【正文】 ad of “I find you guilty” the jury may say “You did it”. The clearest example is, perhaps, “Thank you”. Apparently it looks like an imperative, without a subject, however, it is a performative. There is no need to do any other things, because by uttering the words, you have expressed your gratitude to the hearer, though people sometimes say jokes, “You can’t just thank me with words.”Moreover, even the most typical constative verb state may be used to do things, though it is used to describe things. When speaking “I state that I’m alone responsible”, the speaker has made a statement and undertaken the responsibility. In other words, the distinction between performatives and constatives seems cannot be maintained. All sentences can be used to do things. A Theory of the Illocutionary ActAustin made a fresh start on the problem and considered it from the ground up again in the latter part of How to Do Things with Words, that is to say, in what sense to say something is to do something. Austin thought that there are three senses in which saying something may be understood as doing something. The first sense is an ordinary one. That is, we move our vocal organs and produce a number of sounds, organized in a certain way and with a certain meaning when we speak. In this sense, when somebody says “Hello!” We can ask a question like “What did he do?” instead of “What did he say?” And the answer could be that he produced a sound, word or sentence“Hello!” The act performed in this sense is called a locutionary act. However, within this act Austin suggests that there is another act. “In performing a locutionary act we shall also be performing such an act as: asking or answering a question , giving some information or an assurance or a warning, announcing a verdict or an intention, pronouncing sentence, making an appointment or an appeal or a criticism, making an identification or giving a description, and the numerous like” (Austin, 1962: 9899). For example, to the question “What did he do?” when the person concerned said “Hello!”, we could perfectly well say “He offered a greeting.” In other words, we not only produce some units of language with certain meanings, but also make clear our purpose in producing them, the way we intend them to be understood, or they also have certain forces as Austin prefers to say when we speak. In the example of “Hello!”, it ought to have been taken as a greeting or we can say it has the force of a greeting. This is the second sense in which to say something is to do something, and the act performed is known as an illocutionary act. Austin acknowledges that when the latter is used in a broad sense “force” can be looked at as part of “meaning”. So we are thinking in the example, we can also say “He meant it as a greeting”. In the retort “What do you mean?”, the word mean is also used in the broad sense. However Austin considers it is better to distinguish meaning from force, with the former used in a narrow sense, or what we called the more constant, inherent side of meaning. In the third sense it is to say something can mean to do something concerns the consequential effects of a locution upon the hearer. The speaker may change the opinion of the hearer on something, or mislead him, or induce him to do something, or surprise him, etc by telling somebody something whether or not they are intended by the speaker. These effects can be regarded as part of the act that the speaker has performed. This act that is performed through, by way of, a locutionary act, is called a perlocutionary act.For example, when the speaker says “Hello!” to someone, he has made it clear that he wants to keep friendly relations with the hearer. On the speaker’s side, the friendship will definitely have effects on the hearer. The effect may be negligible when the two interlocutors are on normal terms. But a simple “Hello!” from one side may bring about great changes in their friendship if there were any tensions between them. The other may accept his show of friendship, and be friends with him again. In this situation, we can say “He has made peace with his friend” in response to the question “What did he do?” when the person concerned said “Hello!”. On the other hand, the hearer may take his friendliness as an instance of hypocrisyif he has some prejudice against the speaker, and.Finally, the speaker’s greeting may lead their relationship from bad to worse. Though the speaker had not originally intended the effect, which is still a perlocutionary act performed by him. Another difference between the illocutionary act and perlocutionary act is brought up, that is to say, one is related to the speaker’s intention and the other not. Then in this general theory, which applies to all sentences, the original performatives are only a special type in which the illocutionary force is made explicit by the performatives verb. Searle’s speech act theory Searle’s classification of illocutionary act and indirect speech act theory based on speech act theory not only enriched speech act theory, but provided a strong basis for explaining the inconsistent phenomenon between language form and function. Five basic illocutionary actsWhen Searle studied speech act, he made a very important work, which is for language behavior classification, give theoretical explanation to different types or categories of the speech act. Searle said that one of the most obvious problems in any language philosophy is: how many kinds of ways to use language? (Searle, 1969:14) Through classifying speech act, Searle concluded that the use of language is neither infinite nor unqualified. Based on the purpose of speech act, language use can be classified into five kinds. Through the words making some kind of truth (declaratives), telling people what the things are like (representatives), clarifying one’s own attitude to something (expressives), designing somebody else to do something (directives) and promising to do something (missives). Declaratatives that once be implemented, will bring immediate change to the world. In general, declaratatives regard some heavy and plicated, beyond language institutions and the terms as the prerequisite. Through declaratatives, people changed the w