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A Case Study of Zhejiang Listed Companies Sun Jingshui (Economic College , Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou, Zhejiang 310015) Abstract: It is of profound theoretic and practical significance to carry out in the listed panies the institution of independent directors as an important practice to improve corporate governance in China’s panies. Based on the cases in Zhejiang province, this paper makes a positive study on the following relationships: independent directors ratio and pany performance, independent directors’ salaries and pany performance, independent directors ratio and stock equity structure, independent directors ratio and the status of two positions, ., chairman of the board of directors and general manager. The research displays that independent directors ratio and the largest shareholder’s share proportion are obviously negatively correlated。 that the status of two positions is not the important factor to affect pany performance。 that pany performance and independent directors ratio are of weakly positive correlation。 and pany performance and independent directors’ salaries are of the weaker quadric curve in the inverted Ushape. Although those relationships are not very strikingly significant, this paper provides empirical support for the introduction of the institution of independent directors into the listed panies in china and necessary reference 中國(guó)最龐大的下載資料庫(kù) (整理 . 版權(quán)歸原作者所有 如果您不是在 網(wǎng)站下載此資料的 ,不要隨意相信 .請(qǐng)?jiān)L問(wèn) 3722, 加入 ) DOC或 PPT格式 我國(guó)上市公司獨(dú)立董事制度與公司績(jī)效的實(shí)證分析 20 advice for perfecting it. Key Words: Listed Companies Independent Directors Firm Performance Salaries 通訊地址 : 浙江省杭州市教工路 149號(hào)浙江工商大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院 孫敬水 郵政編碼 : 310015 電 話: 057188088408(宅); 057185566160(小靈通) Em