄂蘭的理論并不只強(qiáng)調(diào)競(jìng)技的層面，事實(shí)上也有溝通合作與對(duì)談。參見 Seyla Benhabib, \Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and J252。rgen Habermas,\ in Craig Calhoun ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 7398. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 2631. Ibid., pp. 3233. Ibid., pp. 179180. 參見 Peter Fuss, \Hannah Arendt\39。s Conception of Political Community,\ in Melvyn ed., Hannah Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World (New York: St. Martin\39。s Press, 1979), pp. 172173. Bhikhu Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the Search for a New Political Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 177. The Human Condition, p. 180. Hannah Arendt, \Philosophy and Politics,\ Social Research 57: 1 (Spring, 1990), pp. 78. Ibid., p. 80. 詳見J252。rgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. by Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989). J252。rgen Habermas, \Hannah Arendt\39。s Communications Concept of Power,\ Social Research 44:1 (Spring, 1977), . J252。rgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. by Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 6566. 另外，哈伯瑪斯也強(qiáng)調(diào)這么修正之后，人們的需要與利益都可以成為道德判斷過程的要素，不會(huì)因\純粹動(dòng)機(jī)\的要求而被漠視。Ibid., pp. 6668. Ibid., pp. 8298. Ibid., pp. 88. 另見Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. by Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 5658. Habermas, Justification and Application, p. 59. Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 169172. Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), pp. 714, 7980. John Gray, \Where Pluralists and Liberals Part Company,\ in Maria Baghramian and Attracta Ingram eds., Pluralism: the Philosophy and Politics of Diversity (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 8788. See also John Gray, Enlightenment\39。s Wake: Politics and Culture in the Close of the Modern Age (London: Routledge, 1995). George Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism (London: Continuum, 2002), pp. 23, 4954. Berlin, The Crooked Timber, p. 11. Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism, pp. 4546. Berlin, The Crooked Timber, pp. 14, 18, 80. Gray, \Where Pluralists and Liberals Part Company,\ pp. 8687, 91, 93, 101. 對(duì)于Gray觀點(diǎn)的反駁，可參見Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism, pp. 1112. Berlin, The Crooked Timber, pp. 77789 /
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