中國農(nóng)業(yè)產(chǎn)業(yè)政策及未來發(fā)展趨勢-資料下載頁
2025-08-12 20:04本頁面
【導(dǎo)讀】均分配，人均耕地很少，土地細(xì)碎化；農(nóng)民組織化程度較低，以單家獨(dú)戶生產(chǎn)為。農(nóng)業(yè)的生產(chǎn)主要以自給和半自給為主，純。粹商業(yè)化生產(chǎn)的較少；村問題，其主要針對的是農(nóng)業(yè)問題。糧食生產(chǎn)積極性下降和糧食種植面積的縮減。小規(guī)模農(nóng)戶和大規(guī)模消費(fèi)之間的矛盾：生產(chǎn)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)和產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量監(jiān)督。和其它產(chǎn)業(yè)相比是否具有競爭力。水土流失，過度開墾，環(huán)境污染，自然災(zāi)害和全球氣候變化等。農(nóng)業(yè)政策是為了實(shí)現(xiàn)一定社會、經(jīng)濟(jì)及農(nóng)業(yè)發(fā)。系列措施和行動的總稱。滿足國民對農(nóng)產(chǎn)品的需求。實(shí)際收入增長和生活水平的改善。農(nóng)產(chǎn)品價(jià)格政策：支持價(jià)格、保護(hù)價(jià)。戰(zhàn)略儲備和糧食安全。致消費(fèi)者難以承受，從而增加貧困人口?！包S箱”政策---容易引起農(nóng)產(chǎn)品貿(mào)易扭曲的政策。發(fā)展中國家不超過10%，無須削減。不需承擔(dān)削減義務(wù)。從“黃箱”政策轉(zhuǎn)向“綠箱”政策，具體
【正文】 s B’s dominant strategy and makes its decision accordingly The Nash Equilibrium Revisited ? A dominant strategy is stable, but in many games one or more party does not have a dominant strategy ? A more general equilibrium concept is the Nash Equilibrium introduced in Chapter 12 ?A set of strategies (or actions) such that each player is doing the best it can given the actions of its opponents The Nash Equilibrium Revisited ? None of the players have incentive to deviate from its Nash strategy, therefore it is stable ?In the Cournot model, each firm sets its own price assuming the other firm’s outputs are fixed. Cournot equilibrium is a Nash Equilibrium. The Nash Equilibrium Revisited ? Dominant Strategy ?―I’m doing the best I can no matter what you do. You’re doing the best you can no matter what I do.‖ ? Nash Equilibrium ?―I’m doing the best I can given what you are doing. You’re doing the best you can given what I am doing.‖ ? Dominant strategy is a special case of Nash equilibrium The Nash Equilibrium Revisited ? Two cereal panies face a market in which two new types of cereal can be successfully introduced, provided each type is introduced by only one firm ? Product Choice Problem ? Market for one producer of crispy cereal ? Market for one producer of sweet cereal ? Each firm only has the resources to introduce one cereal ? Noncooperative Product Choice Problem Crispy Sweet Crispy Sweet Firm 2 5, 5 10, 10 5, 5 10, 10 Product Choice Problem Firm 1 Crispy Sweet Crispy Sweet Firm 2 5, 5 10, 10 5, 5 10, 10 ? If Firm 1 hears Firm 2 is introducing a new sweet cereal, its best action is to make crispy ? Bottom left corner is Nash equilibrium ? What is other Nash Equilibrium? Beach Location Game ? Scenario ?Two petitors, Y and C, selling soft drinks ?Beach is 200 yards long ?Sunbathers are spread evenly along the beach ?Price Y = Price C ?Customer will buy from the closest vendor Beach Location Game ? Where will the petitors locate (., where is the Nash equilibrium)? ? Will want to all locate in center of beach ?Similar to groups of gas stations, car dealerships, etc. Ocean 0 B Beach A 200 yards C The Nash Equilibrium Revisited ? Maximin Strategies Scenario ?Two firms pete selling file encryption software ?They both use the same encryption standard (files encrypted by one software can be read by the other advantage to consumers) ?Firm 1 has a much larger market share than Firm 2 ?Both are considering investing in a new encryption standard Maximin Strategy Firm 1 Don’t invest Invest Firm 2 0, 0 10, 10 20, 10 100, 0 Don’t invest Invest
醫(yī)療健康相關(guān)推薦
鄂ICP備17016276號-1